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In this research project, I aim to re-think about what it entails to make sense of 
ourselves. To this aim, I reconceptualise both reflexivity and experience – 
including the notions of subjectivity that they imply. This is a conceptual inquiry 
where I read the concepts through different traditions to arrive at renewed 
understandings of them. The traditions that I use are poststructuralism, 
posthumanism and, to a lesser extent, psychoanalysis in a relational strand. 
Methodologically, I consider that each reconceptualisation opens new 
experiential possibilities and new worlds. Coherently with that, I do not think of 
my theoretical work as divorced from my work as a psychotherapist and my 
personal life. Hence, I bring them to the text as both influential forces for my 
conceptual articulations and as transformed by my reconceptualisations.  
I argue that we are never reflexive about ourselves alone; instead, we do it as 
part of the relational, cultural and material milieu that is shaping us at that 
moment. Following from that, the possibility of reflexively questioning our 
assumptions is not given by a simple decision of doing so but by yielding to 
foreign milieus or fields that can make our assumptions shift and so allow us 
to question what we were previously taking for granted. Furthermore, in my 
conceptualisation of reflexivity, I contend that when we are reflexive about 
ourselves, we do not capture how we feel/think as if it was something already 
there; instead, I put forward that what we do when we are reflexive about 
ourselves is to relate to ourselves in particular ways that produce our reality 
(including ourselves). I posit that we are constantly reflexively relating to 
ourselves in ways that go well beyond our awareness and intentions and that 
these ways of relating are not performed by us as isolated individuals but as 
part of a greater configuration that includes cultural and material forces. I invite 
the meta-reflexive practice of wondering about how we are relating to 
ourselves and what that is producing as a useful way to bring the attention to 




Diffraction has emerged as a concept opposed to reflexivity inasmuch as 
reflexivity is seen as trying to represent what ‘is’ there or who we ‘are’, thus, 
attempting to mirror reality. Instead, diffraction argues that we cannot 
represent; there is not a mirroring but an interference that transforms us. In 
contrast, I argue that we never find just reflexivity or just diffraction; for 
example, when we try to mirror ourselves, this very mirroring has already some 
degree of difference introduced. My conceptualisation of reflexivity is already 
a diffracted reflexivity. Furthermore, I argue that it is beneficial to be meta-
reflexive about diffractive practices because, unavoidably, we will make sense 
in ways that are against what we explicitly claim. Diffraction emphasises 
processes of transformation and becoming but, in its radical rejection of 
reflexivity, reproduces the categorical and realist reasoning that it rejects. 
Throughout the thesis, I emphasise the need to think about what the different 
conceptualisations do rather than judging them as truer or better as if there 
was just one objective world. Each conceptualisation emerges from a 
particular context and produces a different world. Following from that, I think 
about experience through three traditions – existential phenomenology, 
poststructuralism and posthumanism – looking to see where they take me. 
Then, I articulate a reconceptualisation of subjective experience using my 
explorations. I think about experience as an impersonal affective force that 
moves us. This force does not belong to an individual but is produced in a 
greater relational, material and cultural context. We do not symbolise ‘our’ 
experience but an experience of the whole of the situation that passes through 
us and shapes us as subjectivities when we process it. We work-through this 
experience not solely cognitively but by our bodily sense; this does not mean, 
though, that we should just ‘follow’ our experience, indeed, we also need to be 
critical of it because it can lead us to reproduce social and relational dynamics 
that have detrimental consequences.  
In conclusion, when we make sense of ourselves we produce ourselves, not 




experience, relationships, cultural frames of understanding and material 
arrangements, all of them with their own force. The way in which we make 
sense and thus our subjectivity is continuously produced from this greater 







This is a research project aims to reconceptualise reflexivity and experience 
to think anew about making sense of ourselves. Methodologically, I think 
through different traditions to diffract my concepts of interest, arriving at – 
necessarily temporary – renewed articulations. The traditions that I mostly use 
are poststructuralism, posthumanism and to a lesser extent, psychoanalysis in 
a relational strand. 
The new conceptualisations that I put forward are not only theoretically – 
abstractly – important, as if theory could be divorced from life. Instead, these 
new conceptualisations are important because they produce new worlds: 
different ways of becoming a subject, different ways of articulating affective 
experience, different questions, different tools, different problems, and so on. 
In coherence with that, at different points throughout this research, I bring to 
the page how these reconceptualisations are influenced by my experiences – 
including my experience as a psychotherapist – and how these 
reconceptualisations produce me and my experience differently. 
Based on a relational perspective, we do not pre-exist our relating but are 
produced through relating – not only in interpersonal terms but in material-
discursive ones. In coherence with this, my conceptualisation of reflexivity 
shifts the understanding of it as a discrete activity performed by a bounded 
subjectivity that captures how things ‘are’ to understand it as an ever-present 
way of relating to ourselves that is not performed by an already bounded 
subject but produces a particular kind of subjectivity and a certain world.  
With this relational, material-discursive and performative understanding of 
reflexivity, I contend that the possibility of questioning our assumptions is not 
given by an individual decision but requires yielding to the foreignness of 
unknown fields that might unwittingly shift our assumptions and hence we are 
able to see what we were previously taking for granted. Furthermore, I 
emphasise the need to develop a meta-reflexivity that asks about the ways of 




Originally, my conceptualisation of reflexivity is made with, not against, 
diffraction. I contend that we never find pure reflection or pure diffraction but 
different shades of them, as in a diffraction pattern. Moreover, I propose that 
when we hold diffraction as the superior term, we unavoidably betray our best 
intentions and reproduce the representationalism that we were so keen to 
avoid. I further elaborate the benefits of a diffracted reflexivity and of using 
meta-reflexivity with diffraction.  
Throughout the thesis, I argue to regard different concepts and theories as 
more or less useful for particular contexts because of how they produce these 
very contexts. I value the theories in their productions rather than in their truth-
value because there is not a world to discover but a production of worlds 
through practices of knowing. In coherence with this, I read the concept of 
experience through the lenses of existential phenomenology, 
poststructuralism and posthumanism. I let myself be taken by each of these 
traditions, opening up to what they produce. I, intra-actively with the three 
traditions – and my psychoanalytic background – arrive at an articulation of the 
concept of experience. I think of experience as an impersonal affect with its 
own force to produce us as subjectivities. This experience can be elaborated 
from the felt sense rather than from our cognition to enable a movement in our 
experience and in our ways of subjectivation. Finally, I assert that we do need 
to critically consider where this experience/affect is taking us because it can 
lead to reproduce dynamics that can be detrimental.  
To conclude, in this thesis I grapple with reflexivity and experience to think 
differently about the practices of making sense of ourselves. In very broad 
terms, I would say that I have arrived at the following ideas: 1. In making sense 
of ourselves we are also producing ourselves. 2. We do not make sense 
intentionally and separately from our relational, affective, and material-
discursive engagements. Strictly, it is not that ‘we’ make sense of ‘ourselves’, 
but a greater intra-active assemblage makes sense and produces ourselves 




ways of making sense and producing ourselves and the world are better or 
truer. 4. There is not a way to control the way in which we make sense, rather 
we ‘find ourselves’ making sense. And 5. Given the previous points, the only 
thing we can do is to be curious about how we are relating to ourselves when 
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A point of departure  
I have a memory – or was it a dream? – from my early childhood. I was 
watching a cartoon in which there were two animals in a forest. One 
of them was keenly seeking something, the other one was just looking at him. 
At some point, the observer asked: ‘what are you looking for?’ The seeker 
answered: ‘I do not know, I will know when I find it.’  
Where could I find a point of departure for this research? Should I know from 
the start what I am looking for? Even when stating ‘I am inquiring into the notion 
of making sense of ourselves´ I always find myself already in the 
middle (Deleuze & Parnet, 2007). When did I decide that making sense of 
ourselves will be my topic? How? It was not a rational and straightforward 
decision; at some moment, I just knew that this was my interest. When the ‘I’ 
is uttered, something of me is already there, already intermingled, already non-
personal. The ‘I’ arrives late.  
I could play to articulate a narrative about how my work as a psychotherapist 
motivated my inquiry about making sense of ourselves. I work with making 
sense, with the making sense of my clients, with the making sense of myself, 
with the use of myself for psychotherapeutic purposes; hence, it seems to 
follow that I would be interested in the processes of making sense. However, 
it feels forced to me to state that my research steams from my work as a 
psychotherapist. It would maybe be more reassuring to think that I knew all 
along what I was looking for in my inquiry in relation to my work but the truth is 
that I did not. To be clear, for sure, my work has to do with my inquiry, both of 
them move and motivate each other; however, my profession as a 
psychotherapist does not work as a definite foundation for my inquiry, nor the 
other way around. Instead, they become together and along a bunch of other 
things as my affective relationships, the texts that I read, the food that I eat, 





I do not find a point of departure in a research question either; when 
I enunciate it, it is already born with my assumptions. Should I start with my 
assumptions, then? Are they the foundations in which my argument is 
elaborated? I do not think that my assumptions are an isolated virgin 
foundation; instead, they re-create themselves in my activities. Therefore, my 
assumptions are not behind my theories and my activities: they are 
fundamentally intermingled with them. Where should I start, then? Only a 
paradox can satisfy me: I cannot help starting in the middle. (Deleuze & Parnet, 
2007) 
Richardson (1994) reflects about how we have been taught to know in advance 
and then just write up, but writing as a method of inquiry embraces that in the 
very process of writing things get created and re-created. In contrast, 
traditionally: 
The doer exists before the deed, so the researcher can (and must for 
IRBs) write a research proposal that outlines the doing before she 
begins. The assumption is that there is actually a beginning, an origin, 
that she is not always already becoming in entanglement. (Lather & 
St. Pierre, 2013, p. 630) 
A research proposal would assume that I know from the beginning so that 
would not allow much novelty and movement. I write this introduction, which 
outlines the full thesis, after having written at least a first draft of all my chapters 
and after deciding to not include some of them. The order and the coherence 
of the whole came at ‘the end’. In a way, I look back at what I have done and I 
play with ways of knitting them together in a way that also makes each part 
become differently.  
But an introduction, even if not a point of departure, serves a purpose, it is 
there for a reason, it works to produce something. An introduction opens 
something, starts something: introduces. I introduce my work to you through 
the introduction. We start making a connection; maybe not our first connection, 
but a new connection. The connection is not with me, it is with my writing. I 




escapes me, goes beyond me. I do not have this writing in me, I do not own it 
as a possession that I have. As Bion (1970) argues from psychoanalysis, 
knowledge and thoughts are not something that we possess inside of us but 
something larger with a life of its own. This writing stretched me to be written, 
this writing made me differently. What would this writing do to you – if anything? 
I want my writing to do things but the things that my writing will end up doing 
are not mine to say. I introduce you to my writing by telling you that I do not 
possess it.  
My research frame  
So, let’s do this. Let’s ‘start’. I will take off by telling you about how I am framing 
my research. My research question could be: How do we make sense of 
ourselves? How are we reflexive about our experience? Nonetheless, there is 
no straightforward way to answer this question. Just as I announce it several 
others begin to emerge: What do I mean by experience? What is to make 
sense? What is reflexivity? What is a self? More crucially, the question about 
how we make sense of our experience assumes that we as subjects are in 
charge of the process of making sense. In that way, the question already puts 
forward a dualism between subject and experience, placing the subject in the 
active role. We could also wonder: How experience makes sense of us? How 
experience and sense-making intra-act1(Barad, 2007)? Furthermore, the 
question about how we make sense of ourselves takes for granted what 
making sense is, we are just asking how we do it. Maybe a better question 
would be: what is happening when we make sense – or fail to make sense – 
of ourselves? This question does a better job of not assuming what it is to 
																																																						
1 Intra-action is a neologism introduced by Karen Barad (2003,2007) to differentiate it from 
interaction. Interaction points at two units relating with each other whereas intra-action points 
at how the relationship is ontologically prior. It is ‘intra’ because there is not an outside of the 
units but a relating as the space where the differentiations emerge: difference within. I define 
this concept in more detail in chapter 4 ‘Reflexivities as affective ways of relating that produce’ 
in the section ‘Reflexivities as apparatuses.’ 
The question that I posited would be pointing at how neither experience nor sense-making are 
units in themselves but they are constantly taking shape through intra-acting – that is, not 




make sense. But this new question still assumes a subject in charge of the 
making sense, although the way in which it is formulated might invite this 
assumption to be challenged.   
The question about how we make sense, any question really, already implies 
a particular way of organising and conceptualising so it works in a way that 
closes my inquiry more than I need. Maybe I do not have a question – not an 
overarching one, at least. Instead, I am interested in opening up concepts, in 
troubling them. Particularly, I think that being reflexive about our experience – 
which is a way of making sense of ourselves – sets up a humanistic, cognitive, 
masterful and dualistic understanding of the process of making sense of 
ourselves. That is, a bounded human purposefully and cognitively is reflexive 
of their experience as if experience was something there to be made sense 
of.2 I want to think about this differently, I want to propose an alternative 
conceptualisation of making sense of ourselves. To this aim, I will work to 
reconceptualise both reflexivity and experience. I could have chosen other 
concepts as my main targets. For example: making sense, self, subjectivity, 
symbolisation could have all been fruitful candidates and, to a great extent, 
these concepts are part of my reconceptualisations of reflexivity and 
experience. Retrospectively, I think that I chose reflexivity and experience 
because of the work that has been done with them in poststructural and 
posthumanist philosophies and their importance for psychotherapeutic  theory 
and practice and qualitative inquiry. The expression being reflexive about our 
experience is almost a commonplace in qualitative inquiry and psychotherapy 
and I attempt with this work to arrive to a renewed understanding of it.   
My work with reconceptualisations already involves particular ways of 
conceptualising; indeed, to frame my research as opening up concepts to 
reconceptualise them implies, for example, that I think of the concepts as 
things to be explored and not, say, to be discovered. This framing works well 
																																																						
2 I think that both phrases ‘making sense of ourselves’ and ‘being reflexive about our 
experience’ and their variations enact this dichotomy between an active subject making sense 




to provide me more space for my inquiry, to not set up too tightly what I am 
going to do.  
What will I do with these concepts? I will try to open them up, to play with them, 
to move them, to reconceptualise them, to diffract3 (Barad, 2007) them through 
different theories. The theories that I will use are poststructuralism4, mainly 
through Foucault, Derrida and Butler; posthumanism5 fundamentally through 
Barad and Deleuze and Guattari; and, to a lesser extent, psychoanalysis in a 
relational strand6 through authors like Winnicott and Bion7. 
I am not the master in this game; through playing with these concepts they 
also play with me, they also reconceptualise and re-make me. I take a concept, 
I take an author, I take a theory, and I explore where they take me. In the intra-
action of the theories and myself, we both get constantly transformed, our 
boundaries shifting. It is not an interaction where the theories are over there 
																																																						
3 Diffraction is a physical phenomenon where a wave finds a gap or an obstacle and gets 
bended. In the double-slit experiment, two waves get diffracted and then they interfere and 
superpose with each other resulting in a diffraction pattern in which there are no absolutes or 
discrete groupings but a pattern that cannot be pinned down in parts. For example, light waves 
diffracted with the double-slit experiment produce a diffraction pattern that has light in the 
shadows and shadows in the dark. Barad (2007) draws on Haraway (1997) to use diffraction 
to trouble the reliance on the optical metaphor of reflection that wants to represent (to mirror) 
how things are, while diffraction is about the difference that is produced (the diffraction 
pattern). To diffract the concepts refers not to take them as representations of something out 
there, but to see what they produce, where they can take us. When I diffract a concept through 
different theories, I read them with these other theories to see what it is produced that will be 
different from what I started with. I define diffraction in detail in chapter 5 ‘What if reflexivity 
and diffraction intra-act?’ In the sections ‘Diffraction by Haraway’ and ‘Diffraction by Barad’ 
4 By poststructuralism, drawing on Harcourt (2007), I am referring to the theories that reject 
the phenomenological notion that meaning is a subjective enterprise. Instead of this, they both 
draw on and trouble the structuralist understanding that meaning is derived from wider social 
structures that the subject unconsciously enacts. They are different from structuralism in that 
they emphasise the spaces of ambiguity and the constant possibility of subversion of the 
norms. I elaborate more on this theory especially in chapter 3 ‘Questioning our assumptions 
through yielding to foreignness’ and in chapter 8 ‘Re-thinking about subjective experience’, 
specifically in the section ‘Experience from poststructuralism.’ 
5 By posthumanism, I am referring to the theories that trouble the boundedness of the human 
not only in discursive terms but also in material terms. I thematise the term posthumanism in 
chapter 8 ‘Re-thinking about subjective experience’, especially in the section ‘Experience from 
posthumanism.’  
6 When I refer to a relational strand in psychoanalysis, I am speaking, broadly, of theories that 
think of the subject as always part of a relational matrix.  
7 This is far from being an exhaustive list of the theories that I use. For example, I also make 
use of existential phenomenology and Bourdieu’s theory. Nonetheless, I have included the 




and I am over here, both of us well defined. More than understanding them, 
we become together. This is a theoretical thesis and I use the theories to take 
me to places, to be my springboard, to move me, to shake me, to challenge 
me. 
And my research did take me to places, it led me to draw substantively less 
from what I was expecting on psychoanalysis and other philosophical strands 
as existential phenomenology. The research proposal for being admitted in 
this PhD was on reconceptualising symbolisation mainly through relational 
psychoanalysis and existential phenomenology. However, the fundamentally 
psychotherapeutic question about what entails to symbolise our experience in 
the warmth of affective relationships shifted to the questions about how making 
sense of ourselves is not only enabled relationally with other people but also 
in a social, material and cultural milieu that is producing ourselves as 
subjectivities. The theories that captured my attention – the texts that draw me 
to read them – were not the ones that I had originally in mind; I feel that I was 
taken and I have worked in making something out of these surprising 
encounters.  
This emphasis on how the conceptualisations do things, how they take me to 
places, how they produce me differently, how they articulate different worlds, 
places the writing and the conceptualisations as part of the world, becoming 
with it. Not only does my conceptualising produce me differently and articulate 
a different world but conceptualising is not apart from my material-discursive8 
(Barad, 2003, 2007) involvement in the world. That is, the conceptualisations 
that I am able to produce are not only the product of my reading, but of my 
political engagements, affective relationships, health, institutional practices, 
																																																						
8 According to Barad (2003, 2007) the material and the discursive are always already 
entangled, that is why it is material-discursive. It is not that the discursive has an impact on 
the material or is supported by it but that the discursive is always already material and the 
other way around. Matter is not passive but always in process of becoming; this becoming is 
not separated from discursive practices. Discursive practices are always a material process of 
reconfiguring the world. Material-discursive practices do not assume a separation between 




and so on. With my conceptualising produced by, and producing, different 
worlds, including myself, this theoretical thesis will bring myself, my situations, 
to the paper and thus to view.  
Deleuze (1995) calls to not read/write as a representation of something else, 
as if a book, say, had an especial value; instead, he proposes to read/write as 
if a book is part of the world and connects with other things; it is possible 
because of other things and produces things. “Writing is one flow among 
others, with no special place in relation to the others, that comes into relations 
of current, countercurrent, and eddy with other flows-flows of shit, sperm, 
words, action, eroticism, money, politics, and so on.” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 8) 
My writing is made in the middle of things and you read it in the middle of 
things. In these years my writing moved with my life, it curved with the 
intensities of my relationships, it transformed my engagements, it was shaken 
by the unexpected. And I imagine you reading this as another thing in your life, 
connecting with all that is around, producing new things through these 
connections. I am curious to know where you are, reader; where you have 
taken my writing, how my writing will become differently connecting with you 
and all of what is producing you at this moment.  
Overview of the thesis  
The thesis is organised in relation to the concepts that I am exploring: 
reflexivity and experience. As I said, I am framing this research as aiming to 
think differently about being reflexive about our experience – which is a way of 
making sense of ourselves – trough reconceptualising reflexivity and 
experience. The thesis has eight chapters. The first is what you are reading 
now, the introduction. The second one is the methodology chapter. Following 
that, the next four chapters (chapter number three, four, five, and six) are about 
reflexivity. The seventh chapter is on the reconceptualisation of experience.  
Finally, chapter eight is the overall conclusions chapter.  
In the methodology chapter (number two), I explore my ethico-onto-




reconceptualising. I set up a diffractive way of relating to the concepts and 
theories and I propose to use  the authors in the Winnicottian (1971) sense, 
that is, precisely, the contrary to an instrumental use; it is a way of relating to 
them acknowledging their otherness, appreciating that I cannot grasp them as 
if I could totally manage them. I say that my methodology is conceptualising 
for becoming differently. Subsequently, in the next four chapters (number 
three, four, five, and six) about reflexivity, I question traditional understandings 
of the concept that situate it as an individual and intentional activity trying to 
capture and represent what is already there. Specifically, in chapter three: 
Questioning our assumptions through yielding to foreignness, I articulate that 
being reflexive, in the sense of questioning our assumptions, is enabled by 
yielding to foreignness. Drawing on Foucault (1990) and Butler (2005), how 
we are reflexive about ourselves is socially given and so I bring Bourdieu 
(1977, 1993) to propose that we need to yield to the foreignness of different 
social fields to be able to reflexively question our assumptions. In chapter four: 
Reflexivities as affective ways of relating that produce, using Barad (2007), I 
propose a conceptualisation of reflexivity as ways of relating to ourselves that 
produce our subjectivity and the world in that movement. Through this 
proposition, I develop a relational conceptualisation of reflexivity that produces 
its own contexts. I offer a meta-reflexivity that interrogates in which ways we 
are relating and what is that producing. In the final two chapters about 
reflexivity, I play with the concepts of reflexivity and diffraction. Specifically, in 
chapter five: What if reflexivity and diffraction intra-act? I show how these 
concepts are not as differentiated as they are portrayed in the literature and I 
argue for the necessity of troubling the conceptualisations that situate one term 
as the superior one. In chapter six: Betraying our best intentions: using meta-
reflexivity with diffraction, I argue how it is inevitable that we betray our best 
intentions and slip into what we are outwardly rejecting. I emphasise the 
relevance of assuming this vulnerability and through that think about how the 
different practices and concepts (reflexivity and diffraction) can diffract each 




Re-thinking subjective experience. I develop the concept of experience 
through different traditions: existential-phenomenology, poststructuralism and 
posthumanism to see how it gets articulated and what these 
conceptualisations produce – what they are good for. I finish by articulating a 
conceptualisation of experience that makes novel use of the three traditions 
and my psychoanalytic background. The last chapter (number eight), 
unsurprisingly, is the conclusions chapter, where I attempt to articulate what 
my research does.  
I would like to notice that throughout the thesis I am using concepts that might 
need defining for clarification. Since the beginning of the thesis, I have 
attempted to include a footnote with a definition the first time that a concept 
that I regard as needing further definition is mentioned.  
What I kick against and what I contribute  
Throughout this thesis, I am pushing against boundedness, that is, against the 
notion that humans are individuals with set boundaries. In this notion, humans 
are influenced by, and influence, other people, society, knowledge and 
material conditions, but these influencing processes are thought as between 
bounded units, as if we were coming into relation to other external factors. 
Instead, drawing on Barad (2007), in this thesis, humans are produced by, and 
produce, material-discursive practices; the boundaries are not set but always 
in the process of being formed. I am also pushing against masterfulness, that 
is, against the notion that we can intentionally and cognitively control and 
decide to make sense in particular ways. In contrast, I put forward how we 
always find ourselves making sense in particular ways precisely because we 
are always part of a greater arrangement and not a bounded individual that 
can account for themselves.  
I put forward that in making sense of ourselves, we produce ourselves not from 
a mastery position but as part of something wider that we are becoming with 
and we cannot control or hold in our minds. In that sense, I propose an ethics 




produce us differently, an adventure of finding ourselves becoming as we were 
not expecting. This also entails the need to meta-reflexively9 considering how 
we are relating to ourselves and the world assuming that we are always liable 
to betray our best intentions and purposes.  
Crucially, in coherence with a relational and performative onto-epistemology10, 
I am proposing to relate to the concepts and theories looking to see what they 
do, what they produce, what they enable, rather than relating to them judging 
their accuracy – even though, this proposition, paradoxically, considers the 
realist way of relating as enabling and useful in some contexts because of what 
it produces. I strongly believe that this emphasis in the productions can help 
to enable more openness to diversity and to become otherwise in the 
academy, in our professional lives and life in general.  
As well as drawing from different fields my research contributes to different 
fields. The field of psychotherapy is one of these. The reconceptualisations of 
reflexivity and experience speak to psychotherapy, a profession that 
constantly requires us to both use ourselves reflexively as psychotherapists 
and facilitate a more enabling manner for the clients to reflexively relate to 
themselves. Furthermore, these reconceptualisations ask for re-workings in 
the notion of psychotherapy. Even if throughout the thesis I elaborate on some 
of these implications, this re-thinking of psychotherapy is something that needs 
a piece of work on its own to be adequately developed. I feel keen to open this 
exploration in further research. My research also contributes to conversations 
around qualitative methodology, especially in the chapter on methodology and 
in all the chapters about reflexivity. Finally, I contribute to poststructural and 
posthuman philosophies, specifically in the conceptualisation of subjectivity. 
																																																						
9 I use the word meta-reflexivity when I refer to an intentional and conscious process of 
bringing attention to how we are reflexively relating to ourselves and the world. This distinction 
follows from my conceptualisation of reflexivity as a constant and unintentional process of 
relating to ourselves and producing ourselves and the world in that movement as I develop in 
chapter four.  




This is developed throughout the thesis, in all the chapters, but especially in 
chapter seven on experience.   
The contributions that I make to these fields are marked by my interdisciplinary 
approach. I am a psychotherapist oriented towards relational theories in 
psychoanalysis and so my inputs in philosophy and qualitative methodologies 
are informed and enriched by my psychoanalytic background. Conversely, the 
contributions that I can make to psychotherapy and psychoanalysis are 
permeated by my dwelling in poststructural and posthuman philosophies and 
their impact on qualitative methodologies.  
In the next chapter, chapter two, I develop my methodology. I elaborate on my 
ontology, epistemology and ethics and my way of understanding the concepts 
and the processes of conceptualisation that are vital for my project as it aims 




















My topic is making sense of ourselves. I wonder about how to articulate 
differently the notion of being reflexive about our experience – which is a way 
of making sense of ourselves. These sentences already imply certain 
conceptualisations of both reflexivity and experience that posit them in a 
duality of active-passive. For instance, the phrase being reflexive about our 
experience poses a duality between active and passive; language-based and 
feeling-based: we are reflexive (actively, purposefully, and through language) 
about our experience (passive and probably related to feelings). It is my main 
objective to think differently about making sense, challenging this dominant 
perspective. Towards this aim, I reconceptualise reflexivity and experience. I 
do not intend to define these concepts in a fixed manner, to say what these 
concepts ‘are’ but to open them up – to diffract (Barad, 2007) them – through 
three different traditions: posthumanism, poststructuralism and, to a lesser 
extent, psychoanalysis in a relational strand. When diffracting the concepts 
through the different traditions, I am not interested in what these concepts 
‘really mean’ but to transform them by reading them through different 
traditions. The objective of doing this is to be able to arrive to different ways of 
articulating these concepts and so to think differently – and produce differently 
– what happens when making sense of ourselves. The concepts are not there 
as reflections of the world but as producing worlds. I am not worried about their 
truth-value but about what differences they make, where they take me, how 
they produce a different making sense, different selves and different worlds. 
An important concept that is present throughout my thesis is the notion of self 
or subjectivity11. Indeed, when we are making sense of ourselves, how am I to 
																																																						
11 In this thesis, I am using the words self and subject. I am not positing a clear-cut distinction 
between them but when I am using self, I am pointing more to a personal and intimate self 
and when I am using subject, I am stressing more how the subject is traversed by the social. 
This emphasis is described in (Avdi & Georgaca, 2010) where they associate the self with a 
phenomenological and humanistic tradition and the subject with psychoanalysis and 
poststructuralism. Having said this, this division is far from being clean, Foucault refers largely 




think about this self? When I look at both of the concepts that I mentioned 
above: reflexivity and experience, I am implicitly, and many times explicitly, 
thinking about the conceptualisation of subjectivity or self that they imply and 
that they produce. In fact, I am using the ‘I’ throughout this thesis, how this ‘I’ 
is understood (and self and subjectivity) are shifting while I conceptualise and 
reconceptualise.  
In this chapter I will speak about how I am doing my research, that is, what is 
commonly understood as methodology. My way of working is to open up these 
three concepts to be thought about in different ways. I use the different theories 
as my springboards that diffract my understanding of the concepts so I can get 
to fresh ways of articulating them and through that to produce my subjectivity 
and the world anew. In that way, I could think about my methodology as a 
diffractive methodology (Barad, 2007; Haraway, 1992, 1997; Murris & Bozalek, 
2019). If I think about methodology in the traditional sense as knowing from 
the start what I am looking for and how to go about it, then, I also think about 
my methodology as a non-methodology. Along these lines, I will also elaborate 
how my methodology resonates with St. Pierre’s (2018) postqualitative inquiry, 
Jackson and Mazzei’s  (2012b) thinking with theory and Jackson’s (2017) 
thinking without a method among others.  
This is an inquiry that looks to reconceptualise but that does not mean that it 
stays at a conceptual level – understood as divorced from life. To the contrary, 
as I will develop, the concepts are not separated from life; concepts articulate 
life and can produce new forms of living. If I play to put a name to my 
methodology, it would be: conceptualising for becoming differently.  
In what follows I articulate my methodology that I have named conceptualising 
for becoming differently. I start with my onto-epistemology. Then I delve in my 
understanding of concepts. Finally, I spell out more directly my way of working, 
including how I use the concepts. For articulating my methodology, I mostly 
draw on posthumanist authors and also in Winnicott and Winnicottian authors 





Ontological and epistemological questions populate the whole of my text. It 
does not feel right to constrain these questions to some paragraphs as if it was 
a straightforward statement of identity: my ontology is x and my epistemology 
is y. My onto-epistemological position is in a constant process of being formed 
and transformed. My research interest about how we are reflexive about our 
experience is in itself both an ontological and an epistemological inquiry. What 
is reflexivity? What is experience? How do we practice reflexivity? How can I 
articulate answers to that? Throughout my thesis, I am thinking and elaborating 
– again and again – about ontology and epistemology.  
Hence, I will not state here my onto-epistemological stance as if it was 
something previous to my work – a position from which I approach my 
research. Indeed, this is one of the last sections that I write. In contrast, I think 
that my onto-epistemological perspective is constantly emerging and shifting 
while I work. Consequently, I will use this space to think about the onto-
epistemological position that I have been developing throughout this work. This 
does not mean that what I state here is pinning down what my onto-
epistemological position is. The account that I give here cannot be but a 
temporal ground; in any re-reading, my work plugs in12 (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987; Deleuze & Guattari, 1983) with all of what is present at the moment, and 
continuously becomes differently.  
Inevitably, I have shown something about my onto-epistemological position in 
what you have already read. For example, I have been using the word onto-
epistemology and that already says something about my ontological and 
epistemological position. Inspired by Barad (2007), I put ontology and 
epistemology in a single word to denote how knowing and meaning are 
																																																						
12 Following Deleuze and Guattari (1983,1987), I use plug in to describe connections that can 
be done at any level and that the main objective of them is to see what they produce. Deleuze 
and Guattari (1983) give the example of a handyman plugging in something into an electric 




precisely produced from within certain situation/relation/material arrangements 
and how knowing actually produces the realities that it is set up to discover.  
My onto-epistemology is relational. Intra-action (Barad, 2007) is a good 
concept to speak about my relational perspective. Intra-action asserts that 
nothing exists by itself; there are no bounded units that then come into relation. 
Instead, the units are constantly formed through relations (including the 
relations with the non-human). Different ways of relating are continuously 
producing what we take as already formed units. In that way, my onto-
epistemology is also performative or productive. Different ways of relating 
produce what we could have taken as bounded units.  
As it might be already apparent, I am drawing on both Deleuze and Barad. I 
think about their conceptualisations as compatible as both emphasise how 
things are always in the making, including human and non-human, and they 
underscore the productions of the concepts rather than to try to get to what 
they ‘are.’ 
Nonetheless, clearly, they have differences that go well beyond the scope of 
the thesis, not to say of the methodology chapter, to be thoroughly explored 
and analysed. For instance, Hein (2016) underscores that Barad and Deleuze 
have incommensurable ontologies. He thinks about Barad as having a 
philosophy of transcendence and identity and Deleuze of immanence and 
positive difference – referring to the processes of differentiating rather than 
difference as to how something is different from another thing. For example, 
Hein argues that Barad’s concept of intra-action does not start from positive 
difference. “As discussed earlier, positive difference is not fixed (i.e., it does 
not have a single identity), and it therefore differs even from itself. As a process 
of continual differentiation, it exceeds all concepts, including intra-action.” 
(Hein, 2016, p. 136) 
Murris and Bozalek (2019) respond to Hein (2016) arguing that Barad does 
posit a perspective of immanence and positive difference, because in her 




matter. I align with this argument and throughout the thesis I think about 
Barad’s and Deleuze’s conceptualisations as compatible inasmuch both have 
a relational perspective which is not reduced to the human relationships but 
includes the material and the discursive as having their own strength and 
active participation. Both theories are processual where any identity is 
understood as a necessarily temporal crystallisation only sustained in a greater 
assemblage13 or intra-action.    
In the following section, I will differentiate this relational and productive onto-
epistemology from an ontology of bounded units that only afterwards come 
into relations. It is this ontology of bounded units that underpins the separation 
between ontology and epistemology and the distinctions between objectivism 
and subjectivism.  
Relational – not subjective – onto-epistemology  
According to Barad’s (2007) conceptualisation, the dichotomies of matter and 
meaning, objectivism and subjectivism, realism and relativism are the reason 
why it makes sense to separate ontology and epistemology.  
The realism-antirealism distinction is often drawn on the basis of 
questions about belief in a correspondence theory of truth, which is 
rooted in subject-object, culture-nature, word-world dualisms. The 
separation of epistemology from ontology is a reverberation of these 
dualisms. (Barad, 2007, p. 125) 
The division between ontology and epistemology implies that what exists is 
already formed and that is why we need to be worried about epistemology, 
that is, about the possibility of knowing what there is. The mainstream 
conceptualisation of knowledge is that it is concerned with understanding an 
outer and objective reality. The extent to which this approach is seen as the 
																																																						
13 According to Colebrook (2002) – A Deleuzian reader - assemblage refers to how life as a 
process constantly needs connections. Anything – a body, a city, a group, etc. - is the product 
of connections and not the other way around. That is, the connections are ontologically prior 
to any unit. The assemblage does not act as a unit or an organism with clear characteristics 
and objectives because what is primordial are the ongoing connections. “There is no finality, 
end or order that would govern the assemblage as a whole; the law of any assemblage is 




valid way of knowing can be assessed realising that the very word 
epistemology comes from the word Episteme (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Episteme 
implicates a fundamental division between subject and object, this 
differentiation is the one that allows knowledge to be objective – if we are part 
of the phenomenon studied we cannot be objective. Therefore, deeply rooted 
in our assumptions is the belief that we are knowing something objective and 
enclosed in itself.   
In contrast, I think that the practices of knowing and what exists are 
intermingled. Hence, I am not an objectivist. If I am not objectivist, if I believe 
that I cannot help but be involved in my research, does that mean that I think 
that every perspective is equally valid because all is subjective and relative? I 
think that both of these positions: subjectivism and objectivism depend on an 
ontology of bounded units. I can only say that something is subjective if I think 
about subjectivity as something already formed, as something in itself. 
Similarly, Flyvbjerg (2001) differentiates what he calls the relativistic position 
from contextualism; positing that from a contextualist position it does not make 
sense to say that everything is subjective because there are historical and 
cultural backgrounds that frame what is deemed possible: “anyone who 
equates contextualism with relativism’s ‘anything goes’ should imagine trying 
to ask the Romans to abolish slavery” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 100). That is, we 
cannot understand a subjectivity outside of its context.  
If we say that any statement is equally valid to others, we are not considering 
the historical and social contexts in which particular discourses are seen as 
more valid than others. Hence, if we are subjectivists, as described before, we 
have not changed our dualistic assumptions. Inspired by Rorty (1991), I say 
that the very conception of relativism (as subjectivism) can only be possible 
with a dualistic assumption of an external reality and a subjective perception 
of it, that is, with realism. Relative or subjective is antonym with objective, they 
need each other. If we say contextualism (Flyvbjerg, 2001), or relational, we 




subjectivity. The notion of subjective rests in a consideration of subjectivity as 
bounded in one individual.  
In contrast, I think that we are constantly relationally, socially and materially 
produced as subjects. As Haraway says: “Ontologically heterogeneous  
partners  become  who  and  what  they  are  in  relational  material-semiotic  
worlding.  Natures,  cultures,  subjects,  and  objects do not preexist their 
intertwined worldings” (Haraway, 2016, pp. 12-13). What we are is constantly 
being produced relationally. This relationality is material-semiotic because the 
meaning is produced in tandem with a material articulation.  
Knowing from within a world and producing worlds –worlding – through 
knowing  
I do not think that I access knowledge as if I was an already bounded 
subjectivity that interacts with what I aim to know. Instead, drawing on Barad 
(2007), I think that the practices of knowing cannot but be understood as 
emerging from being within a particular world that intra-acts (with)14 me. And 
secondly, I argue that these practices of knowing produce a world – including 
my own subjectivity.  
With Barad, we know – meaning is produced – through certain 
situations/relations/discourses/material arrangements. Foucault (1972, 1980) 
already said that what we produce as knowledge responds to certain 
discourses that are ruling our field. Barad (2007), takes Foucault’s contribution 
and puts emphasis in stating that discourse is not separated from matter. The 
discursive practices are always already material and the other way around.  
In other words, materiality is discursive (i.e., material phenomena are 
inseparable from the apparatuses of bodily production; matter emerges 
out of, and includes as part of its being, the ongoing reconfiguring of 
boundaries), just as discursive practices are always already material 
(i.e., they are ongoing material [re]configurings of the world). Discursive 
																																																						
14 I bracket the word ‘with’ because it implies the union of two or more distinct entities, whereas 
the concept of intra-action is emphasising how the entities are always in the process of being 
formed. If the sentence is read without the word ‘with’, it can convey intra-acting as an action 




practices and material phenomena do not stand in a relationship of 
externality to each other; rather, the material and the discursive are 
mutually implicated in the dynamics of intra-activity. (151-152) 
Barad (2007) takes this point from quantum theory15, especially with the 
contributions of Niels Bohr. His approach to resolving the wave-particle duality 
paradox (that an electron could behave as both a wave and a particle in 
different measuring instances), is to argue that these two concepts acquire 
their meaning through specific apparatuses. That is, one of the material 
arrangements – the apparatus – that is trying to measure the electron 
produces it as a wave, and a different material arrangement – a different 
apparatus – produces it as a particle. “For Bohr, the analysis of these 
conditions rests on the crucial insight that concepts are meaningful, that is, 
semantically determinate, not in the abstract but by virtue of their embodiment 
in the physical arrangement of the apparatus.” (Barad, 2007, p. 117)  
This implies that the concepts that we use are not a reflection of the world, the 
concepts are part of the material arrangements of the world. This underscores 
an immanent perspective in the sense that there are not two worlds one of 
material reality and phenomena and another of our representations of them. 
Concepts and matter are entangled and producing each other continuously.  
This point stresses not only that our knowledge is embodied – as existential 
phenomenology does (Merleau-Ponty, 2012)16 – but that what we know, the 
world that we ‘see’, is articulated/produced through the apparatus through 
which we aim to know. The things that exist take their shape in our 
approaching/producing them. And, our way of approaching is enabled by 
discourse and culture – that are also material arrangements.  
The frames of reference, or the apparatuses, that we inevitably – and largely 
unconsciously – use in every activity, including researching, are the ones that 
are useful to describe, make sense or explain what is happening. These 
																																																						
15 A question that could be posed to Barad is about how is she relating to quantum theory? Is 
she giving special truth value to this theory because it is ‘scientific’? 




frames are useful, but they do not produce objective knowledge. We are very 
used to think that cancer, for example, is a real thing out there. I think cancer 
is the name that has been given to a particular dynamic that has been 
produced through certain theories, methodologies and apparatuses to 
approach the body. We could certainly have other apparatuses that would be 
useful as well, in other ways.  
I am not saying that cancer does not exist, I am saying that it does not exist by 
itself. It is not that the materiality of cancer does not exist or is secondary to 
abstract or intangible aspects – like some popular narratives that claim that 
cancer could vanish with certain attitudes, or that emotions or energies could 
produce and eradicate it. In contrast, there is something there affecting the 
body but what it is, is indeterminate until a conceptual and material apparatus 
comes to produce the boundaries that will define it and make it meaningful.  
It is in this way that through knowing we also produce a world. As Barad (2007) 
makes clear what is ontologically prior is phenomena where everything is 
connected in process and nothing is defined as a unity: there are no 
boundaries drawn. What can draw the boundaries are apparatuses that enact 
agential cuts17 within phenomena, defining entities in their ontic and semantic 
nature.  
Apparatuses enact agential cuts that produce determinate boundaries 
and properties of “entities” within phenomena, where “phenomena” are 
the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting components. That 
is agential cuts are at once ontic and semantic. It is only through specific 
agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of 
“components” of phenomena become determinate and that particular 
articulations become meaningful. In the absence of specific agential 
intra-actions, these ontic-semantic boundaries are indeterminate. In 
short, the apparatus specifies an agential cut that enacts a resolution 
(within the phenomenon) of the semantic, as well as ontic, 
																																																						
17 Barad (2007) conceptualises agential cut to refer to the boundary that is produced within a 
particular configuration and that enables the, always temporary, emergence of entities. The 
concept agential cut assumes that these boundaries are always shifting and in process. Matter 





indeterminacy. Hence apparatuses are boundary making practices. (p. 
148) 
This perspective puts forward that these practices of knowing produce a world 
in that these practices enact the agential cuts that will define the boundaries 
of what we take as existing and meaningful18. And, as I was saying earlier, it 
also underscores that our ways of knowing are materially-discursively enabled. 
We know through being part of determinate intra-actions. We cannot know 
from the vacuum or from a neutral place. This implies an immanent perspective 
because there are not two worlds: the one of representations and the one of 
materiality. There are not, on the one hand, discourses and, on the other hand, 
material arrangements. Instead, they cannot be understood without each 
other, they emerge intra-actively. Knowing is not an activity that we make to 
represent a world as if the researcher and the researched were already defined 
and then would just interact. Instead, we can only know through being from 
within a world and our practices of knowing are also producing this very world 
– including our subjectivities.  
To conclude, my onto-epistemological perspective has temporarily crystallized 
as relational, productive and immanent. All of what there is, is in relation, there 
are no bounded individualities. Different ways of relating are constantly 
producing/performing what we see as units and realities; and there is not a 
separate world for representations and another for things, but the concepts are 
already entangled in material arrangements and producing worlds.  
Ethico-onto-epistemology 
Because each conceptualisation is productive of different realities it matters 
ethically; we need to wonder about which kind of world we are producing, 
about what we are enabling. Barad (2007) speaks about ethico-onto-
epistemology to foreground how, not only ontology and epistemology, but also 
ethics, are entangled with each other. 
																																																						





With this, the ethical dimension in my own work is opened, firstly, in what the 
reconceptualisations that I put forward produce, that is, in what they enable. 
Of course, the productions of my reconceptualisations go well beyond my 
intentions, but it is necessary that I wonder what I am helping to produce. I am 
thinking about this throughout my thesis.  
Secondly, in undertaking this research, I am affected and I become differently 
through the exploration of theories and the reconceptualisation of concepts; 
my research entails an ethical dimension in how I become differently through 
it. I am continuously exploring how I find myself differently and what does this 
enable and prevents me from doing/exploring.  
Thirdly, because I understand my research as entangled with my life, some 
aspects of my life appear in my writing from time to time, including my work as 
a psychotherapist. In this scenario, it is relevant for me to ask what do these 
narrations produce and if they might negatively affect someone. Having this 
last concern in mind, whenever I mention a client I am not directly exposing 
one concrete experience with them/of them but I am drawing on more than one 
client to make a composite that ends up in a product that not even the client 
could recognise as its own – even though they could think that it is related to 
something of theirs. In relation to narrating events of my personal life, I have 
taken care of only referring to situations that the people involved and myself 
feel comfortable to share.  
Conceptualisations as opening lives 
In consonance with my relational, immanent and productive ethico-onto-
epistemology, I cannot think about concepts as separated from my life. I relate 
with the concepts19, and in that relating, I produce. This puts forward a way of 
working that is alive and always in movement. Conceptualising for becoming 
differently. As Gale (2018) articulates, the word concept might convey 
																																																						
19 It is important to say here that I notice that I am speaking about concepts as if they were a 
bounded thing. I do not think that a concept stands on its own but that it is made meaningful 




something more static as an already formed product that can be applied, 
whereas conceptualisation or conceptualising points at the activity of creating 
concepts. “In contrast ‘conceptualisation’ seems to be more about working with 
the concepts themselves, constantly bringing them to life, thinking about them 
and engaging in a doing with them that always involves something new, 
experimental, processual and transmutational.” (Gale, 2018, p. 10) 
I cannot think of my methodology as something bounded in itself that I need to 
follow. What I want to do, what I like to do, is to think with the concepts: to 
conceptualise and reconceptualise. To read an author and be taken by them, 
to start seeing, feeling and living the world differently. What causes me most 
pleasure is to read a text that rocks my world, that opens new worlds, that 
makes me differently, that re-writes and re-tells my history. Texts can be that 
powerful. A text intra-acts (Barad, 2007) (with) me and we become together 
differently; the texts shift through me, I shift through them, and the world shifts 
in that becoming. Conceptualising for becoming differently. 
I take the concepts of reflexivity and experience for them to be opened up and 
diffracted through other concepts/theories. In this endeavour, I am also being 
diffracted and becoming differently. My work is an adventure through 
encountering a new author – a new concept – that will take me somewhere 
else; it is a risk, to be sure, but a risk that I want to take, that I need to take, 
that I am obsessed with taking. So, how do I go about to do this?  
Traditional qualitative inquiry with its emphasis on methodology does not allow 
the space for exploring and experimenting with concepts because it sets up 
from the beginning what the process is like and what we should attempt to find. 
(Jackson, 2017; Jackson & Mazzei, 2012b; Mazzei, 2017; St. Pierre, 2018, 
2019) 
I cannot assume that I am a bounded and rational being that can delineate a 
research proposal and then follow through the steps. What is more, this option 




If we cease to privilege knowing over being; if we refuse positivist and 
phenomenological assumptions about the nature of lived experience 
and the world; if we give up representational and binary logics; if we 
see language, the human, and the material not as separate entities 
mixed together but as a completely imbricated “on the surface” – if we 
do all that and the “more” it will open up -  will qualitative inquiry as we 
know it be possible? Perhaps not. (Lather & St. Pierre, 2013, pp. 629-
630)  
The notion of qualitative inquiry with a set methodology is not appealing to me 
and I am not alone in this quest. There are a few authors speaking about 
researching without a methodology in the social sciences. When I read them, 
my methodology – without a methodology – can write itself more easily. St. 
Pierre (2018, 2019) speaks of post-qualitative inquiry, Jackson and Mazzei 
(2012b) speak of thinking with theory, Jackson (2017) of thinking without 
method, Mazzei (2017) of minor inquiry, Lenz Taguchi (2016) of the concept 
as a method, Wyatt (2019) of creative-relational inquiry, Gale (2018) of 
madness as methodology.  
For example, Jackson and Mazzei (2012b) reconceptualise qualitative inquiry 
not assuming that they are already formed observers that can analyse the 
narratives of their participants. In contrast, they propose to plug in (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987; Deleuze & Guattari, 1983) data and theory; the interviews, the 
theories, their memories, etc. are all becoming together without one having 
precedence over the other.  Therefore, they were not using their participant’s 
accounts as the truth of their experiences but as an input that they could take 
to play with and make a new proposition. “There is nothing pure about what 
they told us, yet we needed their “stories” to knead the dynamics among 
philosophy, theory, and social life to see what gets made, not understood.” 
(Jackson & Mazzei, 2012b, p. 3) 
Wyatt (2019) speaks about the creative-relational inquiry as a process that is 
creative not (only) in the sense of being artistic but of opening up to what might 
become; not to capture and control but to let yourself be taken by the process. 




as methodology - because in the spaces of going off the rails something new 
can start living.  
All these authors – drawing heavily on Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari and 
Barad – propose to think with the concepts, to think about them not as 
reflections or representations of the world but as productive of different worlds. 
A new concept, or a reconceptualisation of an old one, can make appear – can 
produce – a whole different world. This is what I see as the thirst of this non-
methodology of thinking with theory: to produce different worlds. 
Conceptualising for becoming differently. 
That is why a traditional qualitative methodology cannot do. I need to be able 
to get immersed and lost in the theories that I read and let them transform me 
and to produce new conceptualisations through this. Conceptualising for 
becoming differently.  
St. Pierre (2018) connects her post-qualitative inquiry with thinking without 
method (Jackson, 2017) and with minor inquiry (Mazzei, 2017) as requiring 
what Deleuze and Partner (2007) describe as a long preparation – reading and 
writing – that does not have any recipe or method. Precisely, I can say that 
what I concretely do is to read a lot and to write a lot. I do these activities in a 
particular way. I create this work and at the same time this work is creating 
itself in me and this work is also creating me. To be able to create, I need not 
be a master, not a submissive disciple, but I need to surrender to the 
process. With psychoanalysis, I am using surrender meaning to let go to 
something larger than us – something that we cannot cognitively pin down – 
and letting ourselves be transformed by it. (Bollas, 1987) 
To create concepts that produce 
Massumi in his Foreword to Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus 
beautifully captures the emphasis in what a concept can do instead of its truth-
value – as if we could arrive at an objective answer, as if the concept was there 




The question is not: is it true? But: does it work? What new thoughts 
does it make it possible to think? What new emotions does it make it 
possible to feel? What new sensations and perceptions does it open in 
the body? (Massumi, 1987, p. xv) 
My work requires my involvement. I lend myself to it, to be moved and 
transformed by it. I surrender to it. This resonates with postqualitative inquiry: 
“In other words, the post qualitative researcher must live the theories (will not 
be able not to live them) and will, then, live in a different world enabled by a 
different ethico-onto-epistemology” (St. Pierre, 2018, p. 604). The world and 
the subject are not fundamentally separated, in that sense, it is not only the 
world but myself what shifts in this type of inquiry. The bounded subject is not 
the origin or creator of the work because my boundaries are constantly 
producing themselves through my involvement in my work. It is in that way that 
it makes sense to say that this work is also writing itself through me – I am not 
writing from a position of mastery. St. Pierre (2019) says that the concept post-
qualitative inquiry wrote itself  in 2010 while writing a chapter for the 4th edition 
of the handbook of Qualitative Inquiry. There is not an author writing a text as 
if text and author were bounded entities, one in control of another. Instead, we 
become together.  
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1994), the task of philosophy is to create 
concepts. To create concepts does not refer to grasp something that was 
always already there waiting to be discovered but to produce it.  “Concepts are 
not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for 
concepts. They must be invented, fabricated, or rather created and would be 
nothing without their creator's signature.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 5) 
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1994), to create concepts is always to 
bring something new and singular – because it is not reflecting a 
transcendental state of affairs but results from a production. That the concepts 
depend on their creator’s signature brings about the possibility of questioning 
them: concepts did not create themselves, they are not ‘objective’, so they 




concept is the master over it. The concept is created and at the same time, it 
creates itself.  
Philosophers have not been sufficiently concerned with the nature of 
the concept as philosophical reality. They have preferred to think of it 
as a given knowledge or representation that can be explained by the 
faculties able to form it (abstraction or generalization) or employ it 
(judgment). But the concept is not given, it is created; it is to be created. 
It is not formed but posits itself in itself-it is a self-positing. Creation and 
self positing mutually imply each other because what is truly created, 
from the living being to the work of art, thereby enjoys a self-positing of 
itself, or an autopoetic characteristic by which it is recognized. The 
concept posits itself to the same extent that it is created. (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1994, p. 11) 
For Deleuze and Guattari (1994) the specificity of philosophy is to create 
concepts which is an activity that brings about novelty and singularity. The 
creation of concepts does not rely on Universals. “The first principle of 
philosophy is that Universals explain nothing but must themselves be 
explained” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 7). In that way, the role of creating 
concepts is to bring about new possibilities and new worlds, to shift how things 
are currently articulated and produced. “On their account, the purpose of the 
philosophical creation of concepts is essentially pragmatic. The aim is not 
merely to recognize or reconstruct how things are but to transform existing 
forms of thought and practice” (Patton, 2006, p. 285). Conceptualising for 
becoming differently. It is clear the revolutionary emphasis of the authors. If 
what we are doing is trying to reflect about something using the same 
understandings, then we are not doing philosophy, we are not creating 
concepts.  
Philosophy does not contemplate, reflect, or communicate, although it 
must create concepts for these actions or passions. Contemplation, 
reflection and communication are not disciplines but machines for 
constituting Universals in every discipline. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, 
p. 6) 
St. Pierre (2019) takes the philosophy of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari to 
think her postqualitative inquiry. She highlights their ontology of immanence 




transcendentalism which posits two worlds where what exists is a copy – 
unavoidable imperfect – of the ideal. According to Deleuze (1988) the virtual 
is real and it is what enables the genesis of actual experience. The author does 
not think that these are two realms that resemble each other; instead, the 
virtual is different from the actual. The virtual is multiplicity and it is arranged 
in particular and singular ways to actualise something. There is not a copy of 
an ideal state, but a virtual configuration that produces. “The object, the actual, 
can exist only because of singular virtual conditions that cannot be 
reproduced.” (St. Pierre, 2019, p. 5) 
It is in this immanent world that concepts are created not as representations 
of a given state of affairs – that would be back to posit a transcendence – but 
as becomings in themselves that do something in the world.  
There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the 
world) and a field of representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity 
(the author). Rather, an assemblage establishes connections between 
certain multiplicities drawn from each of these orders, so that a book 
has no sequel nor the world as its object nor one or several authors as 
its subject. In short, we think that one cannot write sufficiently in the 
name of an outside. The outside has no image, no signification, no 
subjectivity. The book as assemblage with the outside, against the book 
as image of the world. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 23) 
In this state of affairs, to produce concepts to represent better or to give voice 
is not tenable any longer. Producing concepts gets transformed into a kind of 
revolutionary act for its potentiality to bring about new realities.  
In Deleuze’s (2004) conceptualisation, we are not thinking when we are just 
recognising. He develops that through recognition difference is subordinated 
to identity so that there are already certain unities that are different from each 
other – in contrast, a positive and affirmative difference is positing how things 
get made, always anew, through productive differences. Deleuze differentiates 
the dogmatic image of thought which is given through recognition and 
forecloses the possibility of novelty from thinking. Thinking is through an 
encounter with something that we cannot recognise, that we cannot make easy 




Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not 
of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may 
be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of 
affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its 
primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is 
opposed to recognition. In recognition, the sensible is not at all that which 
can only be sensed, but that which bears directly upon the senses in an 
object which can be recalled, imagined or conceived. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 
176)  
It is along these lines that Jackson (2017) puts forward her thinking without a 
method. A method would set up from the beginning categories that we would 
expect to recognise. In analysing an interview, a methodology teaches us to 
look to recognise themes. In that endeavour, what we do is to recognise but 
not to think – in Deleuzian terms.  
Undertaking a research project without a set methodology does not secure in 
any way that I will be thinking with concepts. I could make a research that also 
looks to recognise and to categorise. For example, to examine the literature to 
see how the concepts that interest me have been conceptualised in different 
traditions. This would limit the possibilities to actually encounter something that 
I cannot make sense of, something that would bring me to a new place, make 
me create a new way of articulating and producing differently. Conceptualising 
for becoming differently.  
What I have been doing  
St. Pierre says: “To repeat, one begins post qualitative inquiry without a 
methodology” (St. Pierre, 2019, p. 10). To have authors stressing this way of 
researching makes me feel a sense of belonging. Reading about post-
qualitative research and other related notions made my own way of 
researching more clearly intelligible and so now I can explain/justify better to 
my colleagues what I have been actually doing.  
What I have been doing is working with concepts, working with theory to see 
where they take me, what they enable me to think/feel/do – how they produce 
a world, how they produce myself. Conceptualising for becoming differently. 




did, in reorienting thought toward the continuous variation in living that might 
engender thinking in thought, experimentation, and creation.” (St. Pierre, 2019, 
pp. 8-9) 
My concepts of interest: reflexivity and experience get reconceptualised 
through other concepts/theories. These reconceptualisations make me able to 
open different ways of thinking and so of articulating the world.  
Jackson and Mazzei (2012b) use their thinking with theory. They think with 
concepts to see where this can diffractively (Barad, 2007) take them. In this 
movement, they intend to bring about the new, to enable the possibility of 
thinking/feeling/acting differently. “We are advocating such as a move to create 
a way of thinking methodologically and  philosophically that gets us out of the 
trap of fixing meaning and instead opens up previously unthought questions.” 
(Jackson & Mazzei, 2012a, p. 745) 
Lenz Taguchi (2016) elaborates her version of concept as method based on 
Colebrook (2013). The concept can be a method because its meaning it is not 
taken for granted but opened up to be further questioned and thus to produce 
differently. 
This can be envisioned as the pedagogical process of learning from and 
with the concept, by tracing its conditions of creation in ways that can 
transform those conditions, and make it possible for us to create new 
concepts and subsequent material-semiotic differing realities. (Lenz 
Taguchi, 2016, p. 214) 
This is an inquiry into the question about making sense through the concepts 
of reflexivity and experience. I use the theories to think with them, living my life 
through their concepts as they take hold of me, seeing where they take me. 
This involvement of myself asks me at times to bring my experiences to the 
page. This is not a merely intellectual exercise. It is not just a detached 
curiosity about how we make sense but a questioning that takes me. 
Instead of beginning with questions, which, according to Whitehead, 
prompt answers that foreclose thought, researchers might begin with 




would not let go, that which Barthes (1980/2010) described as acting 
with a force that wounds. (Mazzei, 2016, p. 159) 
I start researching with a topic that takes hold of me. Making sense of myself. 
This is an interest that comes from the nights in my childhood where I was 
silently repeating my name and losing touch with who I was. Karen, Karen, 
Karen, who is Karen, anyway? It comes from my puzzlement at my own 
feelings and thoughts, it comes from feeling a stranger to myself and to 
struggle to give a stable narrative of what is happening to me.  
The concepts enter in my life through my way of relating to them and they get 
transformed as they become with me and I get transformed through them. My 
ways of relating invite the concepts in certain ways and they shift these ways 
of relating as well. My ways of relating are intra-active (Barad, 2007) because 
they do not suppose a self and an environment but continuously produce these 
differentiations through relating. I become differently and my research 
becomes differently. My ways of relating to the concepts are not masterfully 
intentional. My ways of relating are socially, relationally and materially enabled. 
As I develop my reconceptualisations, I am also thinking about my ways of 
relating to theory. In this I make meta-reflexive movements: I (re)turn to what I 
am doing and I interrogate it, I look at it differently. I think that it is in this 
differing where something opens, something emerges.  
In the process of my research things are always in movement and the 
crystallizations that make me stand in a securer ground are tentative and 
temporal. To have a relational onto-epistemology, where everything is 
constantly in process to be formed can make me feel dizzy. I was looking for 
a long time at a star through my window; it came as a renewed surprise how 
the star slowly moved until it went out of my sight. The sky is moving. But no, 
it is not precisely the sky that is moving – although that might feel more 
comfortable – the Earth and everything is moving. Right now, everything is 




Becoming new ground – again and again 
We can think about Deleuze and Guattari as holding a particular ethics. “This 
ethics might be characterized in the language of one or other of the plateaus 
as an ethics of becoming, of flows or lines of flight, or as an ethics and a politics 
of deterritorialization.” (Patton, 2006, p. 288) 
Deterritorialisation is an important concept in Deleuze and Guattari. Every kind 
of unit that we can think about: a concept, a body, a person, a country needs 
to have been territorialised to be what it is; deterritorialisation is the possibility 
of this unit to become differently through a line of flight. “The very connective 
forces that allow any form of life to become what it is (territorialise) can also 
allow it to become what it is not (deterritorialise)” (Colebrook, 2002, p. xxii). 
The concepts that I am looking at: reflexivity and experience, might be 
territorialised by humanistic and phenomenological philosophy and they might 
become otherwise through being deterritorialised and in that movement, 
become differently.  
But Deleuze and Guattari are not proclaiming the need to break apart every 
order that exists, the picture is much more complex. It is not that 
deterritorialisation is good and territorialisation is bad. Furthermore, in the 
movements of deterritorialisation through lines of flight, the lost territory can be 
reterritorialised even in a more rigid way by other forces. For example, the 
concept of reflexivity might have been reterritorialised by posthumanism in a 
way that it leaves it still more fixed and motionless.  
That is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy, even in the 
rudimentary form of the good and the bad. You may make a rupture, 
draw a line of flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter 
organizations that restratify everything, formations that restore power to 
a signifier, attributions that reconstitute a subject—anything you like, 
from Oedipal resurgences to fascist concretions. (Deleuze & Guattari, 




What Deleuze and Guattari advice is something quite more tempered than to 
follow lines of flights and break apart every strata20. Moreover, they warn about 
the dangers that can entail that extreme position. In the chapter called: How 
do you make yourself a body without organs (BwO)?21, they convey: 
Staying stratified—organized, signified, subjected—is not the worst that 
can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into 
demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us 
heavier than ever. This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a 
stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an 
advantageous place on it, find potential movements of 
deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce 
flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities 
segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is 
through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in 
freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows to pass and escape and 
bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO. (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987, p. 161) 
This ethic resonates with me. I am looking to open up the concepts that I am 
exploring but through doing that, I also stay with some theories as my ground 
and I produce new grounds where I can feel comfortable for a while. I feel alive 
connecting to something wider that I do not manage, as part of a process that 
takes me to become what I do not expect. Nonetheless, at the same time, I am 
very aware of my need for ground and certainties. Inspired by Winnicott (1964, 
1971) I think of the need for ground and recognition as necessary to become 
alive and active. So, one of the dangers is staying too static, the other is 
jumping into a dissolution that does not allow me to keep playing. In the next 
section, I sketch how I use the authors – how I relate to them – in a way that 
is coherent with the ethics that I have just mentioned.  
																																																						
20 Strata refers to what has been thickened by “accumulations, coagulations, sedimentations, 
foldings.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 502) 
21 This concept, BwO (Body without organs), refers to the possibility of connections, 
productions, deterritorialisations and becomings, where there is not stratum or an organism 




Using the authors  
In this work, I will be using theories that criticise each other and furthermore 
theories that are built in the ruins of others. I find interesting how Jackson and 
Mazzei (2012b) work with diverse authors and concepts, not needing to fit 
them together, but working diffractively (Barad 2007) with them – seeing where 
they can take them.  
In working diffractively, the concept is not measured in its correctness or its 
truth-value – we are not using the concepts within a representationalistic 
frame. Instead, the concepts are valued in what they produce, in what 
questions they open, in what new thoughts and experiences they allow. 
Conceptualising for becoming differently. 
Vagle (2015) works with different traditions not aiming at an overarching 
approach that contains or overcomes the others. “However, I think productive 
theoretical work can take place when we do not aim to reconcile—but to work 
the edges and margins to see what might become.” (Vagle, 2015, p. 597). This 
does not refer to a dialogue between theories. Instead, with Deleuze and 
Guattari it is about connecting in the middle and becoming otherwise. “It is in 
this playfulness (as opposed to dialogue) where weeds (and flower and stalk) 
grow.” (Vagle & Hofsess, 2016, p. 335) 
I use the theories. I take the criticisms that they have done – and received – 
and this does not prevent me from seeing the potential usefulness and 
productivity of highly challenged theories. I do this because having a relational 
ontology, I cannot have the rhetoric of bringing the new and over with the old 
as if they were consummated and separated entities. Furthermore, using 
Barad’s (2007) concepts, from a relational intra-active ontoepistemology, I 
assert that there is not a theory that is categorically better or truer than the 




cuts – that is the boundary-making practices – that bring about different 
worlds.22 
Barad (2007) takes Bohr’s conceptualisation of apparatus as the material 
arrangements through which different realities and concepts are formed. For 
example, we cannot think about the concept of speed apart from a determinate 
apparatus that measures/produces it.  Taking further this conceptualisation of 
apparatuses, we could think about the theories and the concepts as 
apparatuses that make the agential-cuts of what emerges as elements. The 
production of boundaries through an apparatus is what Barad calls agential 
cuts. These agential cuts are what produce the reality and the meaningfulness 
of what appears. 
Therefore, for example, I think that phenomenology with its emphasis in pre-
reflective experience works like an apparatus that produces, say, a notion of 
experience as foundational, a subject that can reflect about their pre-reflective 
experience, a method to try to access experience directly, etc. These 
productions create a world and create meaning in a way that can be useful for 
some things and less useful for others. Probably if I am with a client who has 
experienced a traumatic event, the concept of pre-reflective experience will 
appear for me and I will make use of it to make sense of their pain and to try 
to help them to articulate it.  
I sustain a relational, immanent and productive perspective and this leads me 
to regard every theory and concept in its productions – not in establishing from 
an impossible neutral place which one is better and truer than the other.  
Murris and Bozalek (2019) bring to the foreground how we, as authors, relate 
to the theories – what we do with them. They write their paper about the use 
of both Deleuze and Barad responding to Hein (2016) that, as I mentioned 
earlier, argues that both theories are incommensurable.  
																																																						





Hein (2016) uses the notion of critique comparing one philosophical 
position with another and finding the one wanting (in his case: Barad 
versus Deleuze, where Barad is seen as falling short of a philosophy of 
immanence and difference), thus seeing them in opposition to each 
other. Instead, and in line with the relational ontology of Barad and 
Deleuze, we use a diffractive methodology as a way of responding 
response-ably to Hein by putting the two philosophers in conversation 
with one another, without presuming that as researchers we are able to 
map the differences and similarities ‘between’ their oeuvres objectively 
– a ‘view from nowhere’. (Murris & Bozalek, 2019, p. 873) 
Furthermore, I think that embracing and defending a theory as better than the 
other can enable practices of indoctrination for example in teaching or in 
supervising because it might be difficult for the students to find other ways of 
relating apart from complying or refusing.  
A common practice in academia is to use the theories looking to find what is 
wrong with them and to affirm our posture through the criticism of other 
theories that are deemed inferior, dangerous or untenable. This is what 
Sedgwick (2003) calls paranoid reading. This might produce a theoretical 
articulation that closes off on itself affirming its own truth – not inviting to be re-
thought. Building on Haraway: 
Articulation must remain open, its densities accessible to action and 
intervention. When the system of connections closes in on itself, when 
symbolic action becomes perfect, the world is frozen in a dance of 
death. The cosmos is finished, and it is One. Paranoia is the only 
possible posture; generous suspicion is foreclosed. (Haraway, 1992, p. 
327)   
Sedgwick (2003) proposes an alternative way to relate to the theories. Drawing 
on Klein, she speaks about reparative reading – instead of paranoid reading. 
She argues that currently the paranoid ‘critical’ reading is not only an option 
among others but it is more imperative and dominant. She challenges this way 
of thinking and tries to open up our practices.  
I am saying that the main reasons for questioning paranoid practices 
are other than the possibility that their suspicions can be delusional or 
simply wrong. Concomitantly, some of the main reasons for practicing 
paranoid strategies may be other than the possibility that they offer 




ways, of seeking, finding, and organizing knowledge. Paranoia knows 
some things well and others poorly. (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 130)  
My attempt here is to seize the different theories in what I can do with them, 
where they take me, what possibilities they open to me. I wish to take the 
concepts and ideas that I read and make something out of them in their intra-
action (Barad 2007) with my thinking. Conceptualising for becoming differently. 
To use these ideas. I try to relate to the theories with an emphasis in what of 
them goes beyond me, in their potentiality to show me/produce and keep on 
showing me/producing new things.  
The Winnicottian use  
Drawing on psychoanalysis, I want to stress how theories and concepts are 
not mastered by me; they have their otherness which is what makes me able 
to use them in the Winnicottian (Winnicott, 1971) sense – which is the opposite 
to the normal notion of use as an utilitarian way of relating. The Winnicotian 
sense of use refers to what feels external to the self – not controlled by the self 
– so that it can be useful to the self in that it gives something new or fresh, 
something that the self could not imagine on its own.  
This possibility of object usage is enabled when, after the subject has attacked 
the object, the object survives – that is, it does not retaliate or withdraw. Given 
this experience, the subject starts feeling that the object is outside their 
omnipotent control and therefore is properly another. With this experience, the 
sense of reality and a new sensation of realness appears (Winnicott, 1971). 
I feel that the theories survive me when, after I have criticised them or thought 
that I can completely grasp them, they surprise me with something new. I think 
of researchers/authors as surviving when we are willing to welcome criticism 
without retaliating or evading it – which might have a lot to do with how the 
social milieu enables a secure space to change our minds, to think further, to 
doubt ourselves and not losing value and recognition because of that.  
There is a yielding here through relating to new concepts or criticisms in letting 




do not relate to them from knowing who I am and I what I need from them.  
Instead, I am taken by them, constantly reshaped with them. I surrender to 
them. As Ghent (1990) clarifies, surrender is different from submission 
because in the latter I submit to someone or to something, losing a sense of 
agency; instead, I surrender to something that no one controls, I let go to be 
transformed by it, and this brings richness and transformation to my 
experience.  
I relate to the concepts as something that I can make use of; for doing this I 
need to see them beyond the dichotomic options of just following them in a 
rigid way or to reject them as worthless. For being able to use the concepts I 
think that they need to appear as not totally manageable and known by me 
and thus able to give me something that I did not already have.  
I think of this attitude as a yielding or surrendering. Eigen (1981) conceives 
that there is a vital component in psychic maturation that is only developed 
through faith. The notion of faith that the author portrays is akin to notions of 
surrendering or yielding. There is no attempt to control but a letting go to 
something other. As Ghent (1990) posits, it is important to make clear that 
surrendering is not meant as submitting to another or to something but as 
letting go to something that is beyond our control. Yielding and surrendering 
imply a being vulnerable to the transformations that difference can bring.  
For transformation to take place is necessary to be given to what can transform 
us. As Bollas (1979, 1987) develops with his notion of the transformational 
object, the self enters in a state of faith – and even awe – in the presence of 
this object, that can only be felt but not known, transforming our environment 
and self-experience.  
With this, I want to make the meaning of yielding more precise. It is not about 
submission but about a faithful openness and surrendering to what goes 
beyond my grasp. What I want to say is that a relationship with the concepts 
that yields to them can be transforming because it is in contact with unfamiliar 




can use otherness for growth (Eigen, 1981). Conceptualising for becoming 
differently. 
Concepts and theories can also be taken as dogmas – closed systems that 
will not allow any difference and will see any attempt of difference as an attack 
that must be stopped. In these cases of dogmatism, control and mastery are 
paramount; there is not a space for yielding and surrendering – these are 
probably dreaded.  
The processes of surrendering to something other that we cannot control 
opens up the possibility of contact with otherness and moving out of our bubble 
or closed circuit. There is a sensation of freshness and aliveness in meeting 
otherness. The point that I want to stress is that for encountering the freshness 
and aliveness of the other we need to be in an attitude of losing the attempts 
at controlling. Instead, we need to yield, to surrender. This might give us a clue 
for why there is what we could call as longing for surrender (Ghent, 1990). In 
giving up a sense of control and mastery, it appears the possibility of 
something beyond ourselves and with that the sensation of creativity, 
aliveness and meeting with otherness outside our closed circuit. 
As Eigen (1981) expresses what we gain from this faithful attitude is 
transformation: “His reward is not the certainty of being right or wrong at any 
given moment, but the profound change of quality and reorientation he finds 
himself undergoing as an experiencing subject” (1981, p. 429). This thesis has 
been a yielding to be transformed in ways that I could not expect and this has 
entailed to risk ontological insecurity.  
Risking ontological insecurity 
To be able to think in the Deleuzian manner, we need to be willing to be 
affected. “In other words, thought happens under the conditions of thinking 
without method, which remain open to forces of the outside” (Jackson, 2017, 
p. 669). Jackson (2017) is drawing on Deleuze’s (2006) conceptualisation of 
outside, that does not refer to the usual duality of inside/outside but to the 




subjectivities – that are the inside of the outside in a process of continuous 
folding. The outside here is what is ‘outside’ a subjectivity but always producing 
this subjectivity. Thus, this subjectivity is always liable to be transformed by 
the outside. This entails an approach to research where the ‘self’ lends itself 
to be taken and transformed. 
In summary, encounters force thought. To create (or to think) requires 
our openness to the violence of the encounter so that everything is 
transformed, so that the images we rely on to “make sense” are 
destroyed to make way for the new. Including ourselves. (Jackson, 
2017, p. 670) 
As I articulate this, my methodology of conceptualising for becoming differently 
takes potentially intimidating tones. Warning, through conceptualising you 
might become otherwise than you were expecting.  
This type of work asks us to tolerate feeling lost and feeling uncertain. It 
demands to lose our frames of reference. “That I didn’t know how to think—
that I sensed my own thinking becoming a stranger to itself—signaled the 
involuntary emergence of thinking without method” (Jackson, 2017, p. 672). 
Because of the required involvement of the self in this work – where the very 
notion of self is put into question as we become otherwise through our inquiry 
– the risk of losing ontological security is high. We touch the limits of 
intelligibility (Butler, 2004) to be able to think differently, to think anew and that 
involves the possibility of not recognising ourselves.  
This kind of inquiry might also inhabit the limits of intelligibility of a discipline 
(St. Pierre, 2019). In the attempt to bring about the new – and not to represent 
and recognise – the boundaries of the discipline are stretched out. I think that 
it is because I am situated within the social sciences is that I encounter the 
problem of needing a methodology and thus of needing to justify why I am not 
using a set methodology.  This need would not be present in philosophy. 
Maybe this work of thinking again about methodology is about social sciences 
pushing its edges and becoming otherwise, following up a line of flight 




that allows something to become differently. This movement risks 
unintelligibility: Is this research? It does not look like it. While almost all of my 
fellow students were collecting data, transcribing interviews and doing 
analysis, I was reading and writing, reading and writing. Was I doing research? 
Proper research? 
Conclusions 
My research has a relational, productive and immanent onto-epistemology. 
This means that all of what exists is in a constant process of becoming through 
relations. This entails that the boundaries that define one entity from another 
are not drawn in any fundamental or essential way. Instead, with Barad (2007), 
the boundaries are produced through material-discursive practices that work 
as apparatuses that enact the agential cuts of what will be considered the 
entities of a world. My onto-epistemology is immanent because all of this 
relating and producing is happening at the same level. There is not, on the one 
hand, a world of concepts or representations and on the other a world of things 
needing representing. Instead, with Barad (2007), the concepts produce reality 
and matter and the concepts come from material-discursive arrangements.  
I put forward that the concepts can act as apparatuses that produce the 
boundaries that define a particular form of world. For instance, reflexivity 
understood from a representationalistic understanding can act as an 
apparatus that produces a world divided between things and representations 
of these things. Because my perspective highlights how the world is produced 
rather than represented, it makes sense to me to think about the different 
theories in terms of what they produce, that is, in terms of what they enable.  
This does not mean that I think that every theory is equally true so that I believe 
in representationalism as much as I believe in posthumanism. To the contrary, 
I am grounded in this onto-epistemological position that makes me regard 
every theory in its productions rather than in its truth-value; precisely because 
I have a relational, productive and immanent onto-epistemology where 




the theories in what they produce rather than in its truth-value but that, 
paradoxically, I take this relational, productive and immanent perspective as 
truer – precisely as ‘representing’ how the world works23.  
My research is conceptual and I use the concepts and theories to open up 
different worlds so different ways of living and experiencing. My inquiry is about 
opening up different ways of articulating how we make sense of ourselves. I 
do this through reconceptualising reflexivity and experience  
My way is to diffract these concepts through different theories so that they can 
become otherwise and so that a new conceptualisation can emerge from this 
process. Crucially, the new concept or way of understanding also produces a 
different world and so produces me differently. This entails that as a researcher 
I am not a bounded subjectivity but I am becoming with my work, through intra-
acting (with) it. Conceptualising for becoming differently. 
Because of this constant process of shaping and reshaping this kind of 
research risks ontological insecurity – through becoming otherwise, I need to 
lose how I have been used to know and to produce myself. With the ethics that 
I read through Deleuze and Guattari (1987), I do not glorify the processes of 
transformation and becoming otherwise because that might be a way of 
relating that produces either a collapse or a fortified rigid structure. Instead, I 
try to go about my research in a process of becoming a renewed ground – 
again and again.  
I use the concepts to see where they can take me, to diffract and be diffracted 
through them. I am wary of trying not to go into a paranoid reading (Sedgwick, 
2003) that collapses one theory to fortify another one. Instead, I am thinking 
about what I can make, what I can produce with the different theories.  
In this endeavour, it makes sense to me to relate to the different theories and 
authors through using them in the Winnicottian sense (Winnicott, 1971). This 
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kind of use refers to relate to them as something that I cannot completely 
manage so something external from me that I can use precisely because of its 
difference. This way of relating is enabled when a theory or an author is 
attacked through criticism, for example, and the theory or the author survives 
the attack not retaliating or evading it but elaborating from it. Giving this 
response, the theory or the author surprises us with a novelty that is not under 
our control.  
After having developed my methodology, my way of working with the concepts, 
I am ready to start with the reconcepualisation of reflexivity that I will elaborate 
in four chapters (chapter three, four, five and six) and then my 
reconceptualisation of experience in chapter seven. Specifically, the next 
chapter, chapter three, thinks about the need for foreign fields to reflexively 
question our assumptions. My thesis not only uses different theories but 
different disciplines (or fields). In that sense, in a way, this next chapter also 








Chapter 3: Questioning our 












In this chapter, I wonder about how to think about the possibility of questioning 
our assumptions – that is encouraged in the social sciences – without resorting 
to the notion that we can stand in a neutral place, outside ourselves and our 
social involvements, to critically assess what we are taking for granted.  I 
develop that a possibility for being reflexive, in the sense of questioning our 
assumptions, is given through yielding24 to foreignness, rather than 
intentionally and masterfully deciding to question them. After setting my thesis 
about yielding to foreignness as a way for questioning what we take for 
granted, I open the question about what might make us prone to risk ourselves 
to foreignness and what are the transforming possibilities that this might bring.  
My circumstances are related to the content of this chapter. My research had 
started as a psychotherapeutic inquiry that used some philosophical concepts 
and has moved to a more poststructural and posthuman inquiry. In this 
movement to different fields, I have come to question, without intending it, what 
I was taking for granted before. This chapter was the first that I wrote about 
reflexivity from a social perspective; moving away from my previous focus on 
subjectivity from psychoanalytic and phenomenological existential 
perspectives. In a way, this chapter opened the road for me to develop the 
thesis in its current form; this is why I start with this chapter. I think of my work 
as interdisciplinary and I believe that this interdisciplinary is, to a great extent, 
what encourages me to continuously question what I am taking for granted.  
Foucault in one of the versions of the preface of the volume 2 of The History 
of Sexuality, narrates how he arrived at this book which made a substantial 
shift in relation to his previous articulations:  
And it led in turn to a rearrangement of my original plan, a considerable 
delay in publication, and the hazards of studying material I had barely 
heard of six or seven years ago. But I reflected that, after all, it was best 
																																																						
24 As I developed in the Methodology chapter using psychoanalysis (Bollas, 1987; Eigen, 1981; 
Ghent, 1990; Winnicott, 1971) yielding is an important concept for me that points at not trying 
to master and control something other – something foreign – so that we can use it and 




to sacrifice a definite program to a promising line of approach. I also 
reminded myself that it would probably not be worth the trouble of 
making books if they failed to teach the author something he had not 
known before, if they did not lead to unforeseen places, and if they did 
not disperse one toward a strange and new relation with himself. The 
pain and pleasure of the book is to be an experience. (Foucault, 1997, 
p. 205) 
As Foucault makes apparent here, yielding to foreignness, in the sense of 
strangeness, can produce a new way of relating to oneself – a novel manner 
of being reflexive about oneself25. This shift is what allows us to question our 
previous assumptions. I am proposing that the possibility of questioning what 
we are taking for granted is given by risking ourselves to foreign territories.  
In this chapter, I wonder about how I can think about the capacity of being 
reflexive about my assumptions – in the sense of being able to question them 
– while I think that the subject is not a bounded individuality that can 
sovereignly exercise reflexivity. I want to question my assumptions – and 
qualitative research and psychotherapeutic practice ask me to do so – but 
does that imply that I would need a neutral place ‘outside’ myself to observe 
and question myself? Furthermore, does this imply that there is a self (myself) 
as a unit already there that I can be reflexive about? How am I supposed to 
question my assumptions if I am continuously culturally produced?  
To have a poststructuralist understanding and to use reflexivity might be a 
conflicting practice (Davies et al., 2004). When we are reflexive we are 
questioning ourselves and our assumptions; this may be understood to take 
for granted that there is a self already there to be known and questioned from 
an external and neutral place. Foucault and Butler challenge this notion. We 
																																																						
25 Here I am outlining what I will develop in the next chapter (number four) about my 
conceptualisation of reflexivity as affective ways of relating that produce. This reflexivity is a 
continuous activity that does not require to be explicitly articulated; nonetheless, we can bring 
our attention to it in a meta-reflexive gesture (that is also another way of relating that 
produces). However, inevitably, throughout the thesis – and more so before chapter four where 
I directly reconceptualise reflexivity – I use the word reflexivity as it is dominantly understood, 
that is, as a cognitive and intentional activity, and also as each author that I work with defines 
it. When I am using my conceptualisation of reflexivity, I signal that I am referring to it, that is, 




learn from them that social discourses are continuously productive of 
subjectivities and we cannot stand outside of them to question our 
assumptions; whenever we are reflexive we do so traversed by social 
discourses. (Butler, 2004, 2005; Foucault, 1990) 
Many authors from the social sciences (T. Adams & Holman Jones, 2011; 
Davies et al., 2004; Denzin, 1997; Gemignani, 2017; Lather, 1993; Pillow, 
2003, 2015) address this dilemma explicitly in different ways. They use 
reflexivity while also acknowledging its limits, they think about the subject as 
already social. In this paper, I hope to contribute to this thread through 
grappling with the question: How can we question our assumptions when we 
cannot stand outside social discourses because we are traversed by them? 
Bringing Bourdieu to the conversation, I offer the thesis that reflexivity, as 
questioning our assumptions, emerges through yielding to the foreignness of 
unfamiliar social fields or positionings.  
With Foucault and Butler, I understand that our assumptions are produced by 
our adherence to certain social discourses that breathe through us. Because 
we are social through and through we cannot question our assumptions from 
an asocial space. On the contrary, inspired by Bourdieu26, reflexivity has a 
chance to emerge when we go out of our familiar social fields through 
concretely moving between the borders of foreign fields or positions. I offer this 
as a way of understanding a reflexive practice – questioning one’s 
assumptions – whilst holding a poststructuralist notion of subjectivity. 
																																																						
26 Bourdieu contributions also build in structuralism, proposing an alternative to go beyond it, 
but it is not considered poststructuralism in the same way as Foucault is (Harcourt, 2007). 
Bourdieu theorises two moments. The first is related with objectivism and structuralism, in 
which the subject is taken out of the picture. In this analysis, a field is sketched through 
positions stated by the amount of total capital and of specific capitals (economic, cultural, 
social and symbolic). The particular point of view of any agent in the field will we shaped by 
his position. The second moment is related to this position that is expressed in a habitus, that 
is a corporeal way of embracing practices and ways of perceiving the world. 
This habitus is made in the roots of the position in the field and is 
also constructing, reproducing or changing the same field. This way of being –habitus- is not 
conscious, that is why in a solely subjective phenomenal account you cannot explain these 
conditions that make this very account possible (Bourdieu, 1989; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 




Reflexivity as the questioning of our assumptions has the chance to emerge 
when we yield to foreignness.  
In what follows, I sketch the call to being reflexive about our assumptions in 
the social sciences. I trouble the possibility of responding to this call drawing 
on Foucault and Butler, who insist that the ways in which we are reflexive about 
ourselves and our work are constrained by the social discourses available. 
Taking this understanding of reflexivity, I set out to explore the possibilities of 
reflexively questioning our assumptions. Bourdieu’s contribution provides us 
with the notion that reflexivity emerges through the crisis produced by the 
mismatch between the subject’s habitus and a new field or position within a 
field. On the other hand, Foucault offers the possibility of thinking otherwise 
through becoming aware that our constitution is contingent and proposing to 
intentionally test our limits. Appreciating Foucault’s motor to become 
differently, I stay with the Bourdieusian need for stumbling against different 
fields, finding ourselves in a dissonance that brings our previously held 
assumptions to the fore, rather than purposefully trying out new practices to 
push the boundaries of our constitution. Butler (2004) underscores that 
because social discourses produce us as subjects, they give us an ontological 
ground that gets shaken in the exploration of foreign terrains. In that sense, 
yielding to foreignness might be a risky practice and it is worth asking what 
circumstances may make it a desirable practice. I underscore Butler’s 
emphasis on the necessity to open alternatives and question our assumptions 
– rather than the desire to do so – because our current situation asks for it. I 
conclude by developing the need to yield to foreignness through stumbling 
against what we do not expect to be able to challenge our assumptions and 
be potentially transformed.  
How can we respond to the call of being reflexive about our 
assumptions? 
In the social sciences, the call to be reflexive in the sense of questioning our 




Denzin & Lincoln, 2017; Etherington, 2017; Finlay, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2017; 
Gemignani, 2017; Pillow, 2003, 2015; G. Rose, 1997; Shaw, 2016; Wilkinson, 
1988). For instance, Finlay, a psychotherapist with a keen interest in reflexivity, 
posits in a recent special issue around reflexivity:  
With reflexivity, researchers examine and deconstruct the way their 
research knowledge is created. They evaluate how they might be 
contingently implicated in their research by examining how their 
background, assumptions, positioning, behaviour, and subjectivity 
might impact on the research process and vice versa. (Finlay, 2017, p. 
120)  
She underscores how the researcher needs to be critically aware of 
themselves to see, for example, how their assumptions close down and open 
up possibilities of understanding (Finlay, 2008, p. 17). Wilkinson, a feminist 
researcher, in a widely quoted paper says: “Reflexive analysis here entails 
continuous, critical examination of the practice/process of research to reveal 
its assumptions, values, and biases” (Wilkinson, 1988, p. 495). In a recent 
handbook of qualitative research Denzin and Lincoln say:  
Reflexivity – as well as the poststructural and postmodern sensibilities 
concerning quality in qualitative research – demands that we 
interrogate each of our selves regarding the ways in which research 
efforts are shaped and staged around the binaries, contradictions, and 
paradoxes that form our own lives. (2017, p. 143)  
With the examples above I hope to have illustrated how we as social scientists 
are called, in different ways, to be reflexive about our assumptions. At this 
juncture, I would like to introduce a Foucauldian argument to trouble the 
possibility to straightforwardly responding to this call. 
For instance, Denzin and Lincoln (2017) suggest a particular way of reflexivity 
that invites us to interrogate ourselves (in plural), being aware of our 
multiplicity, contradictions and of how the selves are continuously created in 
the research process itself. I do not think that this is an idea that came just out 
of the mind of its authors. In contrast, I think that the influence of 
poststructuralism and postmodernism in our field is allowing us a particular 




even welcome – our discontinuities, contradictions and ambiguities. This is 
what I learn from the late Foucault (1984, 1990, 1997): the way in which we 
look at ourselves – and through this, the way in which we produce ourselves 
– is not apart from the discourses that we have available. We can think that 
because it is currently culturally intelligible – and valued – to posit a multiple, 
contradictory and ambiguous sense of self, researchers might be more prone 
to be reflexive about themselves in that way. Therefore, we are reflexive about 
ourselves in a more complex way – allowing multiplicity, contradiction and 
ambiguity – but we do so being also spoken through a cultural discourse 
influential in the social sciences that gives the possibility and the incentive to 
do so. So, we are reflexive about our assumptions, we might be critical of them, 
but we do so being somewhat obedient to another set of assumptions of what 
is available and validated in our discipline.  
Conceiving reflexivity as socially produced, the call to being reflexive about our 
assumptions in the social sciences is troubled. How are we going to be critically 
aware of what we take-for-granted if we cannot stand outside the social? Even 
in troubling ourselves and questioning our assumptions we are being spoken 
by, say, poststructualism, that operates as a social discourse that encourages 
us to look at ourselves in particular ways. So how can we be reflexive about 
our assumptions if we cannot stand outside discourse?  In the next section, I 
develop further this argument about how the way in which we are reflexive is 
socially instituted.  
We are never reflexive alone 
According to Butler (2005) the ‘I’ arrives belatedly when we are already subject 
to a social order that gives the available possibilities of what would be an 
intelligible subjectivity. Butler contends:  
When the “I” seeks to give an account of itself, it can start with itself, but 
it will find that this self is already implicated in a social temporality that 
exceeds its own capacities for narration; indeed, when the “I” seeks to 




its own emergence, it must, as a matter of necessity, become a social 
theorist. (2005, p. 8) 
Furthermore, according to Butler (2005), the way in which we are relating to 
ourselves is enabled by the discourses that constitute the possibilities of 
intelligibility – that is, the recognisable ways of being a subject. She is emphatic 
in saying, informed by psychoanalysis, that we are always partially opaque to 
ourselves. We are always reflexive about ourselves in a social context that is 
forming ourselves in ways that we cannot fully understand. 
I remember how reading this book by Butler affected my ways of being aware 
of myself. I was immersed in the reading when a colleague and friend called 
me and as usual asked me: “how are you?” In other occasions, this question 
would have led me into an extended and nuanced ‘description’ of how I have 
been feeling, what I have been thinking and so forth. At that moment, though, 
nothing could come to my mind. What could I say, anyway? How was I going 
to make sense of myself at that moment? On what narratives was I going to 
draw? How was my account related to the asking? I believe that this book got 
into me, that I yielded to its foreignness – I welcomed it in – and this movement 
brought a sense of misfit and disorientation to a practice of making sense of 
myself that I was used to. Later on, I could critically elaborate on the 
assumptions that I was holding whilst able to just answer the question: “how 
are you?” 
Foucault’s theory has a long-standing commitment to understanding how the 
social discourses are inscribed in the sense of self – a theorisation to which he 
arrived in his later works. He explains his aim saying that: 
Finally, I have sought to study - it is my current work - the way a human 
being turns himself into a subject. For example, I have chosen the 
domain of sexuality-how men have learned to recognize themselves as 
subjects of "sexuality." (Foucault, 1982, p. 778) 
Bringing this to the practice of reflexivity in the social sciences, the ways in 
which I am aware of myself as a researcher are not apart from the discursive 




Discursive practices are characterized by the demarcation of a field of 
objects, by the definition of a legitimate perspective for a subject of 
knowledge, by the setting of norms for elaborating concepts and 
theories. Hence, each of them presupposes a play of prescriptions that 
govern exclusions and selections. (Foucault, 1997, p. 11) 
It is important to say that for Foucault (1997) there is no one to one 
correspondence between certain discursive practices and certain disciplines. 
For instance, my way of writing this text including my ‘experiences’ is enabled 
because in my field, in the place that I work, in the journals that I read and the 
conferences that I go to, this practice is recognised. All these encourage us to 
be reflexive about ourselves by drawing from our ‘experiences’. But this is not 
as straightforward; in the same field, there are also competing discourses that 
are more critical on the notion and the use of ‘experience’ (Jackson & Mazzei, 
2008, 2012a, 2017) – this is why I add the quote marks. In this sense, there is 
not a stable categorisation of what is conceivable and valuable but an ongoing 
dynamic where power/knowledge is involved in the struggle to validate claims. 
According to Foucault:  
To be more precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided 
between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the 
dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of 
discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 100) 
To conclude, for Foucault and Butler, we are never reflexive in isolation. The 
very ways in which we are reflexive about ourselves are socially given. In this 
panorama, the call to reflexively questioning our assumptions is complicated 
because we are always drawing from social discourses in our reflexive activity. 
The question then is how can we be able to see and trouble what we take for 
granted? In the next section, I delve more in Bourdieu seeing what his theory 




Reflexivity emerging from mismatches: Bourdieu’s perspective  
The notion of reflexivity27 influenced by Bourdieusian theory places it outside 
the volition of the subject and in the mismatch between habitus and field (M. 
Adams, 2006; Adkins, 2003; Bondi, 2009; Bottero, 2010; McNay, 1999; 
Rafieian & Davis, 2016; Yang, 2013). Habitus refers to the embodied 
knowledge of how to perceive and act that is born from our positioning in a 
social field that, in turn, is structured according to the amounts of different 
types of capital (economic, cultural and social) that people hold. (Bourdieu, 
1984, 1989; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992)  
Different fields are structured so that there are sectors that hold more capital 
(economic, cultural, social) and there are struggles to get to positions of 
greater validation. The value that a piece of work has is related to its 
positioning “The meaning of a work (artistic, literary, philosophical, etc.) 
changes automatically with each change in the field within which it is situated 
for the spectator or reader.” (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 30-31) 
When I am using Butler and Foucault which sector of the field am I addressing? 
What does it say about me as an author that I work with them? How I feel about 
myself when using them changes according to the different fields and my 
position in them; when I am teaching I might feel knowledgeable and critical, 
when I am at a conference filled with people working with new materialisms 
(Coole & Frost, 2010), I might feel old fashioned. My work is valued and 
																																																						
27 It is important to underline that this is a notion of reflexivity inspired by Bourdieu rather than 
faithful to his own direct conceptualisation of reflexivity and to the whole of his theory. It is in 
Bourdieu’s commentators (M. Adams, 2006; Adkins, 2003; Bondi, 2009; Bottero, 2010; 
McNay, 1999; Rafieian & Davis, 2016; Yang, 2013) rather than in his own work that the link 
between reflexivity and the dynamic of the mismatch can be seen. In fact, when Bourdieu 
speaks directly about reflexivity his notion differs from the definition that I have suggested. He 
says that his aim is to achieve greater objectivity through reflexivity as exercised by people in 
the academic field (Bourdieu, 2004; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu is keen to say that 
we cannot step out of our positioning to be reflexive. In that sense, he posits that it needs to 
become part of the habitus as a reflex, that is, automatic. Importantly, for this to happen it 
needs to be a collective enterprise; being part of the habitus it needs to be promoted from the 




perceived very differently in relation to the field and the position within it that I 
am holding.  
For Bourdieu, what is more pervasive is a pre-reflective (that is, embodied and 
not cognitively thematised) adaptation to our field – precisely because our 
habitus is created by it. It is only when our habitus does not fit with the field 
that our unquestioned assumptions are foregrounded. I suggest the 
expression like a fish out of the water conveys this experience. Levenson 
quotes Mcluhan saying “We don’t know who discovered water, but we do know 
it wasn’t a fish” (2001, p. 239). It is unlikely that we are reflexive about how we 
are and what are we immersed in if we have not inhabited other surroundings.  
When, for example, I speak about my ideas with someone who comes from 
another theoretical perspective, or who belongs to other institutions or 
traditions, their comments could put my thinking in a different light so that I am 
able to suddenly see something that I was previously assuming. This might be 
refreshing; it might also be upsetting.  
In that sense, I am saying that a possibility of being reflexive about our 
assumptions is through yielding to the foreignness that emerges from different 
fields or positionings. Conceiving that we are socially constituted, including the 
ways in which we are reflexive about ourselves, the possibility of developing 
reflexivity is not standing outside the social but moving between frontiers.  This 
implies that questioning our assumptions is not an activity that we can do 
intentionally and at will; instead, explicitly questioning our assumptions, is an 
aposteriori elaboration on a shift that already happened in the mismatch 
between habitus and field.  
Reflexivity emerges from the mismatch between habitus and field because this 
gives the opportunity to become aware of our habitus. This is more prone to 
happen in times of crisis (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) because in a crisis the 
stability of the fields is in jeopardy. It implies a defamiliarisation with our 
habitual ways of thinking, perceiving and acting; thus, enabling change. 




fit between the feel for the game and the game itself, must itself be understood 
as a transforming practice.” (Adkins, 2003, p. 27)  
Bourdieu (1977) refers to this reflexivity – emerging from mismatches  –  as 
the awakening of consciousness. He differentiates his understanding from 
Sartre’s use of the phrase. For understanding the awakening of 
consciousness, the existential philosopher postulates a subject that can stand 
outside of its social constraints and become conscious of its unsurmountable 
freedom (Sartre, 2015)28. In contrast, Bourdieu proposes that this 
consciousness can only be reached having the more material foundation of 
the movement across fields or within them.  
The practical questioning of the theses implied in a particular way of 
living that is brought about by "culture contact” or by the political and 
economic crises correlative with class division is not the purely 
intellectual operation which phenomenology designates by the term 
epoché, the deliberate, methodical suspension of naive adherence to 
the world. The critique which brings the undiscussed into discussion, 
the unformulated into formulation, has as the condition of its possibility 
objective crisis, which, in breaking the immediate fit between the 
subjective structures and the objective structures, destroys self-
evidence practically. (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 168-169) 
It is very relevant how Bourdieu describes the fields as producing a 
naturalisation that makes difficult that the members of it are reflexive about it. 
“Every established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and with 
very different means) the naturalization of its own arbitrariness” (Bourdieu, 
1977, p. 164). The extreme of this, when things appear as self-evident, is 
called doxa. “This experience we shall call doxa, so as to distinguish it from an 
orthodox or heterodox belief implying awareness and recognition of the 
possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs.” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 164) 
In this way, orthodox discourse tries to go back to the doxa, without succeeding 
because the horizon of heterodoxy – that is, competing alternatives – is 
already present. In this sense, Bourdieu differentiates the opposition between 
right and wrong in the terrain of the opinion from the opposition between what 
																																																						




can be thought and articulated (be it right or wrong, orthodox or heterodox) 
and what is taken for granted (doxa).  (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 169-170) 
McNay (1999) richly develops this Bourdieusian notion of reflexivity as 
emerging from mismatches29. Adams (2006) specifies that McNay draws in a 
particular aspect of Bourdieu’s theory to think about reflexivity, namely the 
possibility of transformation and change in the very movement across or within 
fields. Adkins (2003) contributes that: “Reflexivity is therefore understood by 
McNay not to be a generalized, universal capacity of subjects but to arise 
unevenly from subjects’ embeddedness within differing sets of power 
relations.” (2003, p. 30) 
Inspired by this Bourdieusian perspective, I would put forward that reflexively 
questioning our assumptions is not an activity of self-observation and self-
crafting but of the surprises that can emerge when we yield to be affected by 
our dwelling in a different field and/or a different position within a known field. 
Even more, I think that reflexivity is spurred when we inhabit different fields 
and/or positionings and yield ourselves to be conflicted. In this way, we would 
nurture reflexivity in spaces of diversity and dissonance. For instance, Pillow 
(2015) calls attention to the separation between theoretical ascriptions as 
illustrated by how at conferences “all the white poststructuralists sit at the same 
table” (p. 431). In contrast, Pillow (2015) proposes a coming together of 
approaches that are in a potentially productive tension with each other.  
According to Bourdieu  (1984, 1989, 1990, 1993), the sharing with people in 
the vicinities of the field assures us a tacit understanding and coordination 
because of having similar habitus. This does not facilitate a reflexive – in the 
sense of critically questioning – engagement with ourselves and our 
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mismatch is not a given. In fact, it can happen what he calls the ‘hysteresis of habitus’ where 
the habitus and the new field or positioning continue to be out of sync because the subject 
stays with the previous habitus (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). The hysteresis of habitus can 
produce an inability to think in a renewed way, stubbornly thinking and perceiving in terms of 
the past (Bourdieu, 1977). This makes clear that the mismatch can enable transforming 




surroundings. Hence, when we stay in our familiar certainties, not exploring or 
even disdaining other possibilities, it might be more difficult to be reflexive 
about our assumptions. 
Bourdieu argues that within a field there are assumptions that structure the 
field and are invisible for the people who are inside. If someone were to 
articulate a critique about the field that exposes its assumptions, they would 
need to be outside the field unless the very form of the critique is done in a 
way that is coherent with the logic of the field (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 73). This 
makes me think about the critique that I made at the end of the first section on 
reflexivity in the social sciences. I suggested that when we interrogate 
ourselves, allowing multiplicity and paradoxes, this critical questioning of 
ourselves is also obedient to a discourse validated in our field. I posited that 
this interrogation of ourselves might also entail submissiveness to our field. 
According to Bourdieu’s suggestion, I can do this critique without risking my 
belonging to the field because in the very critique I am using the logic of the 
field: I am precisely putting forward a paradox in our possibilities to be critical 
and through this, I am responding to the call to question myself.  
Now, how was I able to arrive at that critique? I believe that my dwelling in 
different fields – interdisciplinarity – is important. For example, I came into 
contact with Foucault’s and Butler’s writings. But, can I differentiate so clearly 
one field from the others? Foucault (and Butler) can help me with this. 
Thinking about social fields as fluctuating with Foucault   
For Foucault (1978, 1997) the disciplines are not clearly delineated and 
differentiated from one another. For example, it is not that psychotherapy as a 
discipline has a certain number of ruling discourses, but it is subject to dynamic 
and ongoing configurations. This helps me to specify that the foreign fields I 
am referring to do not coincide with different disciplines. It can happen that 
different disciplines are ruled by the same discursive practices and conversely 
within one discipline there may be plenty of space for variation and movement 




This connects with different conceptualisations of power in Foucault and 
Bourdieu. Both agree that power works directly on bodies and on ways of 
thinking without a conscious decision by the subject. However, Foucault holds 
a thoroughly relational view of power: it is about particular and situated 
configurations (Foucault, 1978). In contrast, for Bourdieu, power is associated 
with capital and can be exerted by people situated in a privileged position in 
the field. (Akram, Emerson & Marsh, 2015; Bourdieu, 1989)   
Moreover, for Foucault, power already implies resistance “Where there is 
power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is 
never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (Foucault, 1978, p. 95). I 
think that this grants Foucault a much more unstable view of society, where 
resistance might produce shifts on apparently stable discourses. In 
comparison, Bourdieu’s society is much more stable depending on amounts 
of capital of which the economic is always the most fundamental. (Yang, 2013) 
Likewise, Butler (1997a) stresses her difference from Bourdieu in that he 
separates the discursive from the social domain giving precedence to the 
social structures. Whereas Butler insists that they cannot be separated.  For 
Bourdieu, it is a social position that can authorise someone; for Butler is the 
utterance itself. (Butler, 1997a; Nentwich, Ozbilgin, & Tatli, 2013)   
Hence, both Foucault and Butler hold a more dynamic notion of society that I 
adhere to. Hence, I am taking Bourdieu’s notion for thinking about the 
possibility of questioning our assumptions in the mismatch of habitus and field; 
but, with Foucault and Butler, I think of the relationship between habitus and 
field in a more dynamic manner.  
In the next section, I develop the Foucauldian notion of how questioning 
practices emerge from straying afield from oneself (Foucault, 1990) and our 
usual circuits. Foucault (1990) thinks that we need strangeness to continue 




through contact with something unfamiliar30 but this arises in a different way 
from Bourdieu. I find in Foucault a motivation to risk foreignness, a subject 
wanting to do so; whereas Bourdieu does not posit a motivation but situates 
the possibility of reflexivity in a mismatch that goes well beyond the conscious 
intentions of the subject.   
Straying afield from oneself: Foucault’s perspective   
It is clear how vital it is according to Foucault to explore different ways of 
problematising. He declares about his work: “The object was to learn to what 
extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what it silently 
thinks, and so enable it to think differently.” (Foucault, 1990, p. 9) 
The self in Foucault is always incomplete – in an ongoing process – and fragile 
(Fillion, 1998; Longford, 2001). Furthermore, the self is constituted in a 
historical context. This means that its construction is contingent: it could have 
been otherwise. Historical analysis sheds light on other possibilities of 
constitution helping us to have a perspective on our current construction. 
When we have this perspective, the possibility of acting and thinking otherwise 
is opened. We become de-familiarised with what we take for granted through 
becoming more familiar with something other (Fillion, 1998). In the same vein, 
N. Rose (1996) proposes historical investigation as a means to promote our 
capacity to contest what otherwise would be assumed as natural. “I 
nonetheless hope that, in rendering the historical contingency of our 
contemporary relations to ourselves more visible, they may help open these 
up for interrogation and transformation.” (p. 3) 
In light of the notion that the self is produced historically and contextually; the 
possibility is opened to alternative ways to produce ourselves as subjectivities 
																																																						
30 Similarly, Deleuze (2004) conceptualises thought as emerging from an encounter with 
something that we cannot recognise. I wish to notice this convergence but it would take me 
away from the particular exercise of this chapter to delve in the Deleuzian conceptualisation. 
Nonetheless, I touched on it in the chapter on Methodology in the section Concepts as opening 





through appreciating the contingency of our constitution and risking ourselves 
to different practices from the ones that are supported by the historical systems 
that have produced us. Precisely, Foucault’s (1984, 1986, 1990) aesthetics of 
existence are directed to a project of being de-centred and transformed. Even 
if as I have explored in the section We are never reflexive alone, Foucault sees 
how we are aware of ourselves as culturally enabled and not as an intentional 
action by a subject, he also proposes an intentional reflexive process of self-
stylization where we disturb what we are used to and risk ourselves to new 
practices that detach us from how we have been. “I shall thus characterize the 
philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves as a 
historico-practical test of the limits that we may go beyond, and thus as work 
carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings” (Foucault, 1984, p. 
45). In the Foucauldian understanding, then, we can engage in intentional 
reflexive practices that transform our subjectivity.  
Even if Foucault refers to an intentional reflexive work on ourselves performed 
by ourselves, with what can be read as an individualistic and bounded tone, 
the Foucauldian notion of self-creation and transformation has the implicit idea 
that the self is formed from something other. The self is created in a reflexive 
exercise (Foucault, 1984); but, I insist, this reflexive exercise, these ways of 
relating to ourselves are not conscious or intentional and they are socially 
instituted (Foucault, 1986, 1990). Deleuze (2006) sees in Foucault’s later 
writings, especially in The use of pleasure a conceptualisation of the formation 
of the self through a reflexive folding of the social, that inaugurates the 
distinction of inside and outside (self and society). Deleuze underscores how 
the outside/inside has not fixed boundaries precisely because the inside is 
made in a folding the outside. Importantly, if the self is created in a folding 
movement of the outside (the social) that creates an inside (the self), then the 
notion of foreignness gets complicated. If the foreign is what is outside, in this 




For example, I learn to relate to myself – to be reflexive about myself – as 
gendered, as a woman. This is not my invention; it is a social discourse that I, 
unintentionally, fold back to myself, I relate to myself as a woman and through 
that, I produce myself as a woman. As I understand it, in the aesthetics of 
existence that Foucault invites, I could become aware that this way of relating 
to myself is historical and thus, not necessary and, in the light of that, I could 
intentionally push the boundaries to relate to myself in other ways – e.g. not 
assuming gender – that produce me differently. 
Bourdieu, on the other hand, does not refer to the self-constituting reflexivity 
as folding that we see in Foucault, for Bourdieu the fields act in our habitus 
directly. Instead, according to Foucault there is an internal and reflective space 
that is produced in a folding of the social. Once this internal space is formed 
we can have a certain independence from social space. (Deleuze 2006)31. I 
think that it is that independence what grants Foucault the possibility of an 
intentional reflexive practice of self-stylization.  
However, this reflexive relation to oneself is never apart from the power-
relations that instate it in the first place. “Recuperated  by power-relations  and  
relations  of knowledge,  the  relation  to  oneself  is  continually  re-born,  
elsewhere and  otherwise” (Deleuze, 2006, p. 104). It is important to 
emphasise that, as Butler (2005) discusses, Foucault’s notion of reflexive 
practices of self-creation is not made from the position of a centred and 
sovereign subject. “We find in Foucault an understanding that reflexivity, self-
care, and self-mastery are all open-ended and unsatisfiable efforts to ‘return’ 
to a self from the situation of being foreign to oneself.” (2005, p. 129) 
For Foucault, the exercise of thinking and acting otherwise is the motive of his 
work. I see in Foucault a strong motor to get lost, to become undone, to explore 
different ways of becoming. 
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It was curiosity - the only kind of curiosity, in any case, that is worth 
acting upon with a degree of obstinacy: not the curiosity that seeks to 
assimilate what it is proper for one to know, but that which enables one 
to get free of oneself. After all, what would be the value of the passion 
for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of 
knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent 
possible, in the knower’s straying afield of himself? There are times in 
life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one 
thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary 
if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all. (Foucault, 1990, p. 8)  
Foucault’s writing inspires me. I feel that there is indeed something 
aesthetically appealing about it. It makes me desire to explore and get lost and 
there is a poetic tonality to it. To me, questioning our assumptions in this way 
evokes a self that is desiring to do so more than the stumbling that the 
Bourdieusian misfit between habitus and field brings. Nonetheless, both 
Foucault and Bourdieu speak about the importance to go out of our usual 
circuits for being able to question our assumptions. What would be then the 
particular contribution of Bourdieu? Why do I still need Bourdieu for my 
argument? In the next section, I explore this question.  
Stumbling against foreignness with Bourdieu 
Foucault’s use of the expression straying afield of himself brings to mind 
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of fields. Even so, the Bourdieusian and 
Foucauldian ways of articulating this are different. McNay (1999) is critical 
towards the Foucauldian notion of self-stylization, considering it overly 
voluntarist. That is why she turns to Bourdieu: “Habitus suggests a layer of 
embodied experience that is not immediately amenable to self-fashioning.” 
(1999, p. 102). As I briefly discussed earlier, she draws on Bourdieu to argue 
that change is produced – in partial and uneven ways – in the concrete struggle 
of inhabiting different fields. “The questioning of conventional notions of 
femininity does not arise from exposure to and identification with a greater 
array of alternative images of femininity but from tensions inherent in the 




The Bourdieusian emphasis on the need for a concrete movement to different 
fields and/or positions is the reason why Bourdieu continues to be a necessary 
contribution to my argument. Taking his conceptualisation further, I think that 
the fields dwell in the subject in ways that the subject is not conscious of. 
Inhabiting a foreign field or position affects my perspective in ways that I do 
not anticipate, like when I stayed wordless faced upon the question “how are 
you?” I take Bourdieu’s input because it makes me think in the concrete 
movement and clash that is needed to ignite reflexivity.  
Both Bourdieu and Foucault bring to the fore the need for some kind of 
foreignness to be able to question our assumptions.  For Foucault, it is more 
a process of conceiving other options and engaging in different practices of 
the self that push the boundaries to produce ourselves differently. In contrast, 
for Bourdieu the process is not intentional; it is not about having in mind 
different options but about our bodies – our habitus – coming into contact with 
unfamiliar fields that produce a mismatch. I highlight the need to stumbling 
against foreignness (as with Bourdieu) rather than the intentional process of 
working upon ourselves testing our limits (Foucault, 1984) because I 
emphasise how we find ourselves with a different perspective due to our 
dwellings into foreign terrains. I think of a yielding to foreignness and the 
surprises that can bring, rather than an intentional project of the self of pushing 
our boundaries.  Hence, it is not about wanting to yield to foreignness but about 
finding ourselves in a situation where it is asked for us to yield to foreignness. 
It emerges the question: what situations might enable that we yield to 
foreignness? If it is not a voluntary and masterful decision, what can make us 
prone to do it? As Bourdieu notices even in the mismatch of habitus and field 
there can be a hysteresis of the habitus, where the person holds on to their 
previous assumptions and manners (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). What 
situations can be thought as more favourable for us to risk ourselves to 




The need to yield to foreignness: Butler’s emphasis  
Arguably, wanting to yield to foreignness is not an easy movement to sustain. 
For instance, Laplanche portrays how in Freudian theory there are movements 
of decentring that are subsequently recentred, “the   dominant   tendency   is   
always   to relativize   the   discovery   and   to   re-assimilate   and reintegrate 
the alien, so to speak” (1999, 66). In a similar vein, Butler contends that, 
psychoanalytically, the ego tries to maintain immobility and sameness.  
The "mastery" of the ego would then be identified as the effect of the 
death drive, and life, in a Nietzschean sense, would break apart that 
mastery, initiating a lived mode of becoming that contests the stasis and 
defensive status of the ego. (Butler, 1997b, pp. 193-194)  
Kristeva (1991) argues that we are foreign to our own selves. 
Psychoanalytically ‘our’ unconscious is that very intimate part of ourselves that 
at the same time is strange and ungraspable. The stranger is within us. She 
puts forward that assuming this might make us less rejecting of foreignness: 
“How could one tolerate a foreigner if one did not know one was a stranger to 
oneself?” (p. 182). Nonetheless, Visker (2005) makes a critique about 
Kristeva’s argument saying that precisely because foreigners have different 
ways of doing things, they make evident that our ways are not necessary – 
they could be otherwise – which brings a destabilisation of a sense of security: 
we could be different, even slightly different, if we are how we are it is not a 
necessary thing but a product of our living arrangements. They remind us that 
there is a foreignness that we cannot expel – because it is constituting us. In 
that way, Kristeva’s conclusion is reversed: because we are foreigners to our 
own selves, foreigners can irritate us. In the academic field, maybe to be in 
contact with colleagues who concern themselves with something similar to us 
but in a different way might produce a sense of anxiety because we would 
need to re-validate – or question – our own ways, ways that we might be 
emotionally as well as intellectually attached to. Why would we put ourselves 




If we are part of a minority or a segregated group, we may feel like a fish out 
of water. The mismatch between habitus and field would be already there. It 
would be as if that world is not made for us. That might make us prone to 
reflexivity, to question our assumptions, and maybe also to question the social 
assumptions.  
Akram and Hogan (2015) have underscored how to have breaches in life 
could, but not guarantee, being reflexive about taken-for-granted beliefs. They 
conclude that something needs not to be working for us so that we can risk 
ourselves to newness. Concordantly to this idea, Bourdieu says: 
The dominated classes have an interest in pushing back the limits of 
doxa and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted; the 
dominant classes have an interest in defending the integrity of doxa or, 
short of this, of establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect 
substitute, orthodoxy. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 169) 
If one is black living in a world that privileges whiteness one could not but think 
about race. We could think that in these cases reflexivity is forced. This is akin 
to what Bourdieu calls the lucidity of the excluded (Bourdieu, 1990). Thinking 
in the social sciences, many of the theories that are more critical – questioning 
dominant assumptions – are associated with unprivileged groups, I am thinking 
about postcolonialism, feminism, queer theory, etc. 
But is this as fixed? We only need to think about how dominated classes also 
reproduce and desire what enslave them/us. Also, revolutionary movements 
can come from a political and/or intellectual elite that would not be benefited 
economically from the revolution.  
How are we to think of privilege? Is this something that you have? I think that 
the more dynamic and relational version of power and resistance that Foucault 
(1978) brings might help here. As I discussed earlier, Foucault sees power as 
more fragile in that it is always entangled with possibilities of resistance and 
subversion.  
We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process 
whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, 




starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and 
produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, 
renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. (Foucault, 1978, p. 
101) 
Is it not the case that previously unprivileged or excluded groups have 
transformed their situation so that now they are validated and valued (at least 
in certain circles)? This contributes with a much more mobile and emergent 
comprehension about privilege and the possibilities of subversion. 
Furthermore, for Foucault (Fornet-Betancourt, Becket, & Gomez-Muller, 1987; 
Foucault, 1984, 1990), the motivation for questioning our assumptions does 
not stem only from opening up possibilities for people that are in an 
unprivileged position. Instead, he puts emphasis on curiosity and the possibility 
to think otherwise in itself as a motivating force.  
Butler (2004), in contrast, is stronger about positing the suffering of 
unrecognisable lives as the motor force. She thinks that what can make us 
want to sneak out of our known ways, to risk ontological insecurity, is to already 
live in a situation where the current possibilities of intelligibility do not allow our 
ways of living.   
One does not drive to the limits for a thrill experience, or because limits 
are dangerous and sexy, or because it brings us into a titillating 
proximity with evil. One asks about the limits of ways of knowing 
because one has already run up against a crisis within the 
epistemological field in which one lives. (Butler, 2004, pp. 305-306) 
I think that Butler here is giving an answer in sympathy with the notion of 
reflexivity emerging from the crisis produced in the clash between habitus and 
different fields or positionings. Nonetheless, Butler conceptualises this 
differently than Bourdieu. According to Adkins (2003) 
the Bourdieusian habitus is created in the field and submits to it. For Butler 
(1997a) the norms are never totally taken in by the subject, and they need to 
be ceaselessly reiterated by the subject – opening possibilities in each 
repetition to be resignified.  Adkins draws on Butler (1999 as cited in Adkins 
2003) to say that Bourdieu assumes that the incorporation and mimesis of the 




Bourdieu does not give space to the ambivalence that a subject might have 
towards its constituting field32. In that way, I think that Butler’s (1997a) 
conceptualisation widens the notion of a misfit between habitus and field: it is 
not only when moving fields or positions but it is given generally because – to 
different extents – we never completely adapt to our fields.  
According to Butler (2004) the crisis arises because discourses produce areas 
that are not validated or that are not able to be spoken about. It might be that 
this crisis emerges when the available possibilities of intelligibility for being a 
subject do not speak to us and we find ourselves needing other possibilities to 
challenge what it is currently oppressing us from our field.  
For instance, Butler (1999) says in her preface to Gender Trouble.  
The point was not to prescribe a new gendered way of life that might 
then serve as a model for readers of the text. Rather, the aim of the text 
was to open up the field of possibility for gender without dictating which 
kinds of possibilities ought to be realized. One might wonder what use 
“opening up possibilities” finally is, but no one who has understood what 
it is to live in the social world as what is “impossible,” illegible, 
unrealizable, unreal, and illegitimate is likely to pose that question. 
(Butler, 1999, p. viii) 
I think that Butler’s (1999) argument, like Bourdieu’s, points to how the idea of 
having different possibilities opened up is not about a conscious choice but 
about a need that one finds oneself into.  In consonance, I argue that reflexive 
practices that question our assumptions are not possibly done in isolation, it 
cannot come from sameness or as a merely intellectual or conscious exercise. 
It is not about wanting to yield but about finding oneself yielding. What I add to 
Butler is the possibility of questioning and opening up other options previously 
unintelligible come from a concrete movement to other fields that facilitates the 
encounter with something that shakes our world. I propose that for being 
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points towards the fact that the definition of habitus is more flexible and generative than what 
some critics warrant (Akram, Emerson, and Marsh, 2015; McNay, 1999). However, McNay 
(1999), even if being critical of Butler, acknowledges the lack of space for ambiguity is 
Bourdieu’s model: “Although he is undoubtedly right to stress the ingrained nature of gender 
norms, he significantly underestimates the ambiguities and dissonances that exist in the way 




reflexive in a critical and transforming way, I need to inhabit other fields or 
change my positioning because it is not something that I can do just cognitively 
or purposefully. For a new perspective to emerge, we need to inhabit and yield 
to a different field or positioning that dwells in us producing a different 
constellation of forces and in that way a different perspective (Nietzsche, 1968; 
Widder, 2012). For instance, Butler (1991) speaks about her encounter with a 
book about drag and how it changed her.  
As a young person, I suffered for a long time, and I suspect many people 
have, from being told, explicitly or implicitly, that what I “am” is a copy, 
an imitation, a derivative example, a shadow of the real. Compulsory 
heterosexuality sets itself up as the original, the true, the authentic; the 
norm that determines the real implies that “being” lesbian is always a 
kind of miming, a vain effort to participate in the phantasmatic plenitude 
of naturalized heterosexuality which will always and only fail. And yet, I 
remember quite distinctly when I first read in Esther Newton’s Mother 
Camp: Female Impersonators in America that drag is not an imitation 
or a copy of some prior and true gender; according to Newton, drag 
enacts the very structure of impersonation by which any gender is 
assumed. (Butler, 1991, pp. 20-21) 
I imagine Butler stumbling against this book that probably made quite apparent 
that the idea of an essential gender is an assumption that can be troubled. I 
imagine that in this encounter between Butler and this book she yielded to the 
– welcomed – foreignness of it. This might have helped her to explicitly contest 
the assumption of gender essentialism and in that way to critically develop 
feminist theories33.  
I think it is quite apparent that at this juncture the practice of questioning our 
assumptions has taken a tonality of desubjugation. If we are trapped by our 
assumptions we need to yield to foreignness to be able to see them and 
criticise them, to break free of them. Through this, I am not assuming, though, 
that we are ever desubjugated. We keep on being a folding of the outside 
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theory that restricts the meaning of gender in the presuppositions of its own practice sets up 





(Deleuze 2006) but maybe we have more options, more possibilities of 
movement.  
Elaborating on Foucault’s text What is critique? Butler (2004) relates 
knowledge and its rationalities to the subjugation of the subject. It is when we 
stop taking for granted the assumptions of certain knowledge that we see its 
limit and we stop being subjugated to it.  
Indeed, another way to talk about this dynamic within critique is to say 
that rationalization meets its limits in desubjugation. If the desubjugation 
of the subject emerges at the moment in which the episteme constituted 
through rationalization exposes its limit, then desubjugation marks 
precisely the fragility and transformability of the epistemics of 
power. (Butler, 2004, p. 316) 
The activity of critique is not apart from the formation and stability of the self. 
If we are socially constituted through the discourses that bring the limits of 
intelligibility of what we might become, to expose and criticise the assumptions 
of a discourse that has been part of our constitution implies to risk the 
ontological stability that we had through subjecting to a discourse.  
But if that self forming is done in disobedience to the principles by which 
one is formed, then virtue becomes the practice by which the self forms 
itself in desubjugation, which is to say that it risks its deformation as a 
subject, occupying that ontologically insecure position which poses the 
question anew: who will be a subject here, and what will count as a life, 
a moment of ethical questioning which requires that we break the habits 
of judgment in favor of a riskier practice that seeks to yield artistry from 
constraint. (Butler, 2004, p. 322) 
Yielding to foreignness, to that refreshing foreignness that promises 
desubjugation, asks us to bear ontological insecurity, to step on shaky ground 
and risk ourselves to become differently. 
Butler (2004) argues that criticism implies questioning our ways of knowing, 
which are also the ones that have produced us. This is why questioning our 
assumptions is not merely an intellectual exercise because it entails an 
ontological risk.   
To be governed is not only to have a form imposed upon one’s 




not be possible. A subject will emerge in relation to an established order 
of truth, but it can also take a point of view on that established order 
that retrospectively suspends its own ontological ground. (Butler, 2004, 
p. 312) 
Hence, yielding to foreignness can be transforming, but this transformation can 
be dreaded because it implies certain ontological insecurity. There can be 
forces that ask for transformation and others for sameness. When we are in a 
subjugated and unprivileged position, we might find ourselves more prone to 
question ours and social assumptions. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have stressed how Foucault (1986, 1990) and Butler (2005) 
are emphatic about saying that the available social discourses provide the 
limits of what is intelligible. That is, discourses shape the possible ways in 
which people can be reflexive about themselves. Foucault’s later writings 
(1986, 1990) suggest that we are reflexive through establishing a relation to 
ourselves that is always socially mediated. Hence, there is no possibility of 
standing outside ourselves and our social involvements to reflexively question 
what we are taking for granted. We are always thinking about ourselves 
through cultural discourses.  
On   his part, Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984, 1989; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992) underscores how our decisions are mostly non-conscious, led by our 
bodily adaptation – habitus – to the social fields that we belong to. In that 
sense, when we are mostly in contact with a homogenous social field, where 
a few discourses dictate what is valid, there can be a stagnation in the way of 
being aware of ourselves. The possibility of reflexivity emerges in the 
mismatch of habitus and field. Inspired by a Bourdieusian understanding 
(McNay, 1999), when meeting foreignness the assumptions that we have been 
holding become visible and we can move on to think otherwise and become 
otherwise.  
Bourdieu’s notion that reflexivity emerges from a concrete movement of fields 




between frontiers. We never step out of society, we just move among its 
borders. As in travelling, we do not know what the new surroundings will bring 
about on us, we can just be available to be moved and transformed by them 
in unexpected ways. I argue that to question our assumptions we need to yield 
to a meeting – a clash, an encounter, a dissonance – with foreignness.   
In the context of research in the social sciences, if I yield to foreignness, my 
perspective will be affected and I will move my position and identity. I think that 
I can relate to myself being open to find myself perceiving things differently. 
This asks for an attitude of not needing to rule myself, to know everything of 
who I am in advance. I believe that this implies a certain risk and insecurity. In 
contrast, holding on to an academic identity or school of thought can bring a 
sense of security and stability that might be thwarted when yielding to 
foreignness.  
For me, the creation of this chapter, and this thesis, has been a yielding to the 
foreignness of less familiar fields as poststructuralism, posthumanism and 
sociology.	Even if I had already an affinity with these fields, my main field was 
psychotherapy. It has been in the recent years that my dwelling in different 
fields has led me to place greater challenges and thus transformations on my 
academic and professional role as a psychotherapist. 
However, this is not the only foreignness that I am yielding to: I am a 
psychotherapist undertaking a PhD away from Chile, my country of origin, 
where I had an established private practice and I was researching and 
teaching drawing on and speaking directly to psychotherapy. I am in a foreign 
country, language and institution. I am a foreigner in the UK, and in a UK living 
through turbulent times. This foreignness has brought critical attention to the 
assumptions that I was holding when more thoroughly immersed in the field of 
psychotherapy in my birth country and within my familiar institutions. This has 
also shaken my sense of security and identity in the sense that I cannot rely 
as before on previous taken-for-granted certainties. Moreover, Chile, at the 




seems that the shaking of my grounding assumptions is pervasive. But, there 
is promise in this shaking, this chapter is about that: together with the chaos, 
these crises might also enable the foreignness of what is unexpected and 
allows us to question what we assume and so we can become differently.  
The notion of foreignness is something far from being definite and clear. In the 
present chapter, I have drawn on English translations of the French authors 
Foucault and Bourdieu. I write in British English, my second language. 
Foreignness is in the pores of this text. A foreignness with no fixed boundaries. 
Foreign to what? We are even foreigners to our own selves (Kristeva, 1991). 
The frontiers of what is foreign are not stable. Butler (1999) in the preface to 
Gender Trouble reflects about how her book draws on ‘French Theory’, but 
this very name is an American creation. She thinks that it is in America where 
different theories tend to be grouped together, unlike in France where French 
intellectuals have their loyal and exclusive readership. So, her text is American 
and foreign to America, French and foreign to France. Where should we draw 
the boundaries? There are no stable frontiers.  
The word foreignness might have demeaning connotations; a foreigner – not 
only someone from another nationality but also someone from another religion, 
sexual orientation, discipline, theoretical ascription, etc. – might be invalidated 
or unwelcomed. Yet, in this chapter, I have underscored the necessity of 
foreignness. Through risking ourselves to foreign terrains we might be able to 
question our assumptions. Reflexivity might arise in contexts where diversity 
and dissidence are present; contexts where foreignness is not dreaded or 
disparaged. Moreover, the motivation for questioning assumptions – and 
through that opening up different possibilities – can be propelled by being in a 
situation of unprivileged foreignness.  
I am also using the word yielding. By yielding, I mean giving up on our 
mastering efforts. From this perspective, reflexivity is something produced 
through a movement where I let myself be affected by the dissonance brought 




In that sense, it is different from an activity that I can do in isolation and from 
a position of mastery. There is ambiguity in how I am using the word yielding; 
it is not something that could be categorised as completely voluntary or 
involuntary. It requires that I let myself be affected by foreignness but the 
extent to which I let myself be affected does not depend on my masterful 
decision. With Bourdieu (1977), I am reminded that the keenness to question 
my assumptions is not given by a nice attribute of myself but in relation to 
where I am situated in the fields that I inhabit and to what is at stake for me. 
With Butler (2004) we take this risk because there is a need for desubjugation 
to discourses that constrain our possibilities of becoming intelligible subjects. 
When I risk myself to read a paper, a book, to hear someone from a different 
tradition – which entails different theorisations, different ways of practising, of 
teaching, of evaluating, of making institutions – yielding to its foreignness, I 
might become able to see assumptions that I was holding. In this chapter, I 
have done this through my studies of social theorists such as Foucault, Butler 
and Bourdieu. This has also brought instability in my sense of self and in my 
identity as a psychotherapist – probably an instability that I was needing.  
Reflexivity, then, is not an activity done alone by a sovereign self. We cannot 
be reflexive alone. As Butler (2005) says “I have a relation to myself, but I have 
it in the context of an address to an other” (p. 131). I need the other/otherness 
to ignite my reflexivity. She argues: 
The self’s reflexivity is incited by another, so that one person’s 
discourse leads another person into self-reflection. The self does not 
simply begin to examine itself through the forms of rationality at hand.  
Those forms of rationality are delivered through discourse, in the form 
of an address, and they arrive as an incitement, a form of seduction, an 
imposition or demand from outside to which one yields. (2005, p. 125) 
This gives me the lead to say that reflexivity, in the sense of questioning our 
assumptions, is spurred in yielding to foreignness. We are not reflexive, I think, 
when we already know how we think about something, what we are going to 
write or how we are going to act. Being explicitly reflexive about our 




dissonance that is brought about when we step out of our usual circuits and 
we yield ourselves to be affected by foreignness. Not forgetting that this sense-
making entails a different way of relating to oneself – a production of oneself 
–that might be soon enough shaken again by another encounter with 
foreignness.   
In this chapter, I have developed the possibility of reflexivity in the sense of 
questioning our assumptions while sustaining a social and performative 
conceptualisation of subjectivity. I have argued that when we yield to 
foreignness our way of being aware of ourselves, of relating to ourselves, 
shifts, and hence our previous assumptions are made visible and we might be 
able to explicitly question them. In that sense, I have started exploring the 
Foucauldian understanding of reflexivity as a way of relating to ourselves that 
is producing our very selves. Having started to elaborate on a notion of 
reflexivity as ways of relating, the question that pops out for me is, how am I 
to think about the different types of reflexivity that are offered in the literature 
and in our academic practices and lives in general in relation to this notion of 
reflexivity as ways of relating that produce? In the next chapter, chapter four, I 
develop further the notion of reflexivity as ways of relating to ourselves that 
produce and I think of the different reflexivities in these terms, that is, I analyse, 
how the different reflexivities offered in the literature enable different ways of 







Chapter 4: Reflexivities as affective 
ways of relating that produce 34 
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Reflexivity has been thought about, troubled and reconceptualised through the 
years. In an inclusive spirit, Finlay (2017) speaks about reflexivities - in plural. 
She underscores how reflexivity is used and conceptualised differently 
according to the epistemological and methodological stance that we hold. 
Aligning with a pluralistic understanding, I propose to think about these 
different reflexivities as different affective ways of relating to oneself that 
produce. No one way of being reflexive is better than the other in general terms 
because each of them has different productions that may be relevant in 
different contexts – by also producing these very contexts.  
My proposition is not pluralist in the sense of claiming from a neutral place that 
every type of reflexivity has the same relevance and that it is only a matter of 
choosing the most appropriate in each context. In contrast – as I develop in 
the chapter - I am putting forward that each way of being reflexive works as an 
apparatus (Barad, 2007) that produces the boundaries that delimit, and 
ontologically create, its objects (including the subjectivity/ies involved). It is 
because each reflexivity produces a different world that they cannot be judged 
as better than the others in general terms – as if there was only one objective 
world where we can compare and measure the quality or usefulness of each 
reflexivity.  
I am proposing to think about reflexivity as ways of relating to oneself that 
produce. We engage with ourselves in particular and affective ways when 
making sense of ourselves (or others or texts). The way in which we are 
reflexive is related to how we conceive the self – even if we are not explicitly 
aware of this conceptualisation. For example, when I try to make sense of what 
is happening to me by being attentive to subtle sensations in my chest as if 
waiting for the words to come from my body; implicit in this is the idea of an 
embodied self moved by feelings. Furthermore, from a Foucauldian 
perspective (Butler, 1997; Deleuze, 2006; Foucault, 1990) – as I explored in 




producing this very self. I hope it is clear that I am not thinking about reflexivity 
as an activity that someone exercises as if the subject and its reflexivity were 
two separate entities. Instead, I see reflexivity as an inevitable activity that is 
both expressive of a sense of self and continuously creating this very self. As 
there is not an ontological separation between the subject and its reflexive 
activity, it does not make sense to think about a sovereign, bounded, already 
formed subject engaging in reflexive activity as an optional and voluntary 
activity.  
I propose to think about the different theoretical stances on reflexivity as 
different ways of relating to oneself. For example, a more discursive reflexivity 
asks us to relate to ourselves assuming that our self-experience is not 
foundational but draws from different social discourses. This way of relating 
enables certain forms of subjectivity, opens certain questions, allows certain 
actions, etc. In that sense, I am engaging with different theories about 
reflexivity looking to see, on the one hand, what notion of subjectivity they 
imply, and on the other, what ways of relating they enable and what their 
possible productions are.  
Relevantly, through the text, I underscore that these ways of relating are also 
affective35. Brown (2006) reminds us how psychoanalysis can be useful for 
research, among other things, because it underscores how our learning from 
texts is an affective enterprise.  Bondi (2012) also brings psychoanalysis to 
show how research tasks require emotional processing, for instance in 
receiving critical feedback on our work. As a researcher, when, for instance, I 
am reading a text, I am not only trying to make sense of the ideas but I am 
affectively relating to them. Maybe I read the text36 as if I could completely 
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36 How I read the text is not a sovereign choice. The text invites certain ways of being read. 
Also, the conditions within which I happen to be reading it play into how I relate to it e.g., that 
it is sunny and I hear my colleagues typing quickly, that I feel rested, that caffeine is making 




understand it and then disregard it as not worthy of my attention. I might act 
as if my understanding could capture and judge the ideas of the text. Maybe I 
relate to the text as an invitation that takes me to places that I cannot foresee 
– I allow myself to be taken by the text. Or I might relate to it as a friend who 
is challenging my ideas and with whom I want to have a heated discussion – I 
relate to myself seeking to be moved. I think that each way of relating 
generates different possibilities. I might create a chapter that criticises and 
undermines a theory with the first way. The second may enable my desire to 
discuss the topic further. The third might produce the development of a 
renewed understanding.  
Informed by psychoanalysis (Benjamin, 1990, 2004; Ogden, 1988; Winnicott, 
1971), I wonder what is happening relationally and affectively when we need 
to, say, drastically reject one conceptualisation of reflexivity – or reflexivity 
altogether. I think that academic conceptualisations are not only a cognitive 
matter; instead, I think about the academic creation also as an affective and 
relational undertaking. When we attempt to criticise, build on, integrate, argue 
against, and so on, we do so also as an affective operation. 
Along these lines, in what may seem counterintuitive, I bring Barad (2003, 
2007) to think about reflexivity even when she explicitly rejects this concept. 
She proposes, informed by Haraway (1997), to move to diffraction as a better 
alternative. Even though this is the case, I use her concepts to inform my 
argument. What I put forward draws from Barad’s arguments and is critical of 
part of her argument – namely, what I consider the dichotomising operation of 
rejecting reflexivity37 and embracing diffraction. I bring Barad (2007) into the 
conversation to think about different conceptualisations of reflexivity as 
apparatuses that draw the boundaries of what is considered a subject, an 
object, a meaningful concept, an emotion, etc. In that sense, with Barad, 
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reflexivities as apparatuses not only produce a subjectivity but more broadly 
produce a world. For instance, a discursive reflexivity would be an apparatus 
that produces a subject that is, say, permeated by social discourses that 
enable its experience; it also produces emotions that are not conceived as 
personal creations, etc. Moreover, taking Barad’s concept of intra-action, how 
we engage in certain way of being reflexive is not produced by the decision of 
a subject as standing outside its material-semantic ‘surroundings’. Instead, the 
reflexivity works as an apparatus that produces the boundaries that delineate 
my very subjectivity, the object that I ‘observe’ and in general the world that 
appears in that particular agential cut.  
To aid us to think about the ways of relating to ourselves that we find ourselves 
engaged in, I offer the tool of a threefold questioning device to characterise 
how we are engaging with ourselves. This device enables to be ‘meta-
reflexive’38 about the way in which we are reflexive. The first question inquires 
into how transparent or opaque we are assuming our access to 
ourselves/others/texts/(…) to be. The second asks about what understanding 
of subjectivity (essentialist, relational, social/relational, intra-active, etc.) is 
implicit in our way of being reflexive. And the third asks about the affective 
quality with which we engage with ourselves/others/texts/(…). Aided by these 
questions about the different ways of relating, I think about what kinds of 
subjectivity might be produced, what kind of questions are opened and 
foreclosed, and in general what productions and uses reflexivities can have.  
In the next sections, I explore how reflexivity has both an implicit notion of 
subjectivity and produces subjectivities. Following from that, I bring Barad’s 
contribution to think about the different reflexivities as apparatuses that 
produce. Afterwards, I make use of the threefold questioning device I have 
introduced as a tool that might help to qualify how we are relating at any given 
moment or, in Barad’s terms, to qualify what kind of apparatus we are using. 
																																																						
38 ‘Meta-reflexivity’ with scared quotes because it is not about the possibility of neutrally 
observe how we are relating to ourselves. Instead, I understand that to think about how we 




Finally, drawing on psychoanalysis and on Barad’s notion of intra-action, I 
suggest that the use of these different reflexivities or apparatuses is an 
affective task that works largely outside our conscious intentions.  
Implicit notions of subjectivity  
The assertion that our notion of reflexivity has an implicit notion of subjectivity 
has already been highlighted in the literature (Davies et al., 2004; Pillow, 2003; 
G. Rose, 1997; Shaw, 2016). For example, as a psychotherapist, I could think 
that a client is assuming, say, a notion of self as knowable, rational and unitary. 
His way of practicing reflexivity is limited by the implicit notion of selfhood he 
is holding. Perhaps he tries to make sense of himself – he relates to himself – 
through observing and logically analysing his thoughts and actions. Maybe if 
he could think/feel differently about what a self can be, his way of being 
reflexive could also change.  
Our ways of being reflexive in research are also of course shaped by our 
notions of selfhood. For example, Etherington (2017), writes on the use of 
reflexivity for counselling and psychotherapy research arguing that the 
personal is interwoven with our research products and that we should be 
transparent about our subjective participation. She says: “Reflexivity creates 
transparency by providing information about the contexts in which data are 
created and located, and the researcher’s part in the co-construction of new 
knowledge, allowing the reader to judge its trustworthiness” (p. 90). I think she 
is interested in a way of understanding reflexivity – to relate to it – as if we 
could actually be conscious of ourselves and how the context is shaping us. 
Her notion of the self is that it is knowable and somehow separable from its 
creations.  What does this produce? Maybe a research practice where 
researchers feel more responsible for their own involvement, having the ethical 
duty of being transparent about it. It might also enable certainty and 
definiteness in our research processes and conclusions. In this sense, I am 
emphasising how the different reflexivities work, what they produce and not if 




Pillow (2003) shows how reflexivity, in its definition and uses, is related to the 
notion of subjectivity that the authors are holding. She says: 
Thus, if my subject, either myself or an “other,” is knowable the 
possibility that I can then know this subject through better reflexive 
methods is attainable. On the other hand, an understanding of a subject 
as postmodern, as multiple, as unknowable, as shifting, situates the 
purposes and practices of research, and the uses of reflexivity, quite 
differently. (Pillow, 2003, p. 180) 
She is proposing the notion of uncomfortable reflexivity to refer to reflexive 
practices that stay with the multiplicity and unknowability of the subject. This is 
a different reflexivity with different productions. Conceiving the self in this 
postmodern way changes the ways in which I relate to myself and this 
produces myself differently.   
G. Rose (1997) argues that transparent ways of conceiving reflexivity 
conceptualise the self as something prior and already formed waiting to be 
discovered. She argues: “If the process of reflexivity changes what is being 
reflected upon, then there is no ‘transparent’ self waiting to be revealed” (G. 
Rose, 1997, p. 313). Probably Etherington (2017), in her aim of showing how 
the researcher is part of the construction of the research, exemplifies this 
transparent notion of reflexivity. G. Rose (1997) is critical of the practice of 
situating oneself as a researcher – as if one could actually know where one is 
situated – and proposes instead to show the uncertainties in the process. She 
thinks that this practice can generate a questioning of the authority of 
academic knowledge.  
I think that these texts can work to broaden the possible conceptualisations 
and uses of reflexivity. Nonetheless, with these challenges to the 
conceptualisation of the self as knowable in a transparent way, arguably, the 
very practice of reflexivity is put into question. Jackson and Mazzei (2012b), 
for example, imply that reflexivity entails a stable and knowable subject, and 
as they move to other ways of thinking about subjectivity, they reject the notion 




In our process of flattening and folding, we do not seek more and more 
reflexivity that reveals more and more about the researcher’s ways of 
knowing. We seek to unsettle the “I” of both the researcher and 
researched who is a static and singular subject. (p. 10) 
Do not we need at least a certain reification of the self in order to be able to be 
reflexive on it? What happens when our conceptualisation of the self is that it 
is not essential but constantly produced through social discourses? As I 
developed in the previous chapter, Davies and her collaborators (2004, p. 361) 
put this point across positing that reflexive writing relies on a notion of an 
already existing self – the one that is reflexively explored. They underscore 
how this is at odds with conceiving a fluctuating and fragmented subject always 
in process of being constituted by discourse. At this juncture, the second point 
that I mentioned earlier, namely that the reflexive practices are also producing 
a self, is called forth. 
Reflexivities producing subjectivities  
As I started arguing in the last chapter, my argument of reflexivity as ways of 
relating that produce assumes that the subject is continuously constituted. The 
notion that reflexivity is a way of relating to ourselves that is producing this very 
self is influenced by Foucault (1986, 1990, 1997). He emphasises how we take 
ourselves as objects in different ways – drawing from the social discourses 
available – producing ourselves in this action. Therefore, the argument that 
situates reflexivity and a continuously socially constituted subject as 
incompatible is turned on its head: reflexivity is the operation that allows the 
subject to be continuously socially constituted. 
Deleuze (2006), elaborates how Foucault develops in his late work, specifically 
in The use of pleasure (Foucault, 1990) a thematic that was hauntingly present 
in his earlier work, namely the notion of folding. Foucault turns to see the self 
– with the notion of ‘interiority’ that it entails – as being produced in a process 
of folding of the social or the ‘outside’. The categories of external/society and 
internal/self are troubled. “The outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter 




an inside: they are not something other than the outside, but precisely the 
inside of the outside” (Deleuze, 2006, pp. 96-97). What would be the ‘external’ 
social discourses are folded in producing an ‘internal’ space constitutive of the 
self. Therefore, the self is created in a reflexive relation to oneself – a turning 
in, a folding – that is never apart from the power-relations, including the 
knowledge practices, which instate it in the first place.  
Butler (1997) takes Foucault’s input to think about how power is productive of 
the subject. Even if power appears at first as external, it becomes internal 
through a turning on itself in which it assumes a psychic form, giving a sense 
of self and identity to the subject. Importantly, Butler insists that it is the 
reflexive movement of turning upon oneself, which is produced through power, 
the one that inaugurates the distinction of an ‘inside’ – a psychic space – and 
an ‘outside’.  
The form this power takes is relentlessly marked by a figure of turning, 
a turning back upon oneself or even a turning on oneself. This figure 
operates as part of the explanation of how a subject is produced, and 
so there is no subject, strictly speaking, who makes this turn. On the 
contrary, the turn appears to function as a tropological inauguration of 
the subject, a founding moment whose ontological status remains 
permanently uncertain. (Butler, 1997, pp. 3-4) 
Taking this way of thinking about reflexivity as a relating to – and through this 
producing – oneself, I am stressing that we can keep on thinking about 
reflexivity and having a relational and socially traversed notion of subjectivity. 
When thinking about reflexivity as ways of relating to oneself, there is no 
previous and sovereign self that exercises this reflexivity, but reflexivity is the 
way in which ‘we’ turn upon ourselves, we relate to ourselves – not from a 
sovereign place – continuously producing this very self.   
The relation to oneself is a form of self-knowledge that draws from “all the 
techniques of moral and human sciences that go to make up a knowledge of 
the subject” (Deleuze, 2006, p. 103). In that sense, the theories about 
reflexivity are offering ways of understanding and relating to oneself that create 




oneself – one draws the boundaries of what a self is through the conceptual 
apparatus (Barad, 2007) of a particular conceptualisation of reflexivity.   
In the next section, I will develop the Barad’s argument around her notion of 
apparatuses to think further about the different reflexivities as ways of relating. 
Barad (2007) is informed by both poststructuralism, in particular Foucault and 
Butler, and Bohr’s quantum physics.  
Reflexivities as apparatuses 
In this chapter, I have been proposing to think about reflexivity as affective 
ways of relating, positing that each form of reflexivity can be useful in certain 
contexts because each way of relating enables different subjectivities and 
productivities in general. To think further about this, I introduce Barad’s (2007) 
concepts of intra-action, apparatus and agential cut. In what follows, I present 
these concepts to relate them directly to my notion of reflexivities as ways of 
relating.  
In Barad’s perspective, what we conceive as ‘bounded units’ are not 
foundational but emerge through intra-actions. As she says:  
The notion of intra-action (in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which 
presumes the prior existence of intendent entities or relata) represents 
a profound conceptual shift. It is through specific agential intra-actions 
that the boundaries and properties of the component of phenomena 
become determinate and that particular concepts (that is, particular 
material articulations of the world) become meaningful. (p. 139)   
With her notion of intra-action, Barad wants to stop thinking in dichotomies like 
human and non-human, material and conceptual as if they were categorically 
different. She proposes that they are only differentiated through particular 
intra-actions. Importantly, Barad (2007) is drawing on Bohr to postulate that 
concepts are not abstract and separated from the material. For conveying this, 
the notion of apparatus becomes fundamental. It is in the specific material 
arrangement that an apparatus provides, that a concept becomes meaningful. 




According to Bohr, theoretical concepts (e.g., position and momentum) 
are not ideational in character but rather specific physical 
arrangements. For example, the notion of position cannot be presumed 
to be an individually determinate attribute of independently existing 
objects. Rather, position has meaning only when an apparatus with an 
appropriate set of fixed parts is used. And furthermore, any 
measurement of position using this apparatus cannot be attributed to 
some abstract, independently existing object but rather is a property of 
the phenomenon – the inseparability of the object and the measuring 
agencies. (p. 139) 
In that sense, we cannot think about concepts separated from the apparatuses 
that they are intra-acting with for them to become meaningful. In a way, the 
concepts come to exist in specific intra-actions and not in abstract. Barad, 
applies this to herself; thinking about how she is relating to her 
conceptualisations – doing what I qualify as a meta-reflexive move. She is 
researching Bohr to build her own theory. In doing so, she is careful not to say 
that she has the ‘correct’ interpretation of Bohr’s work as if such thing could 
exist in abstract and absolute terms.  She tries not to put forward what Bohr 
was ‘really’ thinking as apart from her “own interpretative apparatus” (p. 121). 
That is, her understanding of Bohr, is an interpretative apparatus that 
delineates (produces boundaries) that bring to life the concepts of Bohr as she 
is using them. Bohr’s concepts (as she understands them) come alive and 
meaningful because her interpretative apparatus is intra-acting (with) them. 
This production of boundaries is what she calls agential cuts. Without these 
boundaries what is, is indeterminate and not meaningful. An agential cut does 
not act only in semantic terms, it is not only what makes something meaningful 
but what makes something exist in ontic terms. As Barad (2007) explains: 
Apparatuses enact agential cuts that produce determinate boundaries 
and properties of “entities” within phenomena, where “phenomena” are 
the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting components. That 
is agential cuts are at once ontic and semantic. It is only though specific 
agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of 
“components” of phenomena become determinate and that particular 
articulations become meaningful. In the absence of specific agential 
intra-actions, these ontic-semantic boundaries are indeterminate. In 
short, the apparatus specifies an agential cut that enacts a resolution 




indeterminacy. Hence apparatuses are boundary making practices. (p. 
148) 
As it might be already implied in the previous paragraphs, Barad thinks of 
apparatuses not just in terms of the instruments that scientists use. Instead, 
bringing Foucault in the conversation, Barad thinks of the apparatuses as 
discursive practices. She defines them in this way: 
Discourse is not what is said; it is that which constrains and enables 
what can be said. Discursive practices define what counts as 
meaningful statements. Statements are not the mere utterances of the 
originating consciousness of a unified subject; rather, statements and 
subjects emerge from a field of possibilities. This field of possibilities is 
not static or singular but rather is a dynamic and contingent multiplicity. 
(2007, pp. 146-147) 
According to Barad’s (2007) argument, discursive practices create the 
boundaries that enable us to make sense in an otherwise indeterminate 
complexity. They are not fixed nor transcendental but historical and always 
open to be modified. Discursive practices create reality in the same way that 
the apparatus enacts the agential cuts that makes intelligible, and thus 
existing, a determinate object of study. Barad thinks of the apparatuses as 
discursive practices and the other way around.  
The basic idea to understand that it is not merely the case that human 
concepts are embodied in apparatuses, but rather that apparatuses are 
discursive practices, where the latter are understood as specific 
material reconfigurings through which “objects” and “subjects” are 
produced. (p. 148) 
How we think about the subject – individually, relationally or socially 
transversed – appears through the conceptual (and material) apparatus that 
we are using. For instance, when we are using the notion of a transparent and 
more essentialist reflexivity, this can be thought of as a conceptual apparatus 
that brings about a unitary and knowable subject. “That is, the agential cut 
enacts a resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent ontological (and 
semantic) indeterminacy.” (Barad 2007, p. 140)  
I think that the different forms of reflexivity make us look at ourselves/produce 




practices through which the world is differentially articulated and accounted 
for.” (p. 149)   
I take Barad’s argument in this way: everything is intra-acting (with) everything 
else, there are no foundational boundaries that essentially distinguish one 
thing from the other. As Barad says: “Outside of particular agential intra-
actions, ‘words’ and ‘things’ are indeterminate” (p. 150). Instead, the 
boundaries are created through conceptual (and material) apparatuses that 
make agential cuts. So, if we bring in the apparatus of a relational and opaque 
reflexivity this will draw certain boundaries that might shape, for instance, 
forms of subjectivity that are permeable and do not intend to master 
themselves. Crucially, our ontoepistemological assumptions shift as we use 
one apparatus or another. They shift because the apparatus brings about the 
semantic meaningfulness and ontic reality of what is shaped. That is, thinking 
of transparent reflexivity as an apparatus, this apparatus brings about/creates 
the boundaries of what we assume to be, say, a unitary and responsible 
subject. Before the apparatus of transparent reflexivity, which is not concepts 
alone, enacted this agential cut, there was not a unitary subject to ascribe 
responsibility to. It is in this sense that our conceptual apparatuses matter, 
because they create the realities that we form part of. Importantly, the 
apparatuses are not stable, they are also intra-active phenomena. In that 
sense, they are in an ongoing possibility of change.  
Significantly, inspired by Barad (2007), the concepts that we use are not apart 
from our material engagement. In that sense, my use of, say, poststructuralism 
is intra-acting (with) the space I inhabit when reading and writing about it, with 
my economic situation, with my feelings, with my relationships, etc. In that 
sense, it is not that I use a concept and apply it in an abstract way; instead, 
this concept is intra-acting (with) my life in ways that go well beyond my 
intentions and awareness. “The agential cut and the formation of a 




subjects and objects intra-acting with and through it.” (Højgaard & 
Søndergaard, 2011, p. 12) 
The sense of what a subject is appears in an agential cut, intra-actively; 
therefore, my ontoepistemological assumptions are not stable. At one point, 
for instance, intra-acting with anxiety, instability in my personal relationships 
and my sense of belonging, I might be performing a transparent reflexivity, 
yielding a sense of stable self: ‘this is who I am’. In an academic context, intra-
acting with papers, secure in some institutional and economic stability, it might 
be easier to hold uncertainty; practice an opaque reflexivity and this might yield 
a sense of shifting, unstable and permeable subjectivity.  
From this understanding, it does not follow to portray one type of reflexivity – 
or reflexivity broadly – as better or worse than other options. Instead, each 
reflexivity, understood as a particular way of relating to oneself – and 
constantly producing that self in this gesture – is a particular apparatus or 
discursive practice that enacts an agential cut producing the boundaries that 
give shape and meaning.  
In the following section, I give myself to the task of particularising these 
different ways of relating through proposing a threefold questioning device to 
aid us in thinking about in which particular ways we are exercising reflexivity. 
These questions point towards different conceptualisations that produce, 
through agential cuts, the boundaries of what we consider our world at that 
moment, including our notion and sense of subjectivity.  
Different reflexivities producing differently 
I put forward that the kind of reflexivity that we are enacting rests upon the kind 
of relationship we are holding towards ourselves. As I have mentioned, I 
propose a threefold questioning device to qualify how we are relating to 
ourselves. I do not see these questions as requiring answers that reflect the 
‘truth’ of how we are ‘really’ using reflexivity, neither do I imply that these 
questions exhaust a characterisation of reflexivity; instead, I see these 




In my conceptualisation, reflexivity is an unintentional way of relating to 
ourselves that is all the time producing. However, we can explicitly think about 
how we are relating to ourselves; that is, we can be meta-reflexive. The 
threefold questioning device that I offer, is a tool for doing that. Crucially, I think 
of this meta-reflexivity also as a way of relating that produces and not as 
reflecting how things ‘are’39.   
The first question of the three-fold questioning device, inquires into how 
transparent or opaque we assume our access to ourselves/others/texts/(…) to 
be. A transparent reflexivity might lay on a relationship to myself where I think 
that I can observe myself as if I could stand outside myself and look through. It 
might be that my conceptualisation of the subject is more essentialist, more 
relational, social/relational or intra-active, in each case I would think that I can 
assert unambiguously and transparently what is going on. Therefore, a 
transparent reflexivity as an apparatus (Barad, 2007) might yield a production 
of unitary and stable subjectivity, a sense of clearly understanding and seeing 
oneself/others/relationships/texts/etc., a knowledge that fills in the gaps with 
certain authority, an analysis where the responsibilities of the people involved 
are foregrounded, a sense of identity that empowers groups of people, etc.  
An example of a transparent reflexivity with a relational/social understanding of 
the subject is put forward by standpoint theories. Hartsock (2006) has 
underlined how standpoint theories criticises the possibility of a subject 
accessing their experience without mediation. She underscores how the subject 
is formed through social relationships and to acquire consciousness of this 
formation – and changing these relational configurations – is an objective of 
standpoint theories. “This is for me an important aspect of standpoint theories: 
they are not about individuals reporting their experience but groups coming to 
understand the social relations in which they are involved” (Hartsock, 2006, p. 
																																																						
39 As I developed in the previous chapter, we can bring to explicit attention how we have 
changed our way of relating to ourselves, how we have changed our assumptions, and that 
conscious elaboration is also a meta-reflexivity. However, this meta-reflexivity is only possible 





179). Arguably, here there is also the assumption that the subjects can 
transparently know the ways in which they are socially engaged. I think that this 
assumption of transparency – the belief in the possibility of actually knowing 
how one is and has been socially formed – allows a sense of empowerment. 
It gives the possibility of not naturalising one’s situation – especially when there 
is unfairness in it – and to do something about it, that is, to change the social 
ensembles that one is part of.  
Another way of being reflexive on myself that allows more opacity will not 
assume that I can transparently know what is going on. Opacity assumes that 
there is something in between what is happening and our narrative of it – the 
unconscious, not articulated dynamics of relating, social discourses, etc.-  that 
implies that there is no direct access to experience. Psychoanalysis can be 
very helpful in this area. Bion (1970) explicitly asks us to tolerate uncertainty and 
not knowing. He posits that when we think we know we saturate something 
preventing further learning. “An analyst with such a mind is one who is incapable 
of learning because he is satisfied” (Bion, 1970, p. 29). Also, Bollas (1987) 
argues that there is much known at an existential and felt level that does not 
translate into verbal conscious articulation. Bondi (2014), informed by Bollas, 
says: “I have acknowledged the limitations of ‘transparent’ self-reflexivity and 
introduced the idea of knowledge that is embodied but unthought” (Bondi, 2014, 
p. 8). This might produce a researcher or a psychotherapist that relies on 
intuitive and bodily feelings to advance their inquiry. At the same time, it can 
produce a piece of work that does not want to close down meaning.  
I do not want to claim that opacity is assured in research – or in psychotherapy 
– because of holding a psychoanalytic understanding. There are, of course, 
different theories and nuances within psychoanalysis. For example, Young and 
Frosh (2009) distinguish ways of bringing psychoanalysis to research into 
interpretative and disruptive ways. The first tries to find a truth or a more fixed 
account of what is happening whilst the second would be continuously 




Hollway and Jefferson (2013) are situated in the first category (Lapping, 2016; 
Young & Frosh, 2009). Hollway and Jefferson (2013) argue that the 
interviewees – and anybody – do not have a transparent access to themselves. 
The research participants are defended subjects and the researcher can get to 
an understanding of what is going through analysing their countertransference. 
However, contradictorily, this analysis can be quite transparent: for example, 
assuming that the researcher can know something that the participant does 
not40. In that sense, this understanding has been criticised for fixing (Lapping, 
2016) the meaning of the participants. For example, Holmes (2013), drawing on 
their proposal, produces quite a transparent interpretation of a research 
participant: “Emma here is adopting a child-like, helpless position in relation to 
the interviewer. By evoking concern in those with whom she interacts she is 
more likely to receive their care.” (Holmes, 2013, p. 166)  
I think that an opaque reflexivity with a relational-social understanding of 
subjectivity is present in Butler’s work (Butler, 1997, 2005). This relational-social 
and opaque reflexivity might be performed through a critical way of relating to 
myself where I am questioning my thoughts and actions, not believing that they 
are foundational because there are social discourses wider than I am that I 
inevitably draw upon. Considering the social discourses in being reflexive might 
yield a subjectivity that is critical of itself and wider social dynamics. It might be 
that in this critical approach some suspicious distance to my ‘experiences’ is 
created.  
The second question inquiries into how is our understanding of subjectivity is 
(essentialist, relational, social/relational, intra-active, etc.). This inquiry has been 
the interest of many authors. To mention a few, within psychoanalysis there has 
been a move towards relational ways of understanding subjectivity in American 
relational psychoanalysis (Mitchell & Aron, 2013), here there is a rejection of the 
notion of the subject as driven by instincts and instead the subject is understood 
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where the researcher could be patronizing towards the interviewee – can be avoided because 




as thoroughly relational (Mitchell, 1981, 2000; Mitchell & Aron, 2013). Gendlin 
(1997), proposes to understand the self as relational and processual – not only 
always influenced by others and its environment but constituted through them. 
I believe that in psychotherapy being reflexive with a relational understanding 
enables less focus on pathology (which is a more essentialist notion) and a 
focus on how different ways of relating might propitiate change. (Serra 
Undurraga, 2016)  
Going beyond a relational perspective that only includes relationships, Butler 
(1997, 2005) speaks about the formation of subjectivity through the social, she 
does not imply that the subject and the social exist as previous entities that then 
relate but that the social is productive of subjectivities. Barad (2003, 2007) 
proposes the concept of intra-action rather than interaction, where she includes 
the social and material dimensions.  I believe this can yield a sense of decentred 
humanness: aware of how our constant engagements with the material non-
human are enabling our existence and experience.  
The third question is: In which affective/relational modality/ies are we relating 
to ourselves? When I am being reflexive about myself, I take myself as an 
object in particular affective ways: challenging myself, comforting myself, 
securing myself, opening myself, distancing from myself, managing myself, 
etc. Bollas (1982) stresses the importance to think about the space where the 
self relates to itself as an object. He points at how we handle ourselves all the 
time in everyday tasks with more or less success in giving space to our desires, 
in managing our anxiety, etc. He relates our way of handling ourselves to how 
we have been handled in the past. How I relate to myself in writing this piece 
is relevant to what I produce. For example, I need to hold the frustration and 
anxiety that a work in progress can produce. Maybe if I am not able to contain 
the uncomfortable sensation of uncertainty, I might rush up to finish the piece, 
closing my inquiry to what I already know and feel comfortable with.  
I would like to think not only about our ways of relating to ourselves and others 




different authors mean by reflexivity when they move away from it (Barad, 
2003, 2007; Davies, 2014; Gale & Wyatt, 2017; Haraway, 1997; Jackson & 
Mazzei, 2012b; Lenz Taguchi, 2012) is probably constrained and narrowed 
down to a very specific notion of reflexivity that assumes transparency and an 
essentialist thinking. In this, I could think that there might be an affective need 
to simplifying a popular concept: reflexivity, to be able to reject it and promote 
a new one: diffraction. We embrace a new concept relating to the concept, to 
ourselves and to others through it, in affective ways. As Wyatt (2019) narrates:  
To say ‘diffraction’ feels an artifice, a pose, a clever play inviting the 
question “What do you mean, ‘diffraction’?” whereupon I can give the 
concept a convoluted explanation (convoluted because I don’t feel as if 
I inhabit it, can’t shuffle into it, like a coat, with familiar ease); and if I’m 
lucky I sound well-read and intellectual. (p. 146) 
Haraway (1997) proposes diffraction as an alternative to reflexivity, criticising 
the latter for only displacing the same elsewhere (p. 16). I understand that 
reflexivity is criticised for reifying what it analyses. But this particular quoted 
phrase is important; it engages me affectively. If reflexivity only displaces the 
same elsewhere who am I when I am still using it? In the same text, Haraway 
acknowledges the work of Sandra Harding in critical reflexivity as necessary 
and closer to her notion of diffraction than to other conceptualisations of 
reflexivity. Haraway (1997) says about the critical reflexivity of Harding: 
Unlike the Latour of Science in Action, she does not mistake the 
constituted and constitutive practices that generate and reproduce 
systems of stratified inequality-and that issue in the protean, historically 
specific, marked bodies of race, sex, and class-for preformed, 
functionalist categories. (p. 36) 
In that sense, Haraway (1997) is stressing how there can be a 
conceptualisation of reflexivity that does not assume that there is a something 
already there – for instance the category of race – but that this is a process 
constantly in-the-making. What is she doing in relational and affective terms? 
Is she making teams? What is this producing in the academic community? 
I want to remark that we can have a more relational and processual 




However, my intention is not to disregard the more essentialist and transparent 
ways of using reflexivity because I argue that they can also have useful 
productions.  
I think about each reflexivity – that is about each way of relating – as an 
apparatus or discursive practice (Barad, 2007) that produces the boundaries 
that delimit its objects. Each of these conceptual apparatuses enact the 
agential cuts that produce particular realities and meanings. Of course, my 
own conceptual apparatus is not out of this; I am offering an apparatus to think 
about each reflexivity as not right or wrong but more or less useful in particular 
moments. Following this path, reflexivity is not in itself about capturing correctly 
what our thoughts/feelings/social and relational positions are. Every time that 
we refer back to ourselves we are performing an action that has an impact, 
that has consequences.  
For example, if in reviewing my notes for writing about a clinical case, I say: 
“Actually, I was not able to hear this client in this session; I was imposing on 
her my own ideas of what a healthy bereavement would be”, I am not only 
trying to capture what was happening in that session but, in this endeavour, I 
am also relating to myself in some particular ways and enabling some 
possibilities. I am assuming a degree of transparency: “I am doing this”, “I was 
not able do that”. I am not holding a relational understanding of my 
performance in this moment; it is more essentialist in that I am seeing 
something that I do as a personal difficulty in my practice. I am relating 
affectively with myself with certain kindness in the sense that I am giving myself 
some space of flexibility: I am not saying for example that “I am an imposing 
therapist”. This reflexivity might yield a sense of myself: “I can impose on my 
clients” that allows a sense of responsibility over myself, a self-awareness of 
how imposing I might be and the possibility of hearing more closely how my 
client might think differently about bereavement. My way of being reflexive also 
produces the boundaries of what I conceive as ‘my client’ and ‘his 




client. Furthermore, both my reflexivity in the session and in thinking about it 
afterwards are not enacted from a position of mastery. Instead, I am part of an 
intra-action (Barad, 2007) with material/semantic situations. What I consider 
as ‘I’ and ‘my client’, ‘bereavement’, and so on, emerges through the operation 
of that apparatus – that is, trough that specific way of reflexively relating to 
myself.  
Useful reflexivities  
In this ground, I propose thinking of reflexivity as affective ways of relating to 
oneself that yield, that produce. Here I could be enacting something that I can 
be critical of: I am saying what reflexivity is or is not, as if believing that I need 
to discuss which concepts reflect reality more adequately. Saying reflexivity is 
not representational but productive can just be another contribution to the great 
amount of academic texts with representational assumptions. Can I get out of 
this? I believe that I cannot dispense with the notion that in every definition 
there is a representational flavour. Maybe the only difference is the aim for the 
definition to be valued in its productions, in its yielding, in its use (Winnicott, 
1971), in what it moves – or does not.  
I propose a way of relating to the different reflexivities and its theoretical 
underpinnings in which we think about the potentialities and disadvantages of 
them, instead of embracing one and disregarding other ways. To be clear, I 
am not proposing to stop criticising conceptualisations of reflexivity, instead I 
think it is important to be aware of the groundings and critics of each way of 
understanding reflexivity so that we can use them.  
As I have developed in my methodology chapter (chapter two), what I mean 
by the word use comes from Winnicott (1971). Commonly, we would associate 
use with a strategic management of the other. However, the word in the 
Winnicotian sense has almost the opposite connotation: it refers to how I can 
perceive the other outside my omnipotent control. He underscores that when 
this happens I am able to use the object. I understand this use as being able 




on the Winnicotian concept of use for her notion of intersubjectivity.  She is 
positing that when we perceive the other as another – not as someone that is 
doing something to us: an enemy or an ally – we can use them in the 
Winnicottian sense. Inspired by this, different theories and ways of conceiving 
reflexivity can be recognised in their otherness – outside a sense of omnipotent 
understanding that would allow us to discard or fully integrate a particular 
theory.   
Reflexivities operating outside our voluntary intention  
I think of the different reflexivities as ways of relating that produce forms of 
understanding and worldings (Barad, 2007) that can be useful in some 
contexts – by producing these very contexts - and I might employ even if being 
unaware of it and consciously rejecting them.   
For instance, I have argued that I do not want to put one way of being reflexive 
over the other. However, I see how I tend to give more value to relational and 
more opaque ways of being reflexive. But this very statement about my valuing 
opaque and relational reflexivities is made from a more transparent and 
essentialist reflexivity. It takes the shape of a confession. Inspired by Barad 
(2007) how I act – for example using a transparent reflexivity – needs to be 
understood not as an operation from a position of mastery but as an action 
that is produced in determinate material/semantic intra-actions.  
Pillow (2003) acknowledges that we might be reproducing a form of reflexivity 
that we are outwardly rejecting. She describes four reflexive strategies that act 
in a confessional fashion; she is critical of them yet acknowledges how: “In 
identifying these four strategies, I have also been able to find myself and my 
writing styles in each and see how attached and invested I remain to these 
ideologies, however much I may think I work against each.” (Pillow, 2003, p. 
181) 
If we stick to one concept and categorically reject alternative 
conceptualizations – as it might be to put forward the notion of diffraction 




the dichotomous thinking that we actually claim to be rejecting41. In 
psychoanalytical terms, it might be similar to what is called a paranoid-schizoid 
operation where we hold one thing very close to our identity, rejecting or 
undermining other possibilities. A paranoid schizoid operation is based on 
splitting (separating into incompatible extremes), which works for creating 
order (Ogden, 1988).  Splitting is used to make an order that brings a sense of 
safety and security – keeping something that is felt to be threatening at bay - 
but it does not help to complex and deepen a process of comprehension. 
“Splitting is a boundary-creating mode of thought and therefore a part of an 
order-generating (not yet a personal meaning-generating) process.” (Ogden, 
1986, p. 48). Following from this, it might be that the rejection of reflexivity 
altogether with the embracing of diffraction helps to create a sense of 
organisation, but that might be at the expense of losing complexity and 
nuances. For rejecting strongly something we probably need to reduce it or 
simplify it. In a Winnicotian sense, we need to negate its otherness that we 
cannot omnipotently embrace with our minds. 
One could think that what I am doing here is to embrace reflexivity through 
rejecting diffraction, that is that I am doing exactly what I am critical of. 
Nonetheless, I hope it is clear that the version of reflexivity as affective ways 
of relating that I develop in this chapter is heavily influenced by Barad’s (2007) 
conceptualisations - that are related to the notion of diffraction42. In that sense, 
reflexivity understood as affective ways of relating is not made in opposition to 
diffraction but in collaboration with it. In any case, I do not claim I ‘know’ or 
control how I am relating to myself, to the concepts and to the readers in this 
work. For sure, I am enacting – and my writing on its own will be enacting – 
ways of relating that escape my best intentions.  
I am arguing here that reflexivity is an activity that we are engaged in inevitably 
– we are always relating to ourselves, forming ourselves (Butler, 1997; 
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diffraction. 




Deleuze, 2006; Foucault, 1990) and producing a world (Barad, 2007) in that 
action. This activity, though, is not commanded from a position of mastery. 
Instead, we find ourselves being reflexive in some ways, even if we claim to 
reject these ways. Because of this, the threefold questioning device can help 
to qualify in which ways we are being reflexive at any given moment, without 
assuming that we already know how we are doing it. But the threefold 
questioning device will not provide objective answers. To be clear: to be 
reflexive on how we are relating is precisely another way of relating, not an – 
impossible – neutral operation. 
Conclusions  
In this chapter, I have put forward an understanding of reflexivities as affective 
ways of relating that produce. According to this conceptualisation all that there 
is, is relating. The entities are not essential but products of ways of relating 
that need to be continuously re-actualised. From this perspective, it does not 
make sense to think in a correct or incorrect conceptualisation of reflexivity but 
to think about what the different conceptualisations enable. Taking Barad’s 
(2007) concept, I ask: what worlds the different reflexivities as apparatuses 
produce? 
I have used Barad’s argument to think how the different reflexivities might work 
as apparatuses that produce their subjects and their objects. Whenever we 
are using a certain reflexivity we are articulating a world. We do this not from 
a sovereign position but as part of an intra-acting system.  
If all what we have is ways of relating that have certain productions - that allow 
some things and disavow others – then meta-reflexivity needs to be directed 
towards the questioning of how we are relating, understanding that, crucially, 
this exercise of reflexivity is in itself a way of relating that yields certain 
productions. And I believe that a potential production of being reflexive about 
how we are relating to ourselves/others/theory is an inquiry that understands 




more useful concepts in certain contexts – because of the very contexts that 
they produce.  
In this chapter I have used Barad’s (2007) conceptualisations to make my 
version of reflexivity that as I have mentioned is not against diffraction. As 
diffraction is such an important concept to how I have been developing my way 
of thinking – as it might be apparent in how much I have used it to frame my 
methodology –  it feels imperative to think further about it and how it relates to 
reflexivity; what it can bring to reflexivity and the other way around.  Following 
from that, in the next two chapters, chapter five and six, I develop the 
relationship between reflexivity and diffraction. Specifically, in the next chapter, 
I elaborate on how reflexivity and diffraction are not clearly separated; we 
never find just reflexivity or just diffraction. I further develop how my 
conceptualisation of reflexivity is an already diffracted reflexivity and why it is 








Chapter 5: What if reflexivity and 










I try to make sense of myself. I need to make sense of myself. Do I? I make 
stories about what is happening in my life. I make a narrative. I make another. 
I ‘reflect’43 about myself. I do not do this from a mastery position; the narratives 
come from a greater assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) of all of what is 
intra-acting (Barad, 2007) (with) me. What is happening in my life? I end up 
hearing myself telling different people different versions of something like: 
“Now I am in a transitional stage, moving from the PhD into something other 
indeterminate yet. I am in the UK, I would like to stay and I need a visa to do 
so; there is some anxiety”. What does this narrative produce? What does this 
narrative give me? A place for my anxiety? A separation between ‘me/us’ – the 
overseas – and ‘they’ – the Europeans, the British? Is this narrative ‘true’? 
Sometimes I feel very confident about getting what I need: visas, fellowships, 
work. Is it what is happening that I am in a transition? I can narrate this 
differently. Another part of me always feels in transitions. What is and is not a 
																																																						
43 Some authors (Aron, 2000; Finlay & Gough, 2003) distinguish between reflection and 
reflexivity. Aron (2000) understand self-reflection as pointing at a cognitive process where we 
try to make sense of ourselves as if from the outside; in contrast, self-reflexivity also includes 
the affective experience of the moment from the first-person perspective. Similarly, Finlay and 
Gough (2003) think about reflection as after the event while reflexivity is more on the spot and 
dynamic. Schön (2008) speaks about reflection-in-action which would be closer to the previous 
notions of reflexivity. These distinctions might find a root in the phenomenological notion of 
reflection as cognitive and thematised which is opposed to the pre-reflective as embedded in 
the action and implicit. While I think of these distinctions as useful, I do not follow them as they 
make assumptions that I trouble. With my conceptualisation of reflexivity as affective ways of 
relating (chapter four), the temporal distinction that grants a separation between ‘in the action’ 
and ‘after the action’ is challenged. I think that we are always in action, we are always relating 
to ourselves, there is never a moment of standing back to look at what happened that is not 
already an action and a way of relating. Furthermore, both these notions rest on an individual 
performing the reflexivity or reflection whereas I think of the subject as part of a greater milieu 
and produced by ‘their’ reflexive activity rather than previous to it. More to the point, I do not 
think that there is an already formed self to be reflected or reflexive about but that it is in 
constant process of becoming. Finally, I do not think of reflexivity as requiring conscious 
awareness but as something that happens involuntarily (we find ourselves being reflexive in 
particular ways) and so what we can do is to, in a meta-reflexive gesture, bring the attention 
to how we are relating to ourselves.  
Coming back to the distinction between reflexivity and reflection, Haraway (1997) and Barad 
(2007) think that reflexivity operates like reflection in the sense of trying to mirror something. 
In this thesis, when I am referring to reflecting I am pointing towards the intention to represent 





transition, anyway? “I am in a transition that brings some anxiety”. Is this 
narrative ‘true’? That might be a senseless question because from where can 
I answer to that? I try another question: Does this narrative work for accounting 
of what is happening to me? But these questions are not separated: for this 
narrative to work, to make use of it, it needs to feel ‘true’. As I developed in the 
previous chapter, in believing this narrative – in holding it – I produce a context 
that makes it ‘real’.  
Both reflexivity and diffraction help me here. I can be concerned with grasping, 
with knowing, with articulating what is going on with me. This would be closer 
to reflexivity, to the idea that I can actually know what is happening to me. “I 
can know what is going on with me, I just need to reflect about it, or to go to 
the psychotherapist, or to make a discursive analysis of what social discourses 
are speaking through me, or maybe to travel, or to do a retreat and get to an 
insight, an answer: yes, this is what is going on with me”. But if I take seriously 
a relational ontology, I cannot know. As I see it, all of what I can do is to relate 
to it in different ways, producing something in this movement. This is my 
conceptualisation of reflexivity as ways of relating that produces. This idea of 
reflexivity met with diffraction. This idea of reflexivity became possible and 
solid after, among many other things, reading about diffraction. But diffraction 
also wants to take me elsewhere. I read the authors on diffraction and they do 
not want reflexivity. They want to move on. The posts. They want to leave 
something behind, to bring the new. I do not like that narrative very much. 
Progression. Evolution. I think that it can produce – or if I am braver, I think 
that it produces – practices of exclusion. “I have evolved, have you?” “I use 
diffraction, do you still use reflexivity?” 
Reflexivity has been criticised and even encouraged to move away from 
(Barad, 2003, 2007; Davies, 2014; Gale & Wyatt, 2017; Haraway, 1997; Lenz 
Taguchi, 2012) because of its alleged reliance on representationalism and its 
aim to identify and categorise the self, leaving little space for difference and 




generative and I make extensive use of it. Nonetheless, I also think that this 
argument might fall prey to some of what it criticises in identifying and reducing 
reflexivity to one reified thing. An operation like: reflexivity is x and y and that 
is why we should move on from it.  
I think that this can be similar to what Sedgwick (2003) calls paranoid reading. 
She suggests that this way of reading is pervasive in critical approaches to the 
point that the very word ‘critical’ is reduced to name this practice that insists in 
suspecting the texts, looking to find in them what is dreaded, reducing their 
complexity and foreclosing alternative paths. Building from this, Bozalek and 
Zembylas (2017) contribute to the debate between reflexivity and diffraction 
trying to stay with the complexity of both practices and not to make a paranoid 
and binary reading that assumes diffraction as the superior term. 
Looking at some of the literature (Bondi, 2009; Brown, 2006; Campbell, 2004; 
Davies et al., 2004; Etherington, 2004, 2017; Finlay, 2002, 2017; Gemignani, 
2017; Pillow, 2003, 2015; G. Rose, 1997; Shaw, 2016; Wilkinson, 1988), 
reflexivity has been conceptualised in numerous ways and it is constantly re-
thought; therefore, it does not sit comfortably with one overarching definition 
of it that can help us to absolutely reject it. As with Winnicott (1971) I want to 
use the authors, which as I have said is the contrary to the traditional meaning 
of use as an utilitarian way of relating. To use in the Winnicottian sense refers 
to the way of relating where I assume that the other is not under my omnipotent 
control; hence, they get placed outside my psychic world, and this externality 
makes me able to use them. I can only use what I cannot completely control. I 
want to use reflexivity and to use diffraction, not to dominate them, not to 
omnipotently discard any of them as useless.   
In this chapter, I argue that I need both: reflexivity and diffraction. Furthermore, 
I contend that reflexivity and diffraction are blurred into each other like a 
diffraction pattern of light; we move from reflexivity to diffraction and back not 
in a definite manner. I do not find spaces where there is just reflexivity or just 




and lighter zones and you cannot pinpoint where exactly the shift occurred.  
Reflexivity and diffraction are not external to each other; I think they blur into 
each other. What if reflexivity and diffraction intra-act?  
Throughout the text, I affirm that a focus on the use and productivity of each 
concept and practice can generate a more open stance towards other ways of 
making sense and making world, thus contributing to spaces of further 
complexities, nuances and multiplicities.  
The rejection of reflexivity in favour of diffraction reproduces what it criticises, 
and I think that, precisely, this is an example of how diffraction shifts into 
reflexivity as reflection. We want diffraction but we also want to know that 
diffraction is the best and that prevent us from being coherent with diffraction. 
At the same time, there is a transforming and diffracting capacity in reflexivity. 
Following Derrida (1978), the gesture of reflecting back to oneself or of turning 
over oneself or one’s work there is always going to be some degree of 
difference produced. I argue, then, that the differentiation between reflexivity 
and diffraction is not absolute or clear-cut.  
With diffraction I need to think about how I am constantly becoming through 
intra-actions (Barad, 2007). Intra-action affirms that we do not interact with 
other things as if we were separate and already formed; we intra-act, the 
boundaries that define the agencies at play are always in process of being 
constituted. Diffraction points at the movements through which I constantly 
become otherwise in a way that the ‘I’, the identity, is lost in the intra-action. I 
think about movements and things getting re-shaped constantly. I resonate 
enthusiastically with the possibilities that this gives, the openness that brings. 
But I still say ‘I’, and I still need to make sense of what is happening and of 
who I am being. My wanting to grasp myself, to grasp the other, to know, “ah 
this is how it is”. I need it but then when I do it I can feel trapped, the other can 
feel trapped. If I feel how I become with, feeling the continuous process, and 
how my doings are produced by something wider than me and that my doings 




feel more lost, and I need to ask again: “but, how is it? What am I/are you 
‘really’ feeling?” “What is this all about?” What I find is never purely diffraction 
or purely reflexivity, in some indeterminate moment it shifts and then again. 
The diffraction pattern with its zones of light in dark and darkness in the light: 
blurred, not clear-cut.  
I do not think that I need to reject reflexivity and become diffractive. I do not 
think that I need to move away from this search that asks: What is happening? 
Who am I being in this situation? What do I feel about this? I do not need to 
stop asking these questions. I think, though, that I can ask these questions 
differently, playing with them. I think I need to open myself to making sense of 
myself through diffraction without needing to reject reflexivity. I think of a 
diffracted reflexivity. A reflexivity, as I am developing it, that holds a thoroughly 
relational ontology and from there says that reflexivity is understood as ways 
of relating to oneself, ways of relating that produce this very self and a world 
in that movement of making sense.  
This chapter is my way of articulating reflexivity and diffraction, their 
connections and how they fade into each other: a diffraction pattern. I attempt 
to put reflexivity and diffraction together, intra-acting (with) each other to 
embrace my diffracted reflexivity. First, I define both, reflexivity and diffraction, 
in depth. After this, I put forward my conceptualisation of reflexivity that uses 
diffraction. I make use of my reflexivity as affective ways of relating to 
ourselves to blur the clear-cut differentiation of reflexivity and diffraction and I 
finish by concluding why I consider so relevant to challenge this sharp 
differentiation between the concepts. At different points, I bring my 
engagement with psychotherapy.  
Reflexivity 
In this section I speak about reflexivity in the social sciences. Reflexivity in the 
social sciences speaks to how the knowledge produced is not neutral but 
comes from a subjectivity. This subjectivity can be understood as bounded, 




of reflexivity earlier I was doing so in more general terms, as the practices of 
making sense of myself. Reflexivity in the social sciences needs this, the 
author needs to make sense of themselves in some way to think about how 
they shape their work. We can make sense of ourselves in very different ways. 
Not one reflexivity but reflexivities.  
That reflexivity is not unitary but that there are different types of reflexivity has 
been highlighted by different authors (Dcruz, Gillingham, & Melendez, 2007; 
Denzin, 1997; Finlay, 2002, 2003, 2017; Gemignani, 2017; Kuehner, Ploder, 
& Langer, 2016; Pillow, 2003, 2015; Wilkinson, 1988). In general, there is a 
differentiation between a more personal reflexivity, with humanistic 
underpinnings and a more social reflexivity that understand the subject as 
socially constituted and asks to be reflexive about the discursive practices and 
institutional workings that impact our research and work.   
A more personal reflexivity in the social sciences (Etherington, 2017; Finlay, 
1998, 2008; Georgiadou, 2016) argues for the personal location of the author 
as directly relevant to the research process and outcomes. Within 
psychotherapy, Stolorow and Atwood (1979), make an early study on how the 
theories in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis derive from the personal 
concerns and lives of their authors. Some authors propose the usefulness of 
psychoanalysis to research and to think about reflexivity (Aron, 2000; Bondi, 
2014; Brown, 2006; Finlay, 2009; Holmes, 2013; Lapping, 2016). In 
psychoanalysis, the notion of countertransference has a place similar to 
reflexivity because countertransference speaks to how the personal 
involvement of the analyst is present in their work with patients.  
Wilkinson (1988) from feminism, made a ground-breaking contribution in this 
regard and she is widely acknowledged as an influence in the 
conceptualisation of reflexivity. She distinguishes between personal, functional 
and disciplinary reflexivity. The first two are at a more personal level, they deal 
with how our particularities as a person influences what one studies and the 




with how the discipline works and how that affects the research productions of 
it. For example, it interrogates what kinds of knowledge and ways of 
researching are validated, which ones are excluded and what are the 
consequences of that. 
Continuing with an emphasis on a more social reflexivity, Harding (1993), also 
coming from feminism, influentially argues for a strong reflexivity where the 
researcher reflects about their social position, personal life and perspectives 
not for trying to achieve more neutrality but to embrace a scholarship that 
stems from – and possibly transforms – a socially situated subject. She 
proposes a new notion of objectivity called strong objectivity that rejects the 
possibility of neutrality and puts forward that the way to achieve objectivity is 
not eschewing the social positionality of the researcher but on the contrary to 
make explicit from where this knowledge is produced.  
The social studies of science posit that there is not a neutrality or possible 
objectivity in the scientific practices; instead, making science is a rhetorical 
practice of representation (Lynch & Woolgar, 1990; Woolgar, 1993). That is 
why Woolgar (1993) proposes to focus the attention on reflexivity, that is, on 
the practices of representation. The argument is that if we can study and show 
our practices of representation we can produce a better account of our 
research. What we say in our studies does not need to be taken as face value, 
but our readers need to see how this knowledge is produced.  
Latour (1988) criticises Woolgar (1988) for implying, against his own relativism, 
that there can be a truer account by increasing reflexivity, that is, for exercising 
a meta-reflexivity. He argues: 
Why can't they be ordered in a pile of reflexive layers? Because they 
are all texts or stories bearing on something else. There is no way to 
order texts in layers because they are all equal. Texts, so to speak, live 
in a democracy, as far as semiotics is concerned. The whole vertigo of 
self-reference stems from the very naive belief that the same actor 
appears in both the first (down below) and last text (up there). (Latour, 




I agree with the criticism that Latour puts forward. That is why my meta-
reflexivity does not claim to generate objective or more objective knowledge 
but to be just another way of relating; however, this way of relating has the 
specificity of generating and awareness and a responsibility over how our ways 
of relating are producing ourselves and our world. Latour’s (1988) way of 
resolving the problem that he finds in Woolgar’s (1988) argument is different. 
Instead of the meta-reflexivity that Woolgar proposes, Latour (1988) argues to 
put the effort in generating better in the sense of more persuasive fictions. 
Haraway (1997) joins Latour in the critique of Woolgar’s use of reflexivity. She 
highlights that Woolgar focus the spotlight on the researcher but does not do 
much to produce a change in the world. Nonetheless, according to Campbell 
(2004), Haraway is not convinced by the idea of making more persuasive 
fictions because for feminism knowledge is political and in that sense a kind of 
accuracy is required to produce criticism and change. The inequalities need to 
be taken seriously.  
Haraway, situating her proposal between feminism and constructivism 
(Campbell, 2004), proposes the concept of situated knowledges (Haraway, 
1988), that highlights that knowledge is always produced locally by socially 
situated actors. She says that acknowledging this produces better accounts – 
more objective accounts – than the ones that assume that their knowledge is 
neutral as if produced from a God’s-eye-view.  
Continuing with the reflexivities that take into account the social and cultural 
dimensions, I think about more discursive reflexivities that are drawing on 
poststructuralist thought that conceptualises subjectivity as socially 
constituted. This type of reflexivity does not look at the person as the 
foundation of knowledge; in contrast, the subject is spoken through dominant 
discourses and this is the focus of attention.   
Reflexivity implies a critical consciousness of the discourses that hold 
us in place, that is, a capacity to distance ourselves from them at the 
same time as we are constituted by them, a capacity to see the work 




effects. This does not mean that one is outside of language or floating 
free of discourse. It means rather, that the possibility exists of reflexively 
turning the gaze of language on itself. (Davies et al., 2004, p. 380) 
Gemignani (2017) also works towards a critical reflexivity that asks genealogic 
questions instead of humanistic and representationalistic ones. Pillow (2003, 
2015) goes in that direction as well proposing to think about an uncomfortable 
reflexivity and reflexivity as genealogical.  I believe that to move the attention 
to discourse is an important practice to be able to make social criticisms and 
in that way to make space to think and act differently. (Foucault, 1990) 
Nonetheless, sometimes these efforts seem, at one time, to acknowledge the 
limitations of subjectivity – in that the person loses its mastery by the 
overpowering social discourses – and to give the masterfulness back – in 
believing that we can catch ourselves and see how discourses are working in 
us, escaping their hold. As Lather says: “To attempt to deconstruct one's own 
work is to risk buying into the faith in the powers of critical reflection that places 
emancipatory efforts in such a contradictory position with the poststructuralist 
foregrounding of the limits of consciousness.” (Lather, 1993, p. 685) 
In that sense, reflexivity has been criticised for trying to grasp, to represent, 
the subjective and/or socially situated position of a subject as if this 
representation could actually be done. In other words, reflexivity has been 
criticised for assuming that we – as ‘observers’ – can be somehow separated 
from what is observed and from that distinction we can actually figure it out 
how we are involved in our endeavours. As I was saying earlier, with reflexivity 
I have the expectation that I can know what is going on with myself.  
Diffraction by Haraway 
Campbell (2004) explains how Haraway moves from reflexivity to diffraction, 
together with moving from representation to articulation. “The concept of 
‘diffraction’ relies not on a model of representation but of ‘articulation’” 
(Campbell, 2004, p. 174). This distinction points that is not a subject 
representing an object, with the duality that this implies. Instead, it is about 




Haraway (1992) puts forward that the practices of representation are 
authorising the person ‘the expert’ that makes the representation, leaving the 
object powerless. “Tutelage will be eternal. The represented is reduced to the 
permanent status of the recipient of action, never to be a co-actor in an 
articulated practice among unlike, but joined, social partners”. (Haraway, 1992, 
p. 312). As I understand it, articulation is a more democratic, non-hierarchical 
way of relating to the world, where we think about movements together and 
what they produce instead of representing. Not saying what is going on with 
me/you/it as if I had the power to define and to name me/you/it; to articulate 
together, not to represent me/you/it, to articulate in between.  
Importantly, Haraway (1992) assumes that the boundaries that define each 
subject are not previously set. Then, it is not about an ‘expert’ representing a 
reality out there – or their own selves, I would add –  as if these two categories 
were pre-set. Likewise, in her model of articulation, it is not that already formed 
things interact with each other but they get shaped in the articulation. “But the 
things, in my view, do not pre-exist as ever-elusive, but fully pre-packaged, 
referents for the names. Other actors are more like tricksters than that. 
Boundaries take provisional, never finished shape in articulatory practices.” 
(Haraway, 1992, p. 313)   
It is in this way that Haraway moves away from reflexivity in its association with 
representationalism and status quo. “Diffraction engages with the different 
possible patterns that interactions with others create. For Haraway, the 
‘interference patterns’ of diffraction can shift existing meanings” (Campbell, 
2004, p. 174). In that way, Haraway moves to diffraction in an effort for making 
a critical practice that changes something in the world. “These diffracting rays 
compose interference patterns, not reflecting images.”(Haraway, 1992, p. 299)  
Reflexivity has been much recommended as a critical practice, but my 
suspicion is that reflexivity, like reflection, only displaces the same 
elsewhere, setting up the worries about copy and original and the 
search for the authentic and really real. Reflexivity is a bad trope for 
escaping the false choice between realism and relativism in thinking 




knowledge. What we need is to make a difference in material- semiotic 
apparatuses, to diffract the rays of technoscience so that we get more 
promising interference patterns on the recording films of our lives and 
bodies. Diffraction is an optical metaphor for the effort to make a 
difference in the world. (Haraway, 1997, p. 16) 
I think it is interesting to think about this in relation to psychotherapeutic 
practice. To me it amounts to more relational theorisations of psychoanalysis 
where the practices of understanding are not aimed at capturing what the client 
is – not to make a descriptive diagnosis of them. Instead, our understanding, 
our interpretations, are relational moves: they come from and produce different 
ways of relating. In a similar vein to Winnicott (1990)44, I would state that the 
value of an interpretation is not because of its correctness, but in its potentiality 
to keep playing. Therapy is about finding ways of relating – or, in Haraway’s 
terms, ways of articulating - that bring novelty. I believe that this way of 
conceiving therapy does more for providing a platform where both client and 
therapist can become otherwise and not get frozen in pre-set roles and scripts.  
Precisely, for Haraway (1992), a possible effect of diffraction is Trinh’s 
inappropriate/d others. Inappropriated not as being outside of relation as in a 
natural or original status, but to be enacting a way of relating beyond 
domination; not being constrained to a taxonomy. Maybe in psychotherapy it 
can be easy to fall prey to practices of appropriating and constraining our 
clients to different taxonomies, even if these taxonomies are more ‘benign’ 
than a psychiatric diagnosis – as it can be that the person has difficulties 
tolerating uncertainty or that they are starting a process of self-actualisation. 
Even in these cases, there can be something of grasping and maybe trapping 
the other in a category. It might be that it is calming for us as psychotherapists 
– and to the clients that might feel recognised and reassured – to ‘know’ what 
is going on, to ‘know’ who is the person that we have in front of us, and to 
‘know’ what we are striving for in our process with them, but it might also 
																																																						




reproduce a colonising way of relating, in that we impose onto them our values 
and categories.  
Diffraction by Barad  
Barad (2007) drawing on Haraway’s insights also works with the notion of 
diffraction in an explicit contrast and rejection of reflexivity. She also starts from 
a criticism of representationalism as a basis for reflexivity. 
Representationalism assumes that language can mirror reality and it is argued 
that reflexive methodologies just place the mirror in front of the researcher. 
Barad’s work criticises reflexivity that even in putting the knower back in the 
picture, it does it as if it was a matter of accepting that we are knowing from a 
certain perspective. Diffraction does not only point to the fact that we are 
situated (as if the world was fixed) but that we are becoming with the world.  
Diffraction speaks to me in therapy of suspending the need, or eschewing the 
need, for a diagnosis or a definite characterisation of our own involvement or 
of any interaction – as if we could stand at a distance and ‘know’ what 
something ‘is’. It speaks about intervening from within, producing something 
as if blindly. We do not know from afar, we are part of it, continuously becoming 
with it. Because we are constantly in a process – always in movement – there 
are not fixed entities that we can categorise. This is not news for many 
psychotherapists. Bion (1970) has been very strong in the need for not 
foreclosing thought through clear definitions and to operate driven by 
something felt that cannot be articulated. In this, Bion was pointing at being 
part of a field that cannot be known but we are unavoidably part of it.  
Through trying to understand something we are becoming with it, producing 
something out of that particular articulation (Haraway, 1992). As Barad (2007) 
makes clear, diffraction is about understanding ourselves as continuously 
defined by, and defining, the world that we are ‘studying’. 
The point is not simply to put the observer or knower back in the world 
(as if the world were a container and we needed merely to acknowledge 
our situatedness in it) but to understand and take account of the fact 




furthermore, the point is not merely that knowledge practices have 
material consequences but that practices of knowing are specific 
material engagements that participate in (re)configuring the world. 
Which practices we enact matter –in both senses of the word. Making 
knowledge is not simply about making facts but about making worlds, 
or rather, it is about making specific worldly configurations – not in the 
sense of making them ex nihilo, or out of language, beliefs, or ideas, 
but in the sense of materially engaging as part of the world in giving it 
specific material form. (Barad, 2007, p. 91) 
I do not think that this compelling conceptualisation is very far from a relational 
understanding in psychoanalysis where it is not (only) about knowing what the 
patient ‘is’, or what dynamics are present but about what ways of relating are 
present between patient and psychotherapist, and how they are moving the 
patient (and also the psychotherapist) to more or less enabling ways of relating 
and being. I think that from a relational perspective, we are not seeing, for 
example, a ‘narcissistic’ client; we are enacting a narcissistic way of relating 
between us: we are making narcissism appear. (Serra Undurraga, 2016) 
In theoretical scholarship, diffraction inspires to not place attention into 
grasping what an author really meant – as if we could represent this knowledge 
– but to put our efforts into thinking what different ideas do. Jackson and 
Mazzei (2012b), for example, see where different concepts can take them.  
I consider the concept of diffraction generative and important. Nonetheless, I 
struggle with the categorical rejection of reflexivity. I believe that there is not a 
clear-cut difference between these concepts and furthermore that they are 
useful to each other. In what follows, I develop my understanding and use of 
reflexivity (that uses diffraction) to then argue how both concepts are not as 
sharply differentiated. Finally, I reflect on the usefulness of blurring this clear-




My understanding and use of reflexivity45 
From a relational ontology, reflexivity is no longer attractive as it assumes from 
the start a separation between the observer and the observed. In stating that 
we need to see how we are present in our research it is assumed that we are 
separated from it and that we can know and state our position as if it was 
something to be observed at a distance. Diffraction, instead, does not put the 
focus on knowing and stating our position, but on the processes through which 
the identities and agencies are constantly made and re-made. Diffraction does 
not think of any methodology as neutral and able to represent the world; but 
as producing the boundaries of what will be taken as the world, the author, the 
participant, etc. to be analysed.  
First of all, as it is suggested, reflexivity starts off with preconceived 
assumptions of binaries rather than investigating how boundaries or 
binaries are produced through the methodology itself. In reflexivity, 
there is a researcher as an independent subject who is actually the 
locus of reflection, whereas in diffraction there is no such distinction as 
subjects and objects are always already entangled. Thus, from a 
diffractive perspective, subjects and objects such as nature and culture 
are not fixed referents for understanding the other but should be read 
through one another as entanglements. (Bozalek & Zembylas, 2017, p. 
116) 
My notion of reflexivity takes into account this criticism and it is not worried 
about stating my position for example saying that I am a woman, that I am 
Chilean, that I do not have children, that I am a psychotherapist, etc. as if these 
identity categories ‘represent’ me or could directly say something about the 
work that I write. Nonetheless, I believe that if I were doing that, I would be 
reflexively relating to myself in certain ways. Maybe if I were defining myself 
like that I would be relating to myself as if I could actually be grasped and 
pinned down in a set of categories. Crucially, I think that this reflexive way of 
relating to myself would be producing – making the agential cut that 
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momentarily defines – that self. Therefore, I would be producing something 
rather than confessing something. 
My understanding and use of reflexivity comes from the notion that we are 
always inevitably reflexive about ourselves. According to a Foucauldian 
understanding (Butler, 1997b; Deleuze, 2006; Foucault, 1990) we produce 
ourselves in a process of folding in social discourses: we reflexively relate to 
ourselves according to the norms that we breathe and in this endeavour, we 
form ourselves. In a relational and psychoanalytic reading (Bruschweiler-Stern 
et al., 2002; Fairbairn, 1952; Mitchell, 2000; Mitchell & Aron, 2013; Ogden, 
1986; D. N. Stern, 2000), our subjectivity can only be understood as emerging 
from previous and current relationships that continuously shape available 
ways of relating to others and to oneself. Reflexivity in this panorama, is a way 
of relating to ourselves that is continuously producing the very self that we take 
ourselves to be.  
We are always aware of ourselves in certain ways (socially and relationally 
enabled), we are always unintentionally reflexive about ourselves. A more 
intentional reflexivity is invited not only from poststructuralism, as to see how 
discourse is operating, but also from, for example, relational 
psychotherapeutic theories that make us prone to think about what ways of 
relating to ourselves and to others we are enacting.  As I have said, the practice 
of the self that I am inviting is a kind of meta-reflexivity that interrogates the 
ways in which we are relating to ourselves – the ways in which we are being 
reflexive. I think that the interrogation of the ways in which we are relating to 
ourselves is benefited from what I call the threefold questioning device that 
provides a set of questions to qualify how we are relating to ourselves, how we 
are being reflexive about ourselves. This device asks how we are conceiving 
ourselves (as a unit self, in relational-intersubjective terms, in intra-active 
terms…), how transparent or opaque we are assuming our access to ourselves 




Therefore, my vision of reflexivity assumes that we are always reflexive about 
ourselves, because we are always relating to ourselves in certain ways 
(socially, relationally and materially given) and in this action producing 
ourselves – not from a mastery position but as part of the intra-action (Barad, 
2007). My conceptualisation of reflexivity invites the meta-reflexive practice of 
bringing the attention to question the ways in which we are currently relating 
to ourselves – the ways in which we are reflexive – understanding that this 
questioning is also a way of relating to ourselves. 
In this understanding, reflexivity as a declaration of from where we are coming 
from is a way of relating to ourselves where, using the threefolded questioning 
device, we are assuming that our subjectivity is bounded, that we can have a 
more transparent access to ourselves and in this endeavour, we might have 
an affective tonality of security and calmness in knowing ourselves. This way 
of relating does not discover a bounded and transparently knowable subject 
but produces it.  
I believe that a constant interrogation of the ways in which we are relating to 
ourselves and to others and what is that producing is necessary and 
generative. Many times, we assume that we hold certain relationship to 
ourselves where for example we assume subjectivity to be intra-active and not 
essentialist, nonetheless, unwittingly, we enact other ways of relating to 
ourselves (as I develop in the next chapter).  
Does the answer to the question of how we are relating to ourselves needs to 
entail to put ourselves in representational boxes? I think that if we understand 
reflexivity as a way of relating to ourselves that produces, then being meta-
reflexive is not about categorising and labelling in essentialist ways but of 
giving a reading of what is happening in certain interactions and this very 
reading moves things in certain ways. To be clear, I do not think that this 
reading is made from a neutral place but it is part of the entanglement that we 
breathe through and contributes to further modify – diffract – the very 




Bozalek and Murris (2019) argue that a diffractive reading does not produce 
absolutisms where one theory that is seen as a unity is qualified as superior or 
inferior to the other. “The superposition created by the diffraction is not ‘critical’, 
but adds force to ‘both’, without assuming that either is a unity, nor the 
interference pattern that has been traced.” (Murris & Bozalek, 2019, pp. 880-
881) 
After having further delineated my way of conceiving reflexivity – which is not 
at odds with diffraction but entangled with it – I develop how the concepts of 
reflexivity and diffraction are more blurred than what it might appear. They form 
a diffraction pattern where reflexivity, as wanting to grasp ourselves, blurs into 
diffraction and the other way around: there is reflexivity in diffraction and 
diffraction in reflexivity and not a blunt categorisation of either reflexivity or 
diffraction. Importantly, for making this analysis about how blurred these 
concepts are, I am heavily relying in my version of meta-reflexivity that asks 
what ways of relating are enacted and what are they producing. That is, I am 
not asking: Is this reflexivity or is this diffraction? But, what ways of relating are 
present here and what they are producing?   
Blurring  
Arguably, at least some forms of reflexivity (Davies et al., 2004; Gemignani, 
2017; Pillow, 2003, 2015; G. Rose, 1997) argue that knowledge cannot be 
neutral and so that it affects what is ‘represented’.  Maybe in these cases the 
difference between reflexivity and diffraction is not so drastic.  
Pillow (2015) thinks about two broad kinds of reflexivity; one understood as 
interpretation and the other as genealogy. Importantly, she points that a crucial 
way to differentiate them is to wonder what purpose or usage we are wanting 
to get through the use of them. While reflexivity as interpretation attempts to 
reveal the workings of power and to facilitate transformation and more fairness, 
reflexivity as genealogical is more thoroughly critical of everything, including 
reflexivity itself; not believing that there is something to discover. Thus, aiming 




understood within reflexivity as genealogy. She does not produce a dichotomy 
naming one reflexivity as better suited than the other, but calls to think about 
the uses of it. Pillow drawing on Ferguson (1991 as cited in Pillow 2015) and 
Sedgwick (2003) argues for not reading a concept against the other but to see 
how they work, how they need each other.  
I think that the work of Pillow (2015) towards emphasising the what for? of our 
concepts and practices is relieving and useful. I believe that this way of relating 
to the concepts and to other research makes space for broadening thought 
and for opening space for other ways of making sense and – using Barad’s 
(2007) terminology – making world. It is in this sense that the work of Barad 
(2007) in explicitly criticising reflexivity as the opposite of diffraction – positing 
a dualism where diffraction comes out victor and the reflexivity loser – seems 
to me as a way of relating that is generating practices of exclusion and policing. 
I believe that it can produce a worry with identifying and clearly distinguishing 
what is reflexive and what is diffractive and to be sure to be in the better group.  
In a way, just now I am doing a similar practice to what I am criticising through 
opposing the work of Pillow to the work of Barad. But I do not reduce Barad’s 
complex and useful conceptualisations to what I name as the dichotomising 
operation of affirming diffraction through the rejection of reflexivity; in fact, I 
use part of her theorisations to criticise this either-or move of eschewing 
reflexivity. I believe that this dichotomising is reproducing a way of relating 
through exclusion that I associate with less emphasis in the nuances and 
intricacy of a theory or a concept. I believe that an attention and honouring of 
the complexity of a concept would account for differences with other concepts 
that are emergent and tentative – rather than categorical. Barad (2007) speak 
about difference within instead of foundational differences but her way of 
separating reflexivity and diffraction speaks to me precisely of what she is 
criticising. Her way of relating to the concept of reflexivity has a more absolutist 




Barad (2007) argues that diffraction is not to look back at ourselves to try to 
define what there is there because that would be representationalistic and 
diffraction moves away from it. Here there seems to be a neatness that makes 
me uncomfortable. I wonder what if we understand this reflexive look back at 
ourselves as an action through which we are also performing something else, 
different than representing. What if there is movement in reflexivity? I believe 
that the practice of referring back to ourselves again and again, also brings the 
possibility of difference and movement. We are relating to ourselves in different 
ways not grasping ourselves in a definite representation.  
In the previous paragraph, I follow Barad (2007) in relating to the concept of 
representation as something to be avoided. Nonetheless, I think that in Barad 
(2007) the difference between representationalism and performativity – in the 
sense of making a difference that produces something – looks quite sharp (too 
sharp). The figure is formed as the need to move away from reflexivity and 
representationalism, but, as I will argue here, representing is not something 
that we can cease doing.  
I suggest complicating the boundaries between representationalism and 
performativity. I think that we can never stop representing even when 
theorising and practicing performativity. Barad (2007) says, using Foucault, 
that representationalism is characterised by the belief that that the represented 
is independent from the practices of representing46. I think that not buying into 
representationalism is indifferent to the constant need of representing. A 
different thing is that in the representations that we make we do not assume 
that we are grasping something external in a definite and accurate way. 
Instead, I understand that in representing we are making sense of something 
in particular ways – that could be otherwise – and producing ourselves and the 
world in this operation.  
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Every time that we develop an argument we are attempting to represent 
something; Even the argument: ‘the practice of representing assumes an 
individuality previous to the describing of it’, is a representation. Every time we 
assert something we need to use a representation in the sense that we say: ‘x 
is in y way’. Furthermore, in eschewing reflexivity the representation is done 
without including the ways in which (we believe) our ways of relating to the 
concept are shaping it in certain ways. The argument takes the form of “this is 
what representation does/assumes” as if we were precisely describing 
(representing) what representation is – even when we are arguing against 
representing. And would it be possible to assert something without 
representing? When I am thinking about diffraction, am I not also representing 
it? 
My own language here, when I write of rendering a prefiguring and 
exemplifying, exploits the resources of representation in order to 
discuss what I claim is antirepresentational. But to take a stand against 
representation is not in fact to escape it. (Arac, 1986, p. xxii)  
Furthermore, I emphasise that representing is itself a doing, it is an action that 
produces. Then the sharp differentiation between representing and 
performativity is complicated. When we attempt to represent – and we do this 
unavoidably – we are doing something and thus we are producing something.  
Wyatt (2019) writes about a diffractive therapy. He underscores that what we 
mean and what we do when we are ‘reflecting’ is not captured by the term 
reflection or reflexivity. Even when we concretely look at ourselves in the 
mirror, the mirror is not neutral, it does not give us a straightforward ‘reflection’; 
what we see there is in an entanglement with our state, the weather, the light, 
etc. Wyatt stresses that when we work with clients, when we go to supervision, 
when we think about clients, etc. what we do is far more intricate and complex 
than to analyse situations as if we could hold them at a distance and know 
about them. We are entangled in the situation in the human and non-human 




I stay with the image of looking at oneself in the mirror. I do not think that what 
I see in the mirror is neutral; I am aware of the material, relational and affective 
entanglements. Is it then that I should say diffraction instead of reflection? 
What I see in the mirror is permeated, yes, but I keep on looking at the mirror 
to see how I look as if the mirror can show me this, as if it can provide me an 
answer to the question: how do I look? And it is this reflexive question what 
takes me elsewhere. That is why I speak of reflection or reflexivity and 
diffraction and all the spaces in-between them; all what is not absolutely 
diffraction nor absolutely reflection. The diffraction pattern of reflexivity and 
diffraction flowing into each other with no accurate beginnings or endings.  
Lenz Taguchi (2012) proposes to become with the data in a transcorporeal (a 
concept that troubles the notion of a bounded body) way, being attentive to 
felt, sensorial data.  
This process of transcorporeal engagements, involving other bodily 
faculties than the mind, constitutes a rethinking of the very act of 
thinking that goes beyond the idea of reflexivity and interpretation as 
inner mental activities in the separate mind of the researcher. (Lenz 
Taguchi, 2012, p. 267) 
I think what is described here can be also understood as another kind of 
reflexivity, another way of relating to ‘myself’, where the researcher can be in 
touch with sensations and feelings that are vague and nuanced. The 
researcher themselves become affectively taken and transformed with the 
data; there is not a position of exteriority in relation to the data. I believe that 
the work of some psychotherapists (Bion, 1970; Bollas, 1987; Gendlin, 1968; 
Ogden, 1997) speak precisely to a way of becoming aware of ‘ourselves’ 
embracing what is felt but not understood in a rational and clear-cut manner. 
In this endeavour, the vague sensations, images, feelings, etc. that the 
therapist can have are not conceived as personal but as a product of the field 
that the therapist is inhabiting.  
A difference between this psychotherapeutic understanding and a diffractive 




relevance is given to the human relationships and the material aspects are in 
a second place or neglected. Nonetheless, psychodrama (Bustos, 1975; 
Moreno, 1955, 1972, 1995; Reyes, 2005), does further work with giving equal 
relevance to the material. In the practice of psychodrama, the space, the 
objects, the temperature, the light, etc. are all integral parts of what is going on 
in any scene. My point is that the reflexive is also already diffractive and the 
diffractive reflexive; they are not external to each other, they are not either 
reflexivity or diffraction as absolutes.  
Another important aspect of a diffractive analysis is that the data also has a 
force. “In the event that emerges, the data is itself understood as a co-
constitutive force, working with and upon the researcher, as the researcher is 
working with the data” (Lenz Taguchi, 2012, p. 272). I resonate with this in how 
I feel that I concomitantly make my work, my work makes me and my work 
makes itself in me. This amounts to how we are affected and transformed by 
our work; in my case by my research and by my clients. Some 
psychotherapists (Aron, 2006; Bass, 2015; Bromberg, 2000; Levenson, 1993; 
Shomron-Atar, 2018) – that, explicitly or implicitly, hold reflexivity as a 
fundamental aspect of psychotherapy – underline how we become otherwise, 
how we are transformed by our work with clients. I relate this to what I see as 
a movement in psychotherapy that resonates with diffraction. This movement 
is from conceiving epistemology and ontology as separated to understanding 
them entangled: There is not an emphasis in knowing as if we could stand 
outside our ‘object of study’, but of being with, becoming with. What we can 
know through being in relation rather than knowing or interpreting as if 
separated from what we are interested in. However, with this emphasis in 
becoming, there is also an emphasis in reflexivity; in questioning and being 
aware of what is happening now, who we are being for the client, what ways 
of relating are present, what is difficult to process, and so on. 
Bozalek and Zembylas (2017), write about their use of two methodologies one 




required an individual perspective as if being able to see at a distance, 
whereas the diffractive methodology makes them understand that they are 
entangled with everything else and that it is this entanglement – and not the 
individual – which has the constitutive force to create the inquiry. The authors 
do not make a sharp separation between both ways of inquiry. In fact, they 
highlight how the reflective journal entries can become diffractive, when 
attending to the entanglements of which they are part. I would like to add to 
this insight that the diffractive methodology also becomes reflexive. For 
instance, I notice that the statements that they make of the diffractive 
methodology – e.g. that they realised that they were not apart from the material 
and relational entanglements – can be in themselves a reflexive journal entry. 
Therefore, I underscore how diffraction can also become reflexive. How 
reflexivity and diffraction are entangled with each other.  
Conclusion: Why blur the sharp division between reflexivity and 
diffraction? 
In this chapter, I have showed how diffraction has emerged through explicitly 
rejecting and moving away from reflexivity. The main aim of this writing has 
been to challenge this dichotomising operation and instead to propose a focus 
on how the concepts work – what they produce – including what they can do 
to each other. After exploring both, reflexivity and diffraction, I have argued 
how their differences are not as clear-cut. Moreover, I put forward that sharply 
differentiating them produces practices of exclusion and policing that aim to 
check or to prove if you are or not in the ‘better’ group. I contend that both 
reflexivity and diffraction have something of each other and that actually 
putting them into conversation can bring about generative yieldings. I 
emphasise how there is a need for both reflexivity and diffraction: we keep on 
needing to ask what is going on with ourselves and also needing to escape a 
fixed and trapping grasping of ourselves. Hence, a diffracted reflexivity and a 




Why am I so invested in complicating the definite separation between 
reflexivity and diffraction? I think because I connect the purity of a concept with 
a moral affirmation of something through an absolute rejection of something 
else. Moral superiority: “I am not like them. I am not like you. I do not do this. I 
am better than that” I think that if we could see ‘in’ ourselves (and in our 
favourite theories) more of that which we reject in others (or in our most 
criticised theories), there would be more possibilities for connection and for 
taking responsibility from a more generous place.  
I started the previous paragraph with a reflexive question – Why am I so 
invested in complicating the definite separation between reflexivity and 
diffraction?  – and it helped me to move something. I do not think that my 
answer exhausted the question, or that the question is what I need to measure 
myself against. But I do think that the reflexive question made me able to 
articulate something in a particular way: to make sense and to make world.  
Furthermore, I am very interested in troubling this sharp division because I 
want to foreground the inevitable possibility of slippage to different positions, 
more when we are rejecting one of them strongly. My way of using meta-
reflexivity as asking what ways of relating are being enacted now, helps me to 
make this critique. Psychoanalysis helps me here through thinking about the 
paranoid-schizoid mechanisms (Ogden, 1988) where what needs to be 
strongly rejected is clearly taking a hold on us at the same time. Paradoxically, 
poststructuralism and posthumanism help us to decentre the human but at the 
same time there is an unwittingly and inevitable movement of re-centring of 
the mastery of the human as I explore in the next chapter.  
I feel more trustful and hopeful towards conceptualisations that do not aspire 
to this purity, that acknowledge and embrace the fact that they also enact what 
they reject. They reflexively relate to themselves allowing their incoherencies. 
Pillow (2003) stresses how she finds herself also caught in what she criticises 
even if she tries to avoid it. Davies et. al. (2004) highlight the ambivalences in 




they do manage to resist those habits and sedimentations, to make the 
constitutive force of discourse visible, and revisable, they will nonetheless find 
themselves caught in multiple layers of ambivalence around the existence of 
the subject.” (Davies et al., 2004, p. 363). Lenz Taguchi (2013) also 
foregrounds that even if trying to resist certain images of thinking that assume 
an I, she and her group enacted them anyway. All these are examples of 
papers that acknowledge their slippages in what I see as a reflexive gesture.  
Considering that we cannot just stop being influenced by the very concepts 
and ways of relating that we are keen to criticise, a few authors (Davies & 
Gannon, 2013; Jackson & Mazzei, 2008, p. 304, 2012b; Lather, 1993; St. 
Pierre, 1997) have chosen to continue using the terms but – after Derrida – 
under erasure. As Lather (1993) does with the concept of validity “Rather than 
jettisoning ‘validity’ choice, I retain the term in order to both circulate and break 
with the signs that code it.” (p. 674) 
In the next section, I bring Derrida (1978) and Deleuze and Guattari (1987), to 
think with him about how the concepts that we criticise still – unavoidably – 
have a hold on us. I use my meta-reflexivity to think about diffraction and 








Chapter 6: Betraying our best 










In this chapter, I take issue with what I find a problematic attitude of assuming 
that our critical academic work is not also liable to reproduce some of what it 
is criticising. Drawing on Derrida (1978) and Deleuze and Guattari (1987), I 
emphasise that unavoidably we are going to fall prey to what we are criticising. 
It is inevitable that our work slips (to a greater or lesser extent) into a position 
that we are explicitly rejecting.  
I focus my attention in research working with the concept of diffraction (Barad, 
2007), and also more generally with conceptualisations that embrace 
tentativeness and openness, to show how they reproduce what they reject. I 
propose to use meta-reflexivity (as questioning the ways of relating that we are 
enacting) to think about diffraction. I support a way of relating to the concepts 
where we assume that we will also enact what we want to move on from. I 
think that this acknowledgment helps us to problematize and keep on thinking 
about what our conceptualisations produce, instead of assuming our 
conceptualisation as the superior term.  
If reflexivity is understood as an activity that we engage in unavoidably, 
because it is in a reflexive process that our sense of self is constantly produced 
(Foucault, 1990), then it becomes crucial to keep thinking about it. I think that 
to reconceptualise reflexivity, also through the critique that diffraction poses, 
works for re-thinking and opening up our practices. Also, as I will argue, I 
believe that reflexivity (and meta-reflexivity) can contribute to the practice and 
conceptualisation of diffraction. In this essay, I reflect about how there is 
always some slippage and even when we want to sustain a diffractive 
perspective aligned with positive difference, performativity, and decentring 
practices, there are at the same time practices of identity, security and 
sameness enacted.  
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) propose two terms that could be understood as 
exclusive options: the rhizome (random connections that do not follow a 




conceptualising through dualisms and dichotomies). Nonetheless, they are 
emphatic in saying that the rhizome can always slip into the tree and the other 
way around. They do not draw a notion of their philosophy as embracing the 
rhizome and rejecting the tree but as a constant work of bringing the trees back 
to the rhizome. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) write about how we unavoidably 
construct dualisms even when we actively do not want to, and we need to work 
again at undoing them and in this endeavour we produce yet another one, “the 
furniture we are forever rearranging.” (p. 21) 
In the past chapters, I have been contrasting an inclusive way of relating to the 
concepts – where I underline the different usefulness of each concept – to an 
either-or, dichotomising way of relating – that affirms one concept as superior 
than the other. I am aware that in this very operation, to an extent, I am also 
performing what I criticise: I am thinking that relating to the concepts thinking 
about their usefulness is the best way to go. I think that this betrayal of my best 
intentions is unavoidable. Nonetheless, I do try not to reduce what I criticise to 
a simplified thing that needs to be eschewed. With psychoanalysis, I think that 
the either-or way of thinking is necessary and useful in generating order 
(Ogden, 1988); an order that we might need for developing our arguments, as 
I do here.  
Using Derrida’s idea of writing under erasure (Derrida, 1978, 1997), I invite to 
acknowledge how the concepts and practices that we reject – and more when 
we reject them drastically – still have a hold on us. I show how some texts that 
explicitly affirm values as tentativeness, openness, non-dichotomising 
operations, etc. reproduce what they so actively reject.  
In this chapter, I first bring Derrida and then Deleuze and Guattari to think 
about how we unavoidably reproduce what we explicitly want to avoid. I then 
bring some examples of works where there is slippage – more or less 
acknowledged – to what the text is clearly rejecting. Finally, I think about how 




a further attempt to diffract reflexivity and to use meta-reflexivity with 
diffraction.  
Derrida under erasure 
Derrida (1978) places the reassuring need to master anxiety as fundamental 
for the production of a centred structure. Centred structures are theories that 
tell us how things are. The structure has an immobile centre that needs to be 
outside the structure. The centre is what cannot be changed and what 
regulates the structure. This centre grants us the security of the game because 
there is something permanent beyond the reach of play.  
On Derrida’s (1978) account, Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger are part of the 
rupture of the centred structure. From then on, we can no longer rely on a fixed 
and immobile centre to which to refer to as means for orientation and certainty. 
Instead, there is a vast limitless play of possibilities and the possibility of resting 
in a reliable certitude is no longer available.  
This was the moment when language invaded the universal 
problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or origin, 
everything became discourse – provided we can agree on this word – 
that is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original or 
transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system 
of differences. The absence of the transcental signified extends the 
domain and the play of signification infinitely. (Derrida, 1978, p. 280)  
Nonetheless, this change is not as neat or total. The break that does not grant 
us an old reliable certainty and instead offer us an infinite play of possibilities, 
is not a clean or sharp break. In contrast, to criticise the system that we have 
been brought up in, we cannot but use – at least to some extent – the concepts, 
the tools and the practices that have produced us as subjects.  
There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order 
to shake metaphysics. We have no language – no syntax and no lexicon 
– which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single 
destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, 
the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to 




Derrida (1978) relates the crisis of metaphysics – the old certainties – with the 
crisis that implied that the European culture stopped being the centre, the only 
possibility. The birth of ethnology, that implies a critical approach to 
ethnocentrism, was when the European culture was no longer the only centre. 
Nonetheless, even if being profoundly critical, ethnology is still majorly a 
European science, using the concepts that it criticises. Derrida thinks of this 
slippage as a necessary fact not as a contingency.  
This does not justify, for Derrida, an uncritical use of the concepts or a giving 
up in the attempts to critique. Instead, we can relate to this necessity of using 
the concepts we criticise in different ways. A better way of relating to them is 
through thinking critically how we are still using what we denounce. “The 
quality and fecundity of a discourse are perhaps measured by the critical rigor 
with which this relation to the history of metaphysics and to inherited concepts 
is thought” (Derrida, 1978, p. 282). The answer that Derrida (1978) offers to 
this is to conserve the concepts but to use them denouncing their limits. 
No longer is any truth value attributed to them; there is a readiness to 
abandon them, if necessary, should other instruments appear more 
useful. In the meantime, their relative efficacy is exploited, and they are 
employed to destroy the old machinery to which they belong and of 
which they themselves are pieces. This is how the language of the 
social sciences criticizes itself. (Derrida, 1978, p. 284)  
I think that Derrida (1978) is proposing a particular way of relating to the 
concepts, a way that I find very generative. If we were to relate to new concepts 
in a way in which we absolutely believe them or idolise them as a kind of 
salvation, or the only possibility appealing to us – as it can happen with for 
example the term reflexivity, deconstruction or diffraction – then, we would be 
relating to them as the one truth and we wold be falling prey of the same that 
we are criticising.  
Derrida (1978) uses the notion of bricoleur of Levi-Strauss. By this concept he 
means the use of concepts of traditions and theories that are under our 
criticism as tools even if they were not ‘originally’ made for that purpose. This 




person that does a mosaic or a patchwork uses pieces of what once was a 
‘full’ object to create something new.  
Derrida (1978) explains that Levi-Strauss uses the concept of the bricoleur in 
contrast to the engineer who does not borrow but creates its own tools; but if 
by bricolage we understand to borrow concepts from other heritages that have 
come under suspicion, then every theory is a bricoleur, therefore the engineer 
– the one who constructs its discourses from the scratch – is a myth. As Levi-
Strauss says that the bricolage is mythopoetic, Derrida resorts that probably 
the engineer is a myth that the bricoleur created.  
In the last paragraph, we have deconstructed the term engineer, but it is not 
so simple. Derrida (1978) shows that, for example, the deconstruction of the 
concept of the engineer through the notion of the bricoleur ends up breaking 
the very notion of the bricoleur because the bricoleur was sustained in the 
opposition with the engineer.  
As soon as we cease to believe in such an engineer and in a discourse 
which breaks with the received historical discourse, and as soon as we 
admit that every finite discourse is bound by a certain bricolage and that 
the engineer and the scientist are also species of bricoleurs, then the 
very idea of bricolage is menaced and the difference in which it took on 
its meaning breaks down. (Derrida, 1978, p. 285)  
This shows that the usefulness of a term like the bricoleur, that challenges 
some dichotomic assumptions, depends for its operation on a contrasting 
dichotomy. In that way, we do not get completely away from a certain 
foundationalism, even in criticising it. For opposing the dichotomy, we need 
another dichotomy.  That is why, as I have mentioned, Derrida (1978, 1997) 
proposes to still use the concepts – if they are useful – but denouncing its 
limits, as he says to use them under erasure.  As Spivak explains: “This is to 
write a word, cross it out, and then print both word and deletion. (Since the 
word is inaccurate, it is crossed out. Since it is necessary, it remains 
legible).”(Spivak, 1997, p. xiv) 
Spivak (1997) makes the point that it is important to assume that we are within 




metaphysics would actually be to reproduce a metaphysical way of thinking 
that dreams of a full closure. Again, the way proposed is to use the concepts 
but under erasure.  
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the 
outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate 
aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain 
way, because one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not 
suspect it. (Derrida, 1997, p. 24) 
I find this point very important and this is what I delve on in the following 
sections. How the lack of consideration of how we enact what we reject, or the 
belief that we can aspire to an ideal, can lead us to be far more trapped by 
what we think we are avoiding. As Derrida (1978) writes about reading and 
making philosophy: 
What I want to emphasize is simply that the passage beyond philosophy 
does not consist in turning the page of philosophy (which usually 
amounts to philosophizing badly), but in continuing to read philosophers 
in a certain way. (Derrida, 1978, p. 288)  
Derrida (1978) proposes a way of relating to the concepts. As I have said my 
notion of meta-reflexivity has to do with interrogating precisely which ways of 
relating we are enacting. Using this meta-reflexivity, I argue that we can relate 
to some concepts – as deconstruction, as diffraction, as discourse, etc. - 
announcing how we embrace them, nonetheless, in this very action we betray 
these ‘critical’ concepts we cherish because we relate to them as a truth or as 
an identity flag that we hold.  
An input from Deleuze and Guattari 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) postulate three ways of thinking: one is the tree-
like root-thinking, the second is the fascicular-root thinking and the third is the 
rhizomatic thinking. The first has a central root and grows from hierarchies and 
dichotomies – like a tree and its branches. The second does not have a central 
root but a fascicular root system but ends up reproducing a root anyway. The 
third, the rhizomatic, moves away from roots; it is a flat multiplicity with no 




Deleuze and Guattari (1987) claim that even the fascicular thinking that makes 
a criticism to unity (i.e. Nietzsche) unwittingly posits back a unity (i.e. eternal 
return). They write: “The world has become chaos, but the book remains the 
image of the world: radicle-chaosmos rather than root-cosmos. A strange 
mystification: a book all the more total for being fragmented.” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 6) 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that in these cases, concepts like the 
‘multiple’ are put forward with plenty of enthusiasm but this is far from sufficient 
to actually enact them. That is why they affirm that one has to make the 
concepts, not only to announce them. This is similar to Derrida when he says: 
“It must have the form of that of which it speaks” (Derrida, 1978, p. 286). I 
understand this as a way of relating to the concepts that performs what it 
announces: If I announce tentativeness, I need also to make my inquiry 
tentative, I need to actually relate to the concept in a tentative way. 
Nonetheless, in affirming tentativeness, I am necessarily not tentative. So, is 
it possible to make the concepts? I understand that Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987) hint at this possibility with the rhizome, but as Lenz Taguchi (2013) 
makes clear, in the attempt to produce a rhizomatic way of thinking it is 
unavoidable to unwittingly reproduce other images of thinking that do assume 
a root.  
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) consider if it can be said that they are bringing a 
new dualism in opposing rhizomes to trees, maps to traces47. But they put 
forward that these are not neatly separated. “There are knots of arborescence 
in rhizomes, and rhizomatic offshoots in roots” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 
20). They assert that it does happen that the rhizome gets rooted, that we end 
up reproducing exactly what we wanted to dismantle, that the map becomes 
trace. Then, they argue, what needs to be done is to bring the closed structures 
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back again into the map, back into the rhizome. “It is a question of method: the 
tracing should always be put back on the map” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 
13). There is a sense of needing to continuously work to deterritorialize what 
has been coded and taken.   
We invoke one dualism only in order to challenge another. We employ 
a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that challenges 
all models. Each time, mental correctives are necessary to undo the 
dualisms we had no wish to construct but through which we pass. 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 20) 
For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), the rhizome and the tree are no strangers to 
each other, but slip into each other constantly. With this thinking there is not 
an encouragement to enter the rhizome and leave behind what is criticised for 
good, but an awareness of the constant slippage and the need to continuously 
work to undo the dualisms that we necessarily use.   
In the next section, I wish to make a critical review to some conceptualisations 
that I see as missing this meta-reflexive work of thinking what they are 
unwittingly reproducing. As I envisage it, this meta-reflexive work has to do 
with thinking how we are relating to ourselves/our work and not only to what 
we are putting forward in terms of content.  
Slippage  
A researcher can state their position with adjectives that convey ambiguity and 
opacity but reading their article we could perceive that they relate to 
themselves with a strong self-certainty: ambiguity and opacity are announced 
but not made. That could produce an inquiry that creates neat categorizations, 
even if the author does not have the intention to do this. Henceforth, I think 
that is relevant to think about how we are relating to ourselves and our work 
and what that is producing.  
As I have mentioned, I think that Barad (2007) does produce a dichotomy even 
when she is explicitly ‘against’ them. She says: 
Diffraction does not fix what is the object and what is the subject in 




against another where one set serves as a fixed frame of reference, 
diffraction involves reading insights through one another in ways that 
help illuminate differences as they emerge: how different differences 
get made, what gets excluded, and how these exclusions matter. 
(Barad, 2007, p. 30)  
But whilst she affirms this, she also makes a comparison table between 
reflexivity (as reflection) and diffraction, not granting a space to continue 
thinking about reflexivity because reflexivity is established as something 
already known that needs to be eschewed.  
Linnell, Bansel, Ellwood and Gannon (2008) also announce loudly what they 
intend to do, they say: “This article is an attempt to hold thought open in a 
textual space that often forecloses thought” (Linnell et al., 2008, p. 285). I 
wonder: What are they doing when saying this? It seems to me as a 
declaration, a professing. Are they opening thought when they affirm that they 
are attempting to do so?  They continue: “We take our work and ourselves 
within that work as precarious, as tentative, as uncertain. We are more 
interested in this article in asking questions that might keep thought open than 
in providing answers”(Linnell et al., 2008, p. 286). I think that this looks more 
like an identity claim: “We are like this and not like that”. The statement in itself 
is an answer. The slippage, the contradiction, is inside the text. Furthermore, 
in the paper these authors do not thematise, they are not meta-reflexive about 
this, maybe inevitable, contradiction.   
Is it not necessarily that in announcing our intentions in a text we are positing 
an anterior subjectivity with intentions that are directly followed by actions and 
results? Are we not slipping to a humanist perspective when doing this even if 
we put forward Deleuzian concepts? For example, (Löytönen, Koro-Ljungberg, 
Carlson, Orange, & Cruz, 2015) say:  
Thus, the purpose of this article is not to create understandings or 
describe our writing experiment per se but to bring together different 
entanglements, rhizomes, forces, and thoughts that might produce 
writing as sensed and lived in a variety of spaces and at different times. 




I believe that there are centring, humanistic and identificatory practices and 
that these are maybe more influential when they are rejected and not 
acknowledged. Psychoanalysis teaches us that what we do not recognise – 
what is unconscious – has more strength and influence that what we dare to 
allow ‘in ourselves’.  
The theories about the multiplicity of self/selves in psychoanalysis (Bromberg, 
1996, 2010; D. B. Stern, 2004), invite us to think about ourselves as 
unavoidably fragmented in different configurations of self-experience. The aim 
of therapy is not to bring about a coherent unity but to allow different and 
contradictory selves to be connected with each other and not estranged and 
totally dissociated from each other. This would add flexibility and richness to 
our sense of self. This leads me to think how it can be generative to 
acknowledge that as researchers we concomitantly inhabit different positions 
and that it might be impoverishing to try to stick to a single one.  
Jackson and Mazzei (2008) say:  
Like Deleuze (1968/1994), we wish to disturb thought so as not to 
reproduce what we already think, know, and experience. We also want 
to expose the fallibility of the narrative “I” and move toward a 
performative “I” who uses experience not simply as a foundation for 
knowledge but as a concept “under erasure” to expose the indecidability 
of meaning, of self, of narrative— without requiring self-identification or 
mastery. (Jackson & Mazzei, 2008, p. 305) 
It is interesting to me to use here reflexive questions that ask for example: How 
it is to be “like Deleuze” or to think “with Deleuze”. What is happening there 
relationally? Maybe there is a sense of group, an adherence, an identification: 
“we, the Deleuzians”. So, besides enacting a self that claims to not require 
self-identification, there is another self that wants to be “like Deleuze”. I 
wonder: Is there a sense of pride in, paradoxically, affirming oneself as 
decentred – or aiming at it? Is this “like Deleuze” a centring action? 
In a more socially situated vein, I also wonder: how could we think about the 
social and political dimensions involved in the interest that certain authors 




we thinking diffraction with and why?” (p. 429). She asks what do the 
conversations on diffraction do to, for example, conceptualisations of race, 
identity and gender? Pillow (2015) points out how very often the authors 
speaking about diffraction are in a concretely separated and privileged space 
in journals and conferences, preventing rich and complex conversations with 
other groups of scholars and theories. Thus, even if there is a theoretical 
embrace of multiplicity and difference, maybe sometimes the actual practice 
can slip into more homogenous and excluding ways of relating.  
Here I have thought about how even if we attempt to open new routes of 
thoughts and move away from old practices of identity and certainties we, 
maybe inevitably, go against our best intentions. Using my meta-reflexivity, our 
ways of relating to ourselves/others/our work might be reproducing what we 
are strongly rejecting. In the next section, I continue with this line of thought 
bringing this meta-reflexivity to bear more specifically into the concept of 
diffraction and diffractive practices. Afterwards, I think about how reflexivity 
can be shaken and re-thought through diffraction. In this endeavour, I hope to 
show some benefits of diffracting reflexivity and using meta-reflexivity with 
diffraction.  
Using meta-reflexivity with Diffraction  
Barad (2007) comments on the pervasive force that drag us back to more 
humanist conceptualisations. She asserts that poststructuralism, by the hand 
of Foucault and Butler, tries to go against this force but nonetheless is not 
successful in their attempt.  
Each of these powerful attempts rockets our cultural imaginary out of a 
well-worn stable orbit. But ultimately the power of these vigorous 
interventions is insufficient to fully extricate these theories from the 
seductive nucleus that binds them, and it becomes clear that each has 
once again been caught in some other orbit around the same nucleus. 
(p. 135) 
So, she recognises the revolutionary potential of these theories but 
underscores that they nevertheless remain orbiting around the same 




needed is a rigorous simultaneous challenge to all components of this gripping 
long-range force” (p. 135). Reading Barad’s text until here, I get a sense of a, 
maybe excessive, enthusiasm. How are we/is she to do that? I feel an 
absolutist overpowering tone: to have a rigorous and simultaneous challenge 
to all components. Is this not a new centre? Is this not a hope similar in form 
to the ones that characterise the illustration? I think that there is an implicit 
rhetoric of progression and development that makes me feel uneasy. I breathe 
again when I read what I see as a meta-reflexive comment in a footnote.    
It would be surprising if my own attempt at making a successful ionizing 
‘quantum leap’ out of the humanist-representationalist orbit doesn’t fall 
prey to the same pull, snagged by some component or another, so great 
is this force. My hope, nonetheless, is that this endeavour may yet 
produce new possibilities that reconfigure the range of possible new 
attempts. And that may well have made it worthwhile. (Barad, 2007, p. 
428)  
I feel a relief reading this meta-reflexive footnote. I think that Barad (2007) is, 
at least implicitly, thinking about how she is relating to herself, to her ideas and 
to her readership. I think that this meta-reflexivity makes more space for 
relating to the book in other ways that are not simply to follow diffraction as a 
new ‘product’ that has better answers.   
Bozalek and Zembylas (2017) write about their use of both diffractive and 
reflexive methodologies. They think about how these practices entail different 
ways of articulating the research process and the subjectivities involved: 
The collective diffractive methodology used in our multiple reading 
group encounters was different from these journal entries, which 
required an individual perspective rather than an intra-active relational 
one, a position of distance and hindsight from the group rather than the 
understanding that we are part of, entangled and implicated in 
everything happening in the group and the material world. (Bozalek & 
Zembylas, 2017, p. 123)  
This speaks to me of how a practice where we do not think of separate selves 
but of entanglements. I would say that we are aware of ‘ourselves’ (putting this 
term under erasure) as always in process and in relation. To be reflexive about 




towards a personal reflexivity (being aware of ourselves as bounded selves) 
that starts with a fundamental separation between the subject and the 
environment. I think about this as opening a particular practice of the ‘self’ 
(Foucault, 1990) that, paradoxically, implies an effort not to subtract oneself 
from the entanglement. 
Nonetheless, crucially, I think that the individualising tendency will inevitably 
reappear. This is not to say that this practice is not worth it, I think it is very 
important and generative but it is not a panacea. With psychoanalysis (Britton, 
2010; Britton & Steiner, 1994), I think that the overvaluation of an idea can help 
to deal with uncertainty together with leading to a more rigid, dogmatic thinking. 
From this psychoanalytic perspective, it is expected that an idea evolves from 
the frenzy of its discovery to see it in its limitations – to see it as one possibility 
– and in this way, it does not become a dogma.  
I ask myself meta-reflexively, how am I relating to this psychoanalytic idea 
here? Am I placing it as a more fundamental truth that can dictate how ideas 
need to evolve? Maybe. Paradoxically, I would need to be able to criticise this 
idea to really enact its content. Maybe there is something gloomy here about 
Kleinian psychoanalysis with its ideal of moderation. Maybe it is not about not 
being continuously excited by an idea but about acknowledging, as Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987) do, that it needs continuous work: “the furniture we are 
forever rearranging.” (p. 21)   
Jackson and Mazzei (2017) show us how diffraction can be seen in a research 
process. A crucial aspect is that the interpretation of the intentions and agency 
cannot be ascribed to a person as if separated from what they are intra-acting 
with. “We recognize how from a posthumanist stance, agency is constituted as 
an enactment, not something that an individual possesses, nor something that 
relies on a demarcation between human/nonhuman.” (Jackson & Mazzei, 
2017, p. 1094) 
They give the example of a woman who switches her way of articulating her 




and critical stance but then at the moment when she hears the footsteps of her 
husband approaching, her discourse shifts to one more conservative and 
accepting of the authority. The researchers do not interpret this as a shift ‘in’ 
the bounded subjectivity of this woman but as different assemblages that 
produce differently.  
The assemblage produces her as mother who knows what is best for 
her children, who feeds those bodies, and for that instant, the territory 
of critique is formed, until the material force of footsteps reclaim the 
territory of patriarchy. The territory that was claimed in the kitchen 
assemblage is now fragmented and carried away. The force of Will’s 
footsteps organize to make a new territory, the territory of small-town 
conservative patriarchy where she is now no longer critic, but docile. 
(Jackson & Mazzei, 2017, p. 1094) 
I think that here there is an interpretation of how the assemblages make 
different ‘voices’ emerge. What comes to my attention is that this interpretation 
appears as made by the ‘voice’ of an author that is, at least partially, outside 
the situation that is interpreted. Nonetheless, from what is explicitly put forward 
in the theory of diffraction we should think about the author(s) – the 
interpreter(s) – as part of the assemblage. The authors clarify: “It is not a matter 
of how a human voice articulates those things, but how the intra-action is an 
agential cut that assembles them and territorializes a space” (Jackson & 
Mazzei, 2017, p. 1096). So, there is not an ‘interpreter’ and a situation to be 
interpreted. The ‘interpreter’ also is formed – becomes – in particular intra-
actions that delineate its boundaries in particular ways. Nonetheless, 
sometimes (and maybe always at the moment of writing an interpretation), it 
appears as if it was objective, as if it was apart from what is ‘described’.  
A crucial difficulty that I find in diffractive analysis is that as it is assumed that 
everything is in a constant intra-action and so there cannot be a clear-cut 
between one agency and another, many times we end up listing an indefinite 
and infinite list of what is affecting the current situation. “The list of entangled 
agencies is potentially endless” (Davies & Gannon, 2013, p. 365). Now I think 
in my writing entangled with the temperature, the sounds of the street, my dog 




some anxiety, how I anticipate what is coming, etc. I think that this is a way of 
relating to myself where I blur myself as part of a greater intra-action. I wonder, 
though, what does it produce to name these lists? I am inclined to think that it 
results in an aesthetic poetic blurring of boundaries. I believe that it makes the 
point of stating how there are innumerable things intra-acting in every moment 
and not a simple causality or explanation. But can we go further/elsewhere 
than to state this over and over again? Maybe the texts that use diffraction 
produce these accounts that emphasise the particularity and entangled nature 
of each situation but what do they do to trouble situations where for example 
unfairness and domination are present? Maybe in these situations being 
reflexive about how hegemonic discourses are present in our accounts can 
generate a troubling of hegemonic orders and that can have (another) political 
impact.  
Also, I think that because of the concept of intra-action (Barad 2007), where 
the author cannot be separated from the whole situation, reflexivity about the 
‘subjective involvement’ is not encouraged. To be reflexive about our thoughts, 
feelings and actions as an actor would assume a separateness and a looking 
at a distance. I resonate with this but also with the advantages that can have 
to be personally reflexive as authors in troubling the authority and correctness 
of our interpretations.  
For instance, Davies (2014) makes a diffractive analysis of a preschools boys 
relationship with anger. In her observations a new boy, Jonathan, arrives to 
the preschool and in a series of intra-actions other boy called Tom, loses his 
centrality and builds up anger. Davies writes about Tom: 
Tom had lost his one-time power to initiate the movement of the group 
of boys, and not only could he no longer trust his friends to include him, 
but even his moment of glory in kicking a goal was taken away from 
him. He had experienced a profound loss of agency. (Davies, 2014, p. 
737) 
I thought that Davies (2014) made quite direct interpretations of the ‘inner’ 




participants? I missed a reflexive wonderment of her involvement in these 
particular interpretations, or certain tentativeness and openness to possible 
different interpretations.  
Nonetheless, maybe what I miss here is just something that does not fit with a 
diffractive analysis because it would entail to refer to an interpreting subject.  
A diffractive approach opens an onto-epistemological space of 
encounter  where a researcher’s task is not to tell of something that 
exists independent of the encounter (producing the appearance of 
truth), but to open up an immanent subjective truth—that which 
becomes true, ontologically and  epistemologically, in the moment of 
the encounter. (Davies, 2014, p. 734) 
So, maybe Davies is just not worried about the debate of this being her 
interpretation or a fact. Maybe this just bring us back to problems of the ‘really 
real’ (Haraway, 1997). Still, I think that the quote that tell us how Tom feels has 
this appearance of truth that Davies is criticising. I think that in having this 
diffractive approach as it is portrayed, it would be useful to make a closer 
analysis of these encounters: What of Davies emerged and came in contact 
with the pre-school, the teachers, the children, the space, etc.? Thinking about 
intra-action it results difficult to name any participant because in this naming 
there is a certain assumption of independence, but as she also underscores, 
it is necessary to hold these names under erasure because I am afraid that 
without them we cannot say anything.  
With Haraway and Barad we want to acknowledge that the positioning is a 
process of emerging in the making not a stable position, but how could we put 
that on the text. We want to articulate our research in intra-active terms but 
then, with Derrida (1978, 1997), we say that it is impossible not to contradict 
ourselves and we need to use what we criticise.  
Davies (2014) reflexively catches herself blaming the new boy Jonathan and 
making a polarisation and a moralist judgment. She wants to move on from 
this but I feel that she ends up doing is placing the responsibility in another 
individual: Tom. She says that Tom from the beginning located the problem in 




He blamed the other. But what if, when he first walked away from the 
bandy amphitheatre, he had been able to intra-act with his anger 
differently? Could he have engaged in mindful breathing sitting out there 
on the steps? (Davies, 2014, p. 740)  
Is this not this placing the responsibility in Tom? We need to make sense of 
what happened in that interaction and that might always entail to ascribe 
different roles and degrees of responsibility. I think she tries to avoid this. She 
tries to go beyond individualities to think about the children as a collective 
through which an affect pass. She offers the possibility of yoga and 
mindfulness as practices that can help the children recognise when exclusion 
is running through their collective body and to do something with it. Reading 
this surprised me, I thought in the need of the author to find solutions and in 
the specificity of the particular solutions offered. Not that it is not a possibly 
very good option but that it might also reflect the preferences, values and 
practices of the author. How do the children, from different social and cultural 
backgrounds, would relate to the yoga sessions? Is it that dynamics of violence 
and exclusion can be simply resolved with mindfulness and yoga? I am afraid 
that with reflexivity being eschewed the assumptions of the author are just not 
acknowledged and with that other possible articulations (e.g. a social and 
political questioning of the dynamics of domination in pre-school) are made 
less likely. This for me is a very important use and benefit of using reflexivity.  
I think that reflexivity can be restraining, can be enabling, can open up 
possibities and and close them down. As Davies said in a previous paper, 
reflexivity can open up. “In that way, the reflexive arc on the process did more 
than dampen down and paralyze. It occasioned opportunity to develop new 
ways of thinking and acting” (Davies et al., 2004, p. 375). It is about how we 
are relating to ourselves in that moment. Therefore, I do not think that it is 
useful to eschew reflexivity (in its different conceptualisations) but to meta-
reflexively ask how we are relating to ourselves – including diffractively – and 




Diffracting reflexivity and my meta-reflexivity 
As I have argued in the previous chapter, I do not think that reflexivity sits 
comfortably with an overarching and reductive definition of it. Reflexivity has 
been reconceptualised and I believe that the emergence of diffraction can 
further this continuous process of challenging and re-thinking reflexivity.  
In my conceptualisation, from a relational thinking, reflexivity asks: what is 
going on now? How am I relating to myself/others/texts, etc.? In this 
endeavour, there is not an assumption that there are previous identities 
influencing our activities. Instead, the question: “what is going on now?” 
assumes that there are material, human and non-human, ways of relating 
(intra-actions) that are producing self states, degrees of activity, affects, etc.  
Therefore, to me the use of reflexivity is not to see the influence of the 
researcher in the research, of the psychotherapist in the therapy, or in general 
of a person in their activities – as if they were separable. In contrast to me the 
function of meta-reflexivity is to continuously ask: how am ‘I’ relating to ‘this’ 
now? Understanding that the ‘I’ and the ‘this’ are delineated in the particular 
ways of relating that are enacted in that moment. Also understanding that the 
answer to this question is also part of the situation – understanding that the 
answer is not an accurate response but a situated perspective that can enable 
other things to happen. So, the aspiration of meta-reflexivity is not to grasp 
who I am or what happened, but to return to a situation, giving in this 
endeavour a perspective about it, a perspective that is part of the situation and 
that can help it to move. I think that this is akin to what Davies and Gannon 
(2013) argue from a diffractive perspective.  
There is no static, stable reality to be investigated, but a complex, intra-
acting, emergent, and mobile set of forces (material, affective, and 
conceptual) that must be documented in fine, molecular detail if we are 
to make sense of ‘what is going on.’  (Davies & Gannon, 2013, p. 374)  
Also, Davies and Gannon (2013) insist that their own methodology and 
theoretical perspectives are part of the inquiry and vital to what emerges from 




how we investigate it. They say: “‘What we do necessarily shifts, intra-actively, 
as it engages with the conceptual apparatus that we bring to bear on it.” 
(Davies & Gannon, 2013, p. 363) 
Along these lines, my meta-reflexivity of trying to see how I am relating to 
myself/others/texts is not apart from my inquiry. When I try to be aware of how 
am I relating to myself I do not catch myself in relation as if I could see a self 
that is fixed – that is not being affected by being seen (related to) in particular 
ways. I argue that when I am trying to be aware of how I am relating to myself 
this operation is just another way of relating to myself, not a more fundamental 
operation. Nonetheless, I think that this way of relating to myself can be very 
generative to both, have a perspective into what we are making – what we are 
concretely reproducing – and open up other possibilities through being aware 
that what appears is not essential but tied to ways of relating.  
Davies and Gannon (2013) work with collective biographies and highlight how 
the stories that emerge there would have been different if the entanglement 
was different. They use the ‘subject’ and ‘their’ stories under erasure. In that 
sense, in Barad’s (2007) terms, the agency that creates the story is the 
entanglement – not the subject alone.  
In this way collective biography dislodges memory from the 
psychological and historical individual humanist subject and resituates 
it beyond the subject as a socio-discursive-material accomplishment 
that always takes place in particular material, affective, spatial and 
temporal contexts that themselves work on memory. (Davies & Gannon, 
2013, p. 372) 
This makes sense to me in psychotherapy. Not only in my role as 
psychotherapist where I am well aware that the articulation of the life and the 
struggles of a client are particular to this specific intra-action, but also in the 
role that I have had as client. I have had a few different psychotherapists, each 
of them in different moments of my life. The different rooms have stayed in my 
body: how the light was present, how airy, how contained, how beautiful, how 
wooden, how modern, how invasive was each of them at different moments. 




them, how I was feeling them, how I was arriving and leaving the sessions. 
Taking the last point, in some occasions, I have taken my bike through calm 
roads to arrive, in others the busy metro or my car through the traffic. All these, 
and an innumerable more, have made my childhood memories emerge 
differently; they have been populated with different characters, different 
shades, different lights and a different feel to them. It is the whole material and 
semantic entanglement given in the session what makes the agential cut 
(Barad 2007) that defines what is interpreted, how we make sense of the 
situation.  
In therapy a more reflexive, essentialist and transparent approach would lead 
to interpret searching for causes: motives, drives, and trauma. A more 
relational and also reflexive approach would be more interested in thinking 
about what is happening now, what is formed in between – and this would be 
more similar to what a diffractive approach is proposing. But again, this 
dichotomy is problematic because it simplifies: To establish causes does 
something relational – it moves something. At the same time, the relational 
has also a representational flavour when we need to say something about what 
is happening now.  
In a way, what I want to convey is that reflexivity is already diffracted. This 
does not convince me to leave behind the term reflexivity because I find that 
the figure of the turning upon oneself is useful and diffraction takes me 
elsewhere. The act of putting the attention back upon oneself, one’s actions, 
one’s creations is already a movement that inevitably brings a novelty. As 
Derrida argues:  
Once the circle turns, once the volume rolls itself up, once the book is 
repeated, its identification with itself gathers an imperceptible difference 
which permits us efficaciously, rigorously, that is, discreetly, to exit from 
closure. In redoubling the closure of the book, one cuts it in half. 
(Derrida, 1978, p. 295) 
And as, performatively, Spivak, repeats: 
From the moment that the circle turns, that the book is wound back upon 




imperceptible difference which allows us to step effectively, rigorously, 
and thus discreetly, out of the closure. (Spivak, 1997, p. xii) 
Here we read the imperceptible difference of this returning, of this repetition. 
“The preface, by daring to repeat the book and reconstitute it in another 
register, merely enacts what is already the case: the book’s repetitions are 
always other than the book” (Spivak, 1997, p. xii). We could only think about 
repetition or about reflection as in capturing oneself if we believe in a static 
world. “The return, at this point, does not retake possession of·something. It 
does not reappropriate the origin. The latter is no longer in itself.” (Derrida, 
1978, p. 295) 
So, I keep reflexivity (analysed through my meta-reflexivity) because it takes 
me to the activity of keeping looking back to how I am relating to 
myself/others/texts and that is useful. Each way of relating to ourselves has 
different productions, and each of them can be valuable in different context 
because of the very context that they produce. Reflexivity is already diffracted. 
Reflexivity is not about capturing, grasping ourselves, because in the turning 
things unavoidably move. The turn that makes a reading about what is 
happening now, what ways of relating I am enacting is very generative 
because it can open up the possibility of other ways of relating. The meta-
reflexive analysis of the ways of relating does not assume a representation of 
previously set units. It knows that in ‘knowing’ it is producing.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued how we are always bound to betray our best 
intentions even when – or more when – we actively self-ascertain our posture. 
Drawing on both Derrida (1978) and Deleuze and Guattari (1987) this slippage 
is not avoidable, but somehow structural. With Derrida (1978) we think about 
using the concepts under erasure; being cautious and aware of how we use 
what we criticise precisely to make that critique. With Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987) we cannot avoid producing dualisms and what we can do is to 




I argue, through bringing some examples, how the slippage is always already 
there and more when it is not acknowledged. I emphasise the need for 
embracing this necessary slippage producing an inquiry that is aware of its 
own contradictions and that aims to work with what the concepts produce 
rather than trying to define them in a clear-cut manner in opposition with 
other(s) and superiority in front of other(s).  
Finally, I have showed the usefulness of bringing concepts that are posited as 
opposites – reflexivity and diffraction – to think together. In this I am arguing 
for thinking with, instead of against, to produce novelty and not to make deeper 
the dualisms. Murris and Bozalek (2019) do something akin to this with their 
response-able and diffractive reading; they think that the concepts can 
resonate and do things to each other. They explore this process rather than 
trying to define each concept in categorical ways.  
I propose that diffraction, as divorced from reflexivity and my meta-reflexivity, 
can produce some disadvantageous consequences. For instance, to propose 
yet another concept as the one that surely avoids all the drawbacks and hence 
enacting a way of relating with a high level of self-certainty that militates 
against the openness and movement that diffraction argues for. Furthermore, 
I think about some of the benefits of my meta-reflexivity, as to think about and 
own how I am relating to myself/theory/participants, because a diffractive 
analysis can make appear the interpretations – that inevitably makes – as 
emerging from nowhere.  
I also propose that reflexivity is already diffracted in that the movement of 
turning upon myself/others/texts already produces a shift and a movement. 
Reflexivity produces rather than represents – as in giving an imagine of how 
things ‘are’. Diffraction can help reflexivity to be aware of how what emerges 
from ‘me’ is already part of a greater entanglement. It can help me realise that 
I am not bounded and separated but connected in ways that go well beyond 
my control and awareness. I offer a meta-reflexivity that asks about how ‘I’ am 




answer to this question produces ‘me’ and the ‘person’, ‘text’, ‘situation’ and 
so on anew.  
Finishing this chapter I have also finished with my reconceptualisation of 
reflexivity as ways of relating that produce. As I have said in the beginning of 
this thesis, I want to think differently about the notion of being reflexive about 
our experience, which is a way of making sense of ourselves, through 
reconceptualising reflexivity and experience. In the next chapter, chapter 
seven, the last chapter before the conclusions of the thesis, I develop my 
reconceptualisation of experience. To a great extent, the notion of experience 
has already been re-worked in the previous chapters, however, now I will focus 
my attention on it and it will further move how I think differently about being 





















Thinking about how we make sense of ourselves, the word experience does 
not take long to appear. When referring to what is going on with us we might 
draw on our experience. We say that “we make sense of our experience”. 
Psychotherapists are concerned about helping clients to symbolise their 
experience. We say that “we need to be reflexive about our experience”. But, 
how are we to conceptualise the word experience?  
I can relate to others’ as well as my experience in many ways and these ways 
of relating are implying a particular conceptualisation of experience. For 
example, I might try to understand, symbolise or grasp my experience. The 
worry about grasping my experience might reflect certain phenomenological 
conceptualisations of experience that assume that experience is a foundation 
which we need to reveal and understand as ‘it is’, making our best effort to 
bracket our assumptions. In contrast, from a poststructural frame, we would 
not speak so much about understanding experience as if it was something 
foundational. Instead, we would be worried about how this experience is 
produced through cultural discourses that necessarily make other kinds of 
experience unintelligible. Therefore, we would be interested in troubling our 
experience understanding that our intimate experience is shaped through 
wider cultural and political frames. Indeed, poststructuralism puts the attention 
in the cultural and social dimensions, deconstructing and taking away the 
centrality of the notions of subjectivity and experience with their 
phenomenological heritage. Another option, with posthumanism, could be to 
think about experience as something that moves us, that goes through us, but 
that we do not possess – even if it feels so intimate. From a posthumanist 
frame, experience does not belong to a bounded subject. Posthumanism helps 
us to re-join the interest in experience that we had in phenomenology but in a 
renewed manner that is influenced by poststructuralism but moves beyond its 




I have sketched above three ways of relating to and conceptualising 
experience. In this chapter, I explore how each of these traditions 
conceptualises experience. Firstly, I elaborate on how existential 
phenomenology (a particular branch within phenomenology) draws on lived 
experience as a foundation from which language and culture derive. In this 
perspective, we are not Cartesian isolated minds but bodies that are already 
in the world; we experience not from the translucency of cognitive 
consciousness but from the opacity of our bodily perception (Gendlin, 1973; 
Merleau-Ponty, 2012). Secondly, I explore how poststructuralism troubles this 
conceptualisation, arguing that every ‘access’ to our experience is already 
cultural (Butler, 2005; Foucault, 1990); we do not access experience, we 
produce experience. Thridly, I elaborate on some posthumanist takes on 
experience. Posthumanism is influenced by poststructuralism yet also critical 
of it. I stress how posthumanism brings back the attention to the body and to 
the affective dimension in a different manner than existential phenomenology. 
The concept of affect (Clough & Halley, 2007; Massumi, 1995; Williams, 2010) 
becomes useful here as that which passes through subjectivities – producing 
these very subjectivities in that movement. After these explorations, I develop 
a renewed conceptualisation of ‘subjective experience’ using my intra-action 
with the three traditions explored and my psychoanalytic background.  
It is relevant for me to note that I am not aiming at establishing which 
conceptualisation of experience is better and truer than the others48 – although 
I do develop how phenomenology has been criticised by poststructuralism that 
has also been criticised by posthumanism. To not be aiming at establishing 
which conceptualisation is better or truer does not translate to me into giving 
to each theory the same validation. Whenever I articulate something I do it 
from a set of assumptions. In the context of my academic work I am drawing 
on posthumanist concepts to articulate how I am relating to the concepts. 
																																																						
48 As I develop in the chapter ‘Reflexivities as affective ways of relating that produce’, if I was 
to establish which conceptualisation is truer and better than the others, I would need a neutral 




Paradoxically, posthumanist concepts like Barad’s (2007) intra-action and 
diffraction led me to weight other theories – that are highly criticised by 
posthumanism – in their productions rather than in their truth-value. Hence, I 
am more interested in where the different conceptualisations take me – so I 
use the concepts in a diffractive way.  
I can see myself conceptualising experience in any of these three ways in 
different contexts and each of these ways generates different productions. For 
example, many times I try to ‘listen to my experience’ to symbolise what is 
happening to me and generate a more or less articulated narrative about it – I 
use experience more closely to phenomenology. Other times I relate to my 
experience as conceptualised by poststructuralism, generating a distance and 
critique about my experience as enabled by social discursive practices. For 
instance, I found myself troubling the keenness that I experienced to sum up 
points on my Sainsbury’s card. Finally, I live experience as it would be 
understood from a posthumanist framework generating a troubling of the 
boundedness that make me say ‘my experience’ and an attention to how I am 
becoming – how my experience and my subjectivity are constantly 
transformed, and thus, blurred – in connection to all of what is part of my 
situation. I have found myself attending to my experience with wonder and 
curiosity about what is circulating through me. For example, wondering what 
is happening in the relationship with this person and in this place that I 
suddenly feel cloudy and de-energised?  
I live through the different conceptualisations of experience that I will explore 
in the next sections. I let the three traditions articulate my experience 
differently. Even if I speak about the three traditions, it is crucial to me to make 
clear that these conceptualisations do not stay closed-off in themselves but 
that they are already intertwined and that they intra-act (with) each other 
through me, my thinking and my writing, leading me to a creative 




I go through the three traditions in this order because this is how they appeared 
historically and also because this is the order in which I came to know them. 
When I get to poststructuralism, I bring some of existential phenomenology 
that is already in the horizon. Furthermore, when I arrive to posthumanism I 
bring both existential phenomenology and poststructuralism. I realise how 
subjectivity and experience are assumed by existential phenomenology, 
questioned by poststructuralism and made impersonal, spread and collective 
by posthumanism. This generates that the notion of subjective experience gets 
abolished by the posterior traditions, as belonging to the first. However, my 
intra-action (with) the three traditions and also with my psychoanalytic 
background, brought me to a reconceptualisation of subjective experience that 
I develop in the last section ‘Re-thinking about subjective experience’. In this 
last section, with the help of existential phenomenology and psychoanalysis, I 
make a turn and bring back the notion of subjective experience – an 
experience that is ‘mine’, where I can ‘find myself’ and be in contact with my 
intimacy – in a way that it is coherent with posthumanism because I do not 
think of a bounded subjectivity but a becoming subjectivity. In this turn, I think 
of how I find myself through losing myself and how, with the concept of affect, 
there can be a, paradoxically, collective sense of intimacy. Following from that, 
I consider how poststructuralism with its emphasis on questioning experience 
as produced socially can help us to problematise where experience as affect 
can take us. Hence, I develop my reconceptualisation of subjective experience 
with the posthumanist understanding queered by existential phenomenology, 
psychoanalysis and poststructuralism. I am able to articulate this 
reconceptualisation coherently because I give emphasis to what these insights 
produce (not to their truth-value), looking to arrive at a more enabling 
conceptualisation of experience. 
Experience from existential-phenomenology 
Phenomenology, in the broadest sense, studies the structures of 




2018). It aims to be able to study how things are directly experienced before 
theoretical or other kind of schemas are interposed. Moreover, 
phenomenology argues that every theoretical scheme, or science in general, 
is a derivative of this more fundamental lived experience. (Merleau-Ponty, 
2012) 
According to Smith (2018), Husserl started this philosophy and his followers 
have drawn on his writings but have also departed greatly from his perspective. 
Heidegger, his successor, thought that Husserl’s emphasis in consciousness 
and subjectivity was neo-Cartesian. Heidegger does not agree to bracket the 
ontological questions – as Husserl proposes – because we find ourselves 
already in the world. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are very influenced by 
Heidegger and are associated with existential phenomenology (Craig, 1998). 
For Sartre (2015) consciousness cannot but be understood as already in the 
world. On his part, Merleau-Ponty (2012) puts the stress in our bodily 
engagement to the world, stressing that our experience is necessarily 
embodied and situated.   
In this section, I take the existential perspective on phenomenology. Some 
questions that emerge from my intra-action (with) this perspective are: How 
are we to conceive experience and what is its relation to our sense of self and 
to the reflective ‘I’? Can we give a transparent account of our experience? How 
reflection affects pre-reflective experience? I explore what the 
conceptualisation of experience in an existential phenomenological account 
makes me able to open in my life situations.  
The reflective ‘I’ emerging from the pre-reflective experience 
Existential phenomenology criticises the solipsistic and rationalistic 
perspective portrayed by Descartes (Frie & Reis, 2001). Broadly, we could say 
that existential phenomenology tries to depart from a view of consciousness 
as if it was a cognitive endeavour performed by a ‘constituting I’ separated 
from embodiment and situatedness. Contrary to that, this stream underlines 




reflective ‘I’ can only be understood in reference to our immediate bodily 
immersion in the world. (Dreyfus, 2000)  
According to Zahavi (2003), Heidegger says that there is not an ‘I’ from the 
beginning but intentional life. Intentionality is a main concept in 
phenomenology which stresses that the main characteristic of consciousness 
is to always be directed towards something and not in-itself: when I am 
conscious, I am always conscious of something. Intentionality does not require 
a reflective I; experiences are felt to be my experiences but not from an 
established I. We do not need to seek things and life out there as if we were 
already formed as reflective subjects looking to understand the world and our 
experiences. Instead, we find ourselves always already in the world. More to 
the point, there is a co-givenness of self and world49. 
The idea of the co-givenness of self and world takes me to think about how we 
can have a sense of ourselves through how others relate to us. I look at the 
face of my loved ones and their expressions and movements when they are 
with me gives me – without an explicit and thematised awareness – a sense 
of myself. Materially, the world also gives me a sense of myself, I stand on the 
ground and I implicitly know that I am not that heavy, that the ground can 
support me.  
Likewise, according to Sartre (2015), we do not know ourselves through a 
reflective and cognitive grasp, but we find ourselves already and immediately 
in situations. We come to know ourselves because we are reflected in the 
enterprises that we undertake. As we can see, this follows the line of 
Heidegger’s thoughts about how we come to grasp ourselves. In Heidegger’s 
																																																						
49 From psychoanalysis, there is also the notion that the ‘I’ is something that emerges, an 
achievement (Ogden, 1986, 1988; D. N. Stern, 2000). Stern’s theory (2000a) is clearly 
phenomenologically influenced. For him there is an embodied mind - a primary consciousness 
that is not self-reflective “Each time there is a moment of primary consciousness, the self as 
experiencer is felt and is situated in the world. At that moment, the sense of an emergent self 






propositions the familiarity with oneself “does not take the form of a reflective 
self-perception or a thematic self-observation, nor does it involve any kind of 
self-objectivation” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 162). According to Heidegger, we do not 
need to look in for an elusive ‘I’ but to worldly experience and we will find the 
situated self. For Heidegger, “I am acquainted with myself when I am captured 
and captivated by the world.” (Zahavi 2003, 164) 
This approach to experience makes me think about all of what is happening in 
psychotherapy in a bodily manner without an explicit elaboration of it. From 
this perspective, verbal interpretations have a secondary role in comparison to 
the more pervasive influence of our bodily ways of being together as some 
psychotherapeutic approaches argue. (Boston Change Process Study Group 
& Nahum, 2008; Bruschweiler-Stern et al., 2002; D. N. Stern, 2000) 
According to Merleau-Ponty (2012) we cannot escape the fact that we are 
given in a world. Perception is the background in which my conscious thoughts 
take shape (Merleau-Ponty 2012). For instance, when I am formulating my 
argument for this text, I am not writing from nowhere, I am writing from my 
situation. My situation is the implicit background from which my argument is 
taking shape and without which I could not understand what I am arguing.   
Merleau-Ponty (2012) distances himself from idealism because he situates 
perception in the body which is embedded in the world. Relevantly, Merleau-
Ponty argues that what we encounter in the world goes beyond our explicit 
and conscious acts and volitions. For example, I relate to the colours of this 
room in a bodily manner without being aware of it. The colours are in 
synchronization with my body – for example giving a sensation of expansion – 
without my volition being part of it. In Merleau-Ponty’s (2012) terms experience 
is understood from perception as a communion that is given pre-personally 
and through the opacity of the body.  
Sartre (2015) distinguishes the reflective consciousness from the pre-reflective 
consciousness that we have explored above. Reflective consciousness is 




reflective and positional consciousness – the ‘I’ –  emerges from the look that 
another reflective consciousness poses on me. I only become aware of myself 
as an object through the look of the other that makes me one.  
This mediation given by the emergence of the reflexive I is what 
phenomenology attempts to bracket by going back to the experience as it is 
lived. The reflexive I is redirected from its natural attitude (Merleau-Ponty, 
2012) to follow the stream of pre-reflective consciousness as close to it as it 
can, attempting to bracket all possible interpretations, beliefs and theories. In 
this sense, phenomenology is close to person-centred and focusing oriented 
therapies that try to follow the felt experience of the client, reflecting it back 
being careful of not intruding with our own beliefs and theories. 
For Heidegger, it is important to remain close to the stream of life (Feyaerts & 
Vanheule, 2015). In this sense reflexivity – as a conscious, thematic and 
logical activity – would move away from it. Heidegger argues that a 
“hermeneutical understanding remains within and accompanies factic life, and 
simply raises and accentuates it into a new level of transparency and 
expressibility.” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 168) 
It is clear how existential phenomenology insists that reflection needs to be on 
the pre-reflective and the conundrum is about how can it be possible to reflect 
on the pre-reflective without changing it. For Sartre (2015) there is a possibility 
of a pure reflection that only discloses what is already there. In contrast, 
Merleau-Ponty (2012) proposes that the reflection on the pre-reflective is 
always through the opacity of the body and not through a transparent 
consciousness.  
In the next section, I develop Gendlin’s contribution to how we can reflect on 
pre-reflective experience. Gendlin was very influenced by Merleau-Ponty and 
also gives great emphasis to embodiment and to the opacity of our awareness. 
Importantly, Gendlin – who besides having been a philosopher was also a 
psychotherapist – does not focus on describing experience ‘as it is’, but on 




assumes that reflection – or focusing on his terms – will change our way of 
experiencing and this is something desired.  
Focusing on the felt sense 
I believe that Gendlin is a very relevant later contribution to existential 
phenomenology. Gendlin (1964) proposes the concept of the felt sense. The 
felt sense is a vague bodily feeling that we are always experiencing in the 
background; it is not an emotion because an emotion has a more specific 
flavour, in contrast, the felt sense is vague and opaque. In the process of 
focusing – a technique that Gendlin developed – we can bring it to the 
foreground. The felt sense has a more relational conceptualisation than the 
previous articulations in existential phenomenology. The felt sense is not 
conceived as individual – it is not bounded in one person – in contrast, it 
emerges in the fundamental intermingling with our surroundings.  
Gendlin (1973, 2004) elaborated on the process – focusing – of giving a verbal 
or some kind of symbolic referent to the felt sense. That is to articulate the felt 
sense according to what it is offering to us. He argues that giving a referent to 
the felt sense transforms it. When we articulate it, we move our experiencing 
forward: we elaborate experience.  
Gendlin (1973) makes a further contribution to the dilemma about the 
possibility of accessing ‘pure experience’. He articulates the inquiry differently 
in a way that moves away from the conundrum of trying to access pure lived 
experience without a scheme that modifies it.  
Obviously, we cannot state experience, as it is unstated. Let us take the 
bull by the horns and study the ways stating can affect experience. In 
this way we make a field of study out of what was an embarrassment. 
(Gendlin, 1973, p. 291) 
Gendlin’s perspective is more relational. It is not interested in capturing ‘pure 
experience’, as if we could isolate it from situations, language and culture. In 
his perspective, everything is already intermingled; therefore, what makes 
sense is to study these relationships. According to Gendlin (1973), experience 




exhaust experience. When we say something from this experience we further 
organise it. In this sense, experience is all the time in process of being formed. 
What we ‘capture’ in our statements is not something that was already there 
fully formed; instead, in every articulation, we keep on forming and 
transforming experience.  
For example, now I attend to my felt sense in my chest and get a sensation of 
sand blowing like in a desert but it does not feel very hot or cold. This 
articulation moves my felt sense and now it feels like a spiral of sand coming 
up from my chest to my throat; it feels good, strong, liberating. I feel my force, 
my strength. I think that maybe the academic writing and speaking can make 
me feel strong and enlivened.  
When I started focusing just now on my felt sense I did not know what was 
going to come up. It is a discovery/creation that articulates and moves my 
experience. I feel a need to do this especially when I am feeling more stuck or 
when I feel confused about what I feel. There is something about articulating 
from the felt sense that gives me freshness in a way that a more cognitive 
understanding would not allow. With focusing I do feel that I articulate my lived 
experience.   
Importantly, according to Gendlin (1964, 1968, 1973, 1997a, 2004) it makes a 
big difference to ground our statements from our experience or felt sense 
rather than from our rational mind. It is different when we speak about what is 
happening to us as if we were trying to logically infer what is going on than 
when we start from our vague and opaque bodily feeling of the situation. In 
Gendlin’s theory when we articulate from the felt sense we affect it and through 
this a process is activated. In contrast, when we speak from rationality the 
chances are that our felt sense stays frozen.  
This idea makes me consider a notion of reflection as needing to be grounded 
in the pre-reflective lived experience, which is always more complex than what 




would stress the importance of a reflective articulation of our bodily experience 
– understanding that this very articulation is forming this experience.  
I consider Gendlin’s theory and focusing practice very useful in my clinical 
practice and personally in my life. Focusing has taught me to attend to my 
experience – to my felt sense – in a way that I need to stay with its vagueness 
and opacity until a form emerges and I can say something about my felt sense 
now in this situation.  
Experience from poststructuralism50  
The poststructural critique amounts to say that when I refer to my bodily 
experience, this is not a ground; my experience of myself could not be in the 
way it is if it was not because I am inscribed within cultural discourses that rule 
what is intelligible and what is not.  
The fact that I take this critique of phenomenology does not mean that I 
consider existential phenomenology dispensable or inferior. As I argue at 
length in chapter five called: Reflexivities as affective ways of relating that 
produce; to consider a concept as better or truer than other would implicate 
that I can judge them from a neutral place. In that sense, it makes more sense 
to me to evaluate the concepts and the theories in what 
possibilities/questions/interventions open, so, I focus the attention in what the 
concepts produce. Furthermore, I think that these different theories are called 
forth in different contexts and further produce these very contexts.   
The existential phenomenological approach helps me to think about how we 
make sense of our experience; it enables me to think about the nature of my 
bodily experience and what happens when I attend to it. With poststructural 
																																																						
50 By poststructuralism, drawing on Harcourt (2007), I am referring to the theories that reject 
the phenomenological notion that meaning is a subjective enterprise. Instead of this, they both 
draw on and trouble the structuralist understanding that meaning is derived from wider social 
structures that the subject unconsciously enacts. They are different from structuralism in that 
they emphasise the spaces of ambiguity and the constant possibility of subversion of the 
norms. Even if Harcourt (2007) mainly places Foucault in this category, I think that Derrida - 
with his critique to phenomenology and use of structuralism (Derrida, 1973, 1978, 1997) - and 





theories, I am not worried anymore about how to access lived experience as it 
is lived. Instead, I am wondering about what allowed this particular kind of 
experience and no other possibilities. Both focuses and inquiries are important 
and generative to me.  
Butler, Foucault and Derrida 
The idea that the ‘I’ comes later into the picture is strongly put forward by Butler 
(1997a, 2005, 2006, 2014) – but differently from how phenomenology does it. 
In an early paper (Butler, 1988), she reflects on how phenomenology – 
especially in the work of Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir – has 
affinities with feminism because of “a commitment to grounding theory in lived 
experience, and in revealing the way in which the world is produced through 
the constituting acts of subjective experience.” (p. 522) Butler agrees with the 
phenomenological notion that it is the action – embodied and contextual – that 
is continuously giving shape to a subject.  
Nonetheless, what troubles Butler (1988) is the centrality and prevalence of 
the subject as “a constituting agent prior to language” (p. 519) that sometimes 
is assumed by phenomenology. Butler clarifies that her approach is different 
in that it takes the social context – and not a constituting subjectivity – as what 
makes actions and interpretations intelligible. “There are social contexts and 
conventions within which certain acts not only become possible but become 
conceivable as acts at all” (p. 525). With this Butler (1988, 2005) is stressing 
that social discourses enable certain kinds of experience and actions and 
make others unintelligible. Subjectivity is no longer a point of departure.  
Stoller (2009, 2010) argues that Merleau-Ponty is not that different from Butler. 
According to the author, Merleau-Ponty is anti-essentialist and for him 
subjectivity emerges in the action. Furthermore, she argues that Merleau-
Ponty posits experience in the world and so it is not ahistorical. What I think 
that Stoller is missing is the difference between contextualising experience 
with language, history and culture – as Merleau-Ponty (2012) does – and 




the first place. With Butler (1988, 2005) the cultural dimension gives the 
conditions of intelligibility so that a particular experience can emerge at all.  
In his later work – as in The History of Sexuality 2 and 3 – Foucault is directly 
concerned about subjective experience. He does not take experience as a 
ground, but wants to study how a particular kind of experience came to be 
constituted in a specific way.  
He is especially concerned about the experience of sexuality.  Experience is 
taken as a product of certain sciences that produce a ‘knowledge’ of sexuality 
and certain normativities that put this knowledge to work. Through these 
cultural discourses and practices – knowledge and normativities – an individual 
becomes reflexive about themselves in particular ways.  
To speak of "sexuality" as a historically singular experience also 
presupposed the availability of tools capable of analyzing the peculiar 
characteristics and interrelations of the three axes that constitute it: (1) 
the formation of sciences (savoirs) that refer to it, (2) the systems of 
power that regulate its practice, (3) the forms within which individuals 
are able, are obliged, to recognize themselves as subjects of this 
sexuality. (Foucault, 1990, p. 4) 
As I have mentioned in previous chapters, Butler (2005) takes Foucault’s input 
to stress that how I make myself an object of knowledge to myself – how I am 
reflexive about myself – is within a historically conditioned form of rationality. 
Butler distinguishes this gesture from phenomenology that points to a 
transhistorical subject that would account for all experience and knowledge. 
She highlights that Foucault thinks about how what we can say about 
ourselves, the ‘authentic’ experience that we can have, is dependent on 
cultural discourses.  
So, with phenomenology we would look to see how the subjective experience 
of sexuality appears – trying to grasp the first-person account as liberated from 
prejudices as possible. In contrast, with Foucault we would think about the 
social discourses that are present and structuring the experience of a person 





There are certain kind of experiences that are intelligible and validated and 
others that are not or that are pushing to become an intelligible possibility. For 
example, the different sexual identities and preferences that have emerged in 
the past years, speak about ways of experiencing sexuality that have slowly 
come to be recognisable and intelligible for a wider sector of the population. 
Foucault and Butler help me to not see experience as foundational and to 
wonder what social discourses are enabling it and to imagine what is not 
allowed into speakability. Poststructuralism enables me to critique and to 
interrogate my experience.  
Derrida (Derrida, 1973, 1997) argues that the notion of experience from 
phenomenology – Husserl’s phenomenology – relates to the notion of a 
presence that is immediate. “‘Experience’ has always designated the 
relationship with a presence, whether that relationship had the form of 
consciousness or not.” (Derrida, 1997, p. 60) 
Derrida (1997) argues that this immediate access is not possible because we 
always access experience through representations51 that always refer to other 
representations. Hence, there is a trace that never gets to a finishing point 
because its meaning is always deferred.  “The trace is in fact the absolute 
origin of sense in general. Which amounts to saying once again that there is 
no absolute origin of sense in general. The trace is the differance which opens 
appearance [l’apparaître] and signification.” (Derrida, 1997, p. 65) 
Therefore, instead of a presence we find an absence and a constant deferral 
in accessing what was supposed to be directly and transparently grasped. As 
Spivak (1997) ‘explains’ Derrida’s concepts:   
The structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of that other 
which is forever absent. This other is of course never to be found in its 
full being. As even such empirical events as answering a child’s 
																																																						
51 It is relevant to notice that the word representation is used here. This does not mean that 
Derrida is favouring representationalism as the belief that a representation can directly mirror 
or stand for something external. “In poststructuralist terms, ‘crisis of representation’ is not the 





question or consulting the dictionary proclaim, one sign leads to another 
and so on indefinitely. (Spivak, 1997, p. xvii) 
Derrida (1973) argues that if we could capture what is happening in the present 
moment – as if that could be grasped in that bounded experience – we actually 
could not have that experience at all. The present moment is always referring 
to other previous moments – to a trace – that prevents it from the possibility of 
being self-contained. In that sense, phenomenology is seen as nostalgic 
because of trying to aim at the impossibility of capturing the pre-reflective 
experience. Aiming to coincide with oneself when one can only be deferred.   
Does poststructuralism bury phenomenology? 
Poststructuralism rejects the main principles of phenomenology. As I have 
argued, the fact that I integrate these critiques does not mean that I think 
phenomenology is not useful. It does not mean either that I do not criticise 
phenomenology. There are concepts that flow from my ontoepistemology, 
while other concepts are at odds with it in one or more grounds. The concepts 
brought by phenomenology as the pre-reflective experience, bracketing, 
consciousness, etc. are definitely contested and reconceptualised or even 
destroyed by the thoroughly relational ontoepistemology that I embrace. 
Nonetheless – as I argue in chapter 4: Reflexivities as affective ways of relating 
that produce – precisely through holding a relational, immanent and productive 
ontoepistemology, I think that, firstly, the theories and the concepts do not 
reflect a reality but produce realities. This helps me to think about the uses and 
productions of the different concepts, rather than assuming that one concept 
is better or truer than other from a neutral place. The concepts are materialised 
and operate as an apparatus (Barad, 2007) that produces a world. That is, for 
example, the concept of pre-reflective experience in phenomenology does not 
reflect how things ‘are’ but does produce a particular way of arranging the 
world where I am, say, looking to follow my bodily sense of a situation. It is 
only from these productions – and from my intra-actions with them – that I can 
see the usefulness of a concept. I cannot claim from a neutral place if they are 




secondly, the concepts do not emerge and acquire significance outside 
particular intra-actions. In some intra-actions to criticise phenomenology can 
work to build a critique on the use of experience as a foundation; in other intra-
actions to attend to what is considered our felt experience as the fundament 
of the truth of a situation can be useful to validate someone. I am not the 
master of what I think and so in different intra-active configurations I can think 
differently from what I expect or claim and contradict myself in many ways – 
as I developed in chapter seven: Betraying our best intentions: using meta-
relfexivity with diffraction.  
Taking this last point, for example, we can use poststructural concepts in a 
foundational manner. Sometimes the drive to deconstruct seems at one time 
to acknowledge the limitations of subjectivity – in that the person loses its 
mastery by the overpowering social discourses – and to give the masterfulness 
back – in believing that we can catch ourselves and see how discourses are 
working in us, escaping their hold. As Lather says: “To attempt to deconstruct 
one's own work is to risk buying into the faith in the powers of critical reflection 
that places emancipatory efforts in such a contradictory position with the 
poststructuralist foregrounding of the limits of consciousness” (Lather, 1993, 
p. 685). In fact, the critique to place experience as a foundation could be made 
to discourse understood as a foundation. Lather (2007) proposes to focus in 
the limits of reflexivity as a better alternative. Furthermore, maybe sometimes 
it is just impossible to not enact some foundationalism and that can also enable 
some movement that later on grants the possibility to challenge our 
foundational beliefs.  
Where does poststructuralism take me? 
Poststructuralism helps me to interrogate my experience – not to try to grasp 
it as in phenomenology. With poststructuralism, I can question myself and 
others and I can push the boundaries of intelligibility so that the possibility of 




There was a text circulating on the internet that was ironically entitled: “I also 
believe that Catholics should be able to get married”. They were making a 
parody of how Catholics give their opinion about the moral feasibility of people 
of the same sex getting married. The text goes on to describe how even if 
some of the manners and practices of the Catholics might look strange – as to 
make statues and giant images of a tortured person – they are as much a 
person as anybody else so that we should just let them get married.  
I think that this text works effectively to make the reader aware of how arbitrary 
it is that some rights are not granted to certain ‘kind’ of people. Butler (1997a) 
argues that what makes power relatively invulnerable is that it produces the 
conditions of intelligibility in not explicit or legible ways and so we do not know 
that it is operating. “The one who speaks according to the norms that govern 
speakability is not necessarily following a rule in a conscious way. One speaks 
according to a tacit set of forms that are not always explicitly coded as rules” 
(p. 134). Interventions like this text that was circulating in internet can bring the 
not explicit and arbitrary rules into legibility and so into questioning.  
In relation to my psychotherapeutic practice, N. Rose (1996) from a 
Foucauldian perspective, argues that the psy-disciplines through their theory 
and practice play an important role in creating ways of relating to ourselves, to 
understand ourselves and to produce ourselves in particular ways. The psy-
disciplines act in tandem with social discourses that are ruling a particular 
society in a determinate moment in history. In that sense, psychotherapy does 
not help to better represent experience but produces experience.  
This perspective, makes me feel that it is imperative that I question 
psychotherapeutic theories as cultural productions that themselves help to 
produce the experience of my clients (and myself in the role of the 
psychotherapist). White (2009), who develops a narrative therapy influenced 
by Foucault, makes clear that the ways in which we think about how things 
should be and how we should work on them are culturally enabled. For 




the best way to resolve their problems. This perspective highlights that how 
we think about psychotherapy is not foundational and thus it can be 
challenged: we can think about it differently.  
In the next section, I will explore how experience can be reconceptualised 
through posthumanism.  
Experience through posthumanism52  
In this section I explore what posthumanism can do to the concept of 
experience. I develop posthumanism in its particular contributions, articulating 
how the notion of experience gets resignified in a way that it makes it 
problematic to say: ‘subjective experience’ because it would assume a 
bounded subjectivity with a personal experience.  
I bring back poststructural and existential phenomenological understandings 
showing how they produce experience differently from posthumanism. 
Posthumanism builds from poststructuralism but its proposal is different. 
Posthumanism brings the attention to how social reality and subjectivity 
concretely materialises itself in ever-shifting ways. This brings an emphasis on 
the body and materiality in general (Blackman, Cromby, Hook, Papadopoulos, 
& Walkerdine, 2008). To me, this entails a renewed attention to bodily affective 
experience that was neglected by poststructuralism in its rejection of 
phenomenology.  
In a way, posthumanism goes beyond the criticisms of the phenomenological 
notion of experience to propose new conceptualisations of experience that 
move away from the notion of ‘subjective experience’, to think about 
experience in an impersonal manner. Braidotti (2018) emphasises that 
posthumanism pushes for affirmative and positive projects of how subjects 
																																																						
52 By posthumanism, I am referring to the theories that trouble the boundedness of the human 
not only in discursive terms but also in material terms. Author like Barad and Deleuze and 
Guattari can be considered exponents of this stream (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012b; Mazzei, 2013; 
Murris & Bozalek, 2019). Nonetheless, as Braidotti (2018) makes evident there are many 
different ways to refer to this tendency. I prefer the term posthumanism because it highlights 




might become otherwise.  “Poststructuralism paved the way for this approach, 
but the posthuman turn materializes it and composes a new ontological 
framework of becoming-subjects” (Braidotti, 2018, p. 3). Poststructuralism has 
provided the possibility of bringing into question what was assumed as the 
nature of subjectivity and posthumanism bring this project further by focusing 
in how we might become.  
Some of the news that posthumanism brings 
In general terms, posthumanism, through the work of Barad (2007), Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987; 1983, 1994) and some authors that are drawing on them53, 
argue for a decentring of the subject and human experience. Instead of 
conceiving a bounded individuality, they think that what we understand as a 
person and their experience is in constant process of emerging through 
material and cultural forces which include the human and the non-human. 
More to the point, the subject is not beyond these forces, it is an arrangement 
of these forces.  
This conceptualisation that decentres subjectivity forces us to conceive 
experience differently. Through existential phenomenology I refer to a subject 
– even if the subject is intersubjective – and an object. The notion of 
consciousness as intentional – which is shared by all the phenomenological 
authors – implies that there is not a relational matrix always in process of being 
shaped as with posthumanism. Instead, intentionality, even if it states that the 
consciousness and the objects are born together, implies a more dichotomic – 
dialectical – understanding: what appears is consciousness on one side and 
																																																						
53 As I have mentioned in the Methodology chapter. Hein (2016) differentiates Barad from 
Deleuze, arguing that Barad is not proposing immanence but transcendence because her 
concept of intra-action is already an identity, so she does not start from positive difference as 
Deleuze does through the concept of the virtual. I find more resonance with Murris and Bozalek 
(2019) who argue that both, Barad and Deleuze, have a relational ontology and that Barad 
does think of everything, including space and time, as constantly produced (aligning with a 
positive difference) and not pre-existent. Importantly, they bring to attention that a 
methodology aligned with a relational ontology would not try to put the texts or the authors 
against each other – leaving one of the terms wanting – but would be attentive to see what is 





its objects on the other. Consciousness and its objects appear as differentiated 
and complementary opposed. Merleau-Ponty (2012) and Gendlin (1973) put 
forward a more relational phenomenology but they are still foregrounding a 
consciousness – even if it is embodied – that perceives.54 With 
poststructuralism, I refer to how the social discourses enable a subjective 
experience. With posthumanism, I think that both these movements 
(phenomenology and poststructuralism) are proposing some kind of causality 
and are privileging a term over the other. Specifically, in poststructuralism the 
discursive dimension over the material, and in existential phenomenology the 
subject or consciousness over the object. With posthumanism, I trouble these 
dichotomies; I think that experience does not belong to a subject and I think 
that experience is produced through material-discursive practices – that is, that 
the material is already discursive and the other way around. (Barad, 2003, 
2007) 
Furthermore, differently from existential phenomenology that brings back the 
subject as already ‘in’-the-world; posthumanism, does not think of the world as 
a container of units, instead, we are part of the world – producing it in every 
intra-action. Through posthumanism the material non-human is not only 
passive and signified by humans but has its own strength as part of the 
arrangement (Barad, 2007). This conceptualisation might hopefully produce a 
sense of responsibility with the world that we are becoming with. The 
conceptualisation of a subject separated from the material might have 
facilitated that we relate to the Earth as an object for our ‘benefit’55.  
																																																						
54 Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) latter work ‘The visible and the invisible’ accounts for this deficit in 
his major work ‘The Phenomenology of Perception’. Merleau-Ponty considers that he 
remained within the dichotomy subject-object. Merleau-Ponty (1968) also considers that the 
notion of pre-reflective assumes that there can be an experience without language. Because 
of this he considers phenomenology as nostalgically desiring to do the impossible: to go back 
to a ‘primordial experience’. 
55 Interestingly, Haraway (2016), along these lines argues “Philosophically and materially,  I  
am  a  compostist, not a posthumanist. Critters—human and not—become-with each other, 
compose and decompose each other, in every scale and register of time and stuff in 
sympoietic tangling, in ecological evolutionary developmental earthly worlding and 




Taking Barad’s (2007) lead, Murris and Bozalek (2019, p. 875) say: “Brittle 
stars are of the world, not ‘in’ it, but part of the world – like all other organisms 
and matter”. This means that no-body is self-contained but always part of 
something broader that it is continuously taking shape.  
Bodies (including human and more than human bodies) are unbounded 
quantum entanglements constituted by concepts and material forces, 
where the social, the political, the biological, and their observing, 
measuring and controlling machines are interwoven and entwined. 
(Murris & Bozalek, 2019, p. 876) 
In this panorama, the boundaries of any entity are always emergent and not 
definite. Murris and Bozalek (2019) argue that both Barad and Deleuze have 
a relational ontology that starts from positive difference in Deleuzian terms, 
and with intra-action in Barad’s terms. That is, what is actualised does not start 
from a previous essence or identity as distinct from others. Instead, any-body 
is actualised from productive differences within that through a process of 
differentiating produce an actualised identity. This ontology produces that the 
possibility of speaking of a subject and their experience gets challenged.  
Subjectivity and affective experience 
Using Deleuzian vocabulary, any identity is unstable, always part of a greater 
and ever-shifting assemblage; what makes something an identity is a 
territorialisation that is always liable to be deterritorialised or reterritorialised. 
Every body, object, idea, subjectivity or other relation is consequently a 
territory, produced and fought over by rival affects within assemblages 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). When an affect territorializes a body’s 
desire, it shapes the potential for that body to affect other relations in 
the assemblage. (Fox & Alldred, 2013, p. 773)  
This different ontology produces a different way of thinking about subjectivity. 
It would not be coherent of thinking about bounded individuals that ‘have’ an 
experience as with phenomenology. The concept of affect, then emerges as a 
more suitable possibility. 
Affect can be a notion of experience that responds to the critiques of 




experience, affect speaks about something impersonal that can be taken up – 
folded in – and in this movement, creates an interiority, a ‘me’, an ‘I’. Affect is 
not subjective, affect can create subjectivity, subjectivity is a production, 
subjectivity is ontologically secondary.  
The concept of affect has been put forward from Spinoza and Bergson to 
Deleuze and Guattari. Affect, in this conceptualisation, does not refer to an 
emotion or an individual affective state that can be readily described. In 
contrast, it is about the non-personal increase – or diminution – of the bodily 
capacity to act and be affected (Clough & Halley, 2007). Affect does not belong 
to a bounded subjectivity because it moves across subjectivities (Williams, 
2010). Affect – as an impersonal affective experience that passes through 
subjectivities – continuously produces (or territorialises) what we consider a 
subjectivity.  
This establishes a fundamental difference of focus between 
anthropocentric and anti-humanist ontologies: between exploring the 
social interactions of active, sense-making human agents and mapping 
impersonal affective flows and territorializations within assemblages. 
(Fox & Alldred, 2013, p. 774) 
The notion of the fold put forward by Deleuze (2006) becomes relevant to how 
we are to think about subjective experience. The assumed ‘interiority’ is not 
essential but produced in a process of folding of the ‘external’ or social; so, it 
is the movement done through folding what actually produces an interiority and 
an exteriority, a subjective experience and a social world. This also entails that 
what is ‘internal’ cannot be thought apart from the social; that is, subjective 
experience is continuously produced in connection with the social.  
Furthermore, according to Massumi (1995), affect is autonomous because it is 
part of the Deleuzian ‘virtual’. That is, it is real but it has not been actualised in 
a particular possibility: it is what enables these actualisations. When it is 
actualised, it can be transformed in an emotion that captures an intensity. 
Nonetheless, this capture is always incomplete and something remains not 




virtual net, wider and more entrenched than what we could ever grasp with our 
understanding. “That is why all emotion is more or less disorienting, and why 
it is classically described as being outside oneself, at the very point at which 
one is most intimately and unshareably in contact with oneself and one’s 
vitality.” (Massumi, 1995, p. 96)  
The concept of affect, then, makes of the intimacy and privacy of an emotional 
experience something that is already beyond and ‘outside’ of us. Put it in 
another way, there is not intimacy or centre of experience that is separable 
from an ‘outside’ that is beyond them. Furthermore – and this explains the 
quotations marks in the word ‘outside’ – the very possibility of an intimate 
‘internal’ emotional experience is given by a folding in of affect. 
In this ontology, there are not previously defined individuals or subjects that 
then engage in affections, but the affect in its movement produces subjectivity. 
Thus, the feeling of interiority, of an intimate world, is relationally constituted 
and not essential. More to the point, when we elaborate or work-through affect, 
we do not make meaning of something individual that was already there inside 
us. We do not precede affect because our constitution is not separated from 
it. In taking up an affect and elaborating it in a meaningful sensation or emotion, 
we – as subjects – are constantly made. 
Becoming-self is one of the ways in which this folding expresses itself, 
but never toward a totalization of self – always toward continued 
individuation. Self is a modality – a singularity – on the way toward new 
foldings. These foldings bring into appearance not a fully constituted 
human, already-contained, but co-constitutive strata of matter, content, 
form, substance and expression. The self is not contained. (Manning, 
2009, p. 35) 
This way of thinking about the subject as always in state of becoming through 
folding grants greater movement and elasticity to articulate what happens in 
any relationship. There is not an essentially differentiated ‘you’ and ‘me’ but a 
movement that constantly produces me and my experience and you and your 




As our thoughts, feelings, and values, expressed in utterances and the 
movements of our bodies, are folded in to establish territorial distances, 
the thoughts, feelings, and values of others intra-act, combine, and 
exchange with them in rhythmic response, allowing new utterances to 
emerge and new meanings to unfold. (Gale, 2016, p. 306) 
I think posthumanism reconceptualises experience as affect, as not belonging 
to an individual because the boundaries of subjectivities are always shifting. 
For instance, the concept of voice is no longer understood as coming from an 
accountable bounded subject with an individual experience (Jackson & 
Mazzei, 2012a, 2012b, 2017; Mazzei, 2013, 2016). Mazzei (2013) mainly 
drawing on (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983) and Barad (2007) posits that voice does 
not belong to an organism but emerges from a becoming that includes all of 
what is relating at that moment, human and non-human. Voice is always part 
of a greater assemblage of human and non-human. 
In the model that Jackson and Mazzei (2017) are proposing, voice is not 
expression, voice is made in an assemblage that is always in process. What 
has the power of producing is not an intentional subject on the backstage but 
a material and discursive intra-action that makes things real and meaningful.  
I think this opens the scope to think about making sense of oneself not as an 
intentional or masterful activity but as a production of a whole assemblage or 
intra-action. When ‘I’ try to articulate what I am experiencing now, this ‘I’ and 
this ‘experience’ is produced through a whole assemblage, material and 
discursive, that produces me and my experience in a particular way.   
The notion of subjective experience goes out of the picture with posthumanism 
because experience as affect is not personal. This is the intersection where I 
bring my contribution using my intra-action (with) the three traditions and my 
psychoanalytic background, to still think about subjective experience: an 
experience that feels mine and intimate and in which I ‘find’ myself but in non-
essentialist and non-foundational terms. I think of subjective experience in 
coherence with posthumanism because I think of a becoming subjectivity more 




Re-thinking about subjective experience: Is there still space for it? 
The posthumanist way of thinking about subjectivity and experience 
dismantles subjectivity and experience as they are usually understood: a 
bounded subjectivity that has particular experiences. I think that for Deleuze 
and Guattari (1983) this dominant understanding would be akin to a molar 
assemblage. For the authors, molar assemblages stratify and organise in a 
way that fixes; whereas molecular assemblages do not have a set meaning 
but just production. 
Although molecular and molar flows of affect are both productive, the 
former deterritorializes: opening up possibilities for what bodies can do 
and desire, and may produce a line of flight (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1988) from a stable state or identity, while the latter imposes order, 
reterritorializes and defines what bodies can and cannot do. (Fox & 
Alldred, 2013, p. 773) 
However, I will propose that we can think about subjectivity not in terms of a 
fixed identity: “this is how I am” “this is my experience”, but as a becoming that 
can constantly surprise us. This implies a reconceptualisation of the term 
subjectivity from how it has been understood.  
As is well known, Deleuze and Guattari rarely use the concept of 
subjectivity and when they do it is mostly in a negative way: Subjectivity 
for Deleuze and Guattari is a molar event, a closure against the process 
of singular individuation and molecular becoming. (Blackman et al., 
2008, p. 15)  
In this panorama, I do not own ‘my’ experience – it is not mine – it becomes 
through me and I become through it. With this articulation, I go to a place where 
the subject in itself tends to dilute – at least the subject that I am used to think 
about. I think this is what posthumanism does. When existential 
phenomenology insists that the world and the subject emerge together, so that 
one cannot exist or be understood without the other, I still sustain a sense of 
subjectivity – an emergent, embodied and situated subjectivity – but a 
subjectivity where the sense of self and continuity does not disappear. With 
existential phenomenology, the sense of identity is troubled in intersubjective 




and accountable through another. Crucially, in this understanding myself and 
the other are, to a certain extent, bounded and distinguishable among 
ourselves and among all the social and material reality around us. In this 
sense, the sense of identity is troubled but not to an extent of blurring the very 
possibility of a bounded identity. Through the poststructural conceptualisation 
subjectivity is permeated and spoken through. Subjectivity is produced by 
wider discourses. Nonetheless, we are still very concerned about subjectivity. 
With posthumanism, subjectivity gets more radically decentred in that it loses 
its centrality. “To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point 
where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I.” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 3) 
In spite of this, in what follows, I work with posthumanism towards 
reconceptualising the notion of an experience that feels personal and intimate, 
my experience, a subjective experience. For elaborating this 
reconceptualisation I use the three traditions that I have explored and also my 
psychoanalytic background. I concern myself with the reconceptualisation of 
subjective experience, that is, an experience that ‘belongs to me’, where I can 
‘find’ myself and have a sense of intimacy with myself. Even when the notion 
of subjective experience has essentialist and foundationalist tones, I look to 
reconceptualise it conceiving it as a becoming that goes beyond what we can 
control. 
Finding ourselves in losing ourselves 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) articulate: 
We can no longer even speak of distinct machines, only of types of 
interpenetrating multiplicities that at any given moment form a single 
machinic assemblage, the faceless figure of the libido. Each of us is 
caught up in an assemblage of this kind, and we reproduce its 
statements when we think we are speaking in our own name; or rather 
we speak in our own name when we produce its statement. (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 36) 
In this last phrase, I get to the refreshing understanding that it is not only that 




produced within this decentring. This last phrase provokes me to think that our 
everyday experience of continuity and identity is enabled – rather than just 
decentred – by the assemblage of different forces.  
It's a strange business, speaking for yourself, in your own name, 
because it doesn't at all come with seeing yourself as an ego or a 
person or a subject. Individuals find a real name for themselves, rather, 
only through the harshest exercise in depersonalization, by opening 
themselves up to the multiplicities everywhere within them, to the 
intensities running through them. (Deleuze, 1995, p. 6) 
In the movie: Call me by your name (Guadagnino, 2017), Elio, the principal 
character, finds the book: The cosmic fragments by Heraclitus which has a 
note written by Oliver, his lover, that reads: “the meaning of the river flowing is 
not that all things are changing so that we cannot encounter them twice, but 
that some things stay the same only by changing”. The river continues to be 
alive as a river only by changing. I stay alive and present as Karen only by 
becoming otherwise.  
Manning (2014) explores into how movement outruns the subject. The author 
insists that it is not the subject the one that is leading. Let’s take the case of 
dancing. She highlights how some choreographers do not ask the dancer to 
achieve a specific figure but to be in contact with the movement in the figure 
and to move in synchronization with it. It is an action, not a representation; a 
verb, not a noun. Manning believes that this quality of no fixation arouses a 
kind of wonder. To me, if we take wonder as curiosity, the fact that the dancer 
needs to follow a movement beyond herself can make her wonder where it is 
going. In contrast, if we have a set of pre-stablished figures – no improvisation 
whatsoever – the question does not have space to emerge, the subject is 
concentrated in performing in a specific and already given way. I am doing this 
choreography. The I does not have the chance to be fluid, to be emergent. She 
says: “A wonder not of a subject (not ‘my’ wonder) but a wondering in 
movement (a wonder that moves the me I am becoming)” (p. 165). Following 
this, I do not possess or control the process that is being enacted: this process 




As Manning (2014) articulates:  
It is not ‘I’ as self-enclosed subject who is creating movement, but 
movement itself that is in the process of recalibrating an ‘I’ that will 
eventually emerge, unmoored. Not ‘I am wondering’ but ‘Where does 
this movement wonder me?’ A body is never in advance of its moving. 
(p. 167)  
I think that Manning (2014) places great emphasis here in how the subject gets 
outrun: going beyond the subject, exceeding identity. But what about the sense 
of intimacy, the sensation of finding oneself that can be given in those 
moments of surrender to something wider. I would like to draw attention to the 
feeling of familiarity or me-ness that can be felt when letting go to something 
wider that we cannot control. It reminds me of the existential phenomenological 
idea that we get to a familiarity with ourselves not through our reflective 
consciousness but through the embodied action in-the-world. This embodied 
action can feel as wider than us because it is outside our conscious efforts. It 
is through allowing this surrender to what is beyond my conscious efforts, that 
I find something that feels true, alive. I do not know where the movement 
wonders me, but it gets me just exactly where I was hoping. The paradox must 
not be resolved (Winnicott, 1953). Writing without knowing what I am saying, 
until the words write themselves. My body and the music in a connection that 
leads me beyond me and at the same time brings me to some intimacy with 
myself. A sense of me that I discover anew while feeling that it was meant to 
be just like that. Finding in pre-reflective experience a me-ness as with 
existential phenomenology. For Heidegger, “I am acquainted with myself when 
I am captured and captivated by the world.” (Zahavi 2003, 164). However, this 
me-ness is not foundational; it is emergent and ever-shifting even if it feels like 
a discovery. The notion of finding a foundation in the pre-reflective experience 
may be related to the sensation of finding something that was there only 
waiting to be awaken. Nonetheless, what appears as me-ness is an emergent 
that only has the chance to appear by allowing the movement to breathe 




I do not believe that this finding oneself is discovering a previous essence – 
something mine and foundational.  I find myself in other, in process, in 
movement, in contact, because I am through and through a contextual and 
relational movement. Maybe I am a way of resonating. A way of being with 
others/places/movements. The way in which I am resonating cannot be 
thought about in isolation. 
This brings to mind Davies and Gannon’s (2013) work where they play with 
new forms of making sense of oneself through collective biographies. In these 
exercises, is not about recalling ‘veridically’ our memories and stories, but 
about how people make sense – articulate and re-articulate – their narratives 
in a bodily way in intra-action with other people, feelings, interpretations, 
landscapes, material arrangements, etc.  
The way in which they work is trying to write their memories not relying on 
explanations or common places but to be faithful to a wording that expresses 
the nuances of the embodied sensations. They say: “We work collaboratively 
to find those words that express the embodied sensations that make up the 
memory. The assembled researchers listen intently to each other’s spoken and 
written memories in order to know them from inside themselves” (Davies & 
Gannon, 2013, p. 359). This way of working could have been directly taken 
from focusing oriented psychotherapy (Gendlin, 1981, 1997b), that I 
mentioned in the existential phenomenology section. 
Davies and Gannon (2013) do not believe that they are capturing the essence 
of the experience; instead, they think that something emerges in the intra-
action that feels right. In Gendlin’s terms (Gendlin, 1964, 1968, 1981, 1997a, 
2004) it would amount to say that there was not a hidden experience fully 
formed that got explicated, but that the experience emerges – it takes shape 
– in the relational context (in the relational/social/material assemblage in 
posthumanist terms). There is a symbolic articulation that feels right because 




individual. It is this articulation what is able to move the felt sense and so to 
activate a process of becoming differently.   
I find interesting how Davies and Gannon’s (2013) way of working with 
collective biographies plays with both the intimacy of personal experience and 
the intra-active becoming in the narrative as it gets shaped by an intra-action 
and not by a masterful subject.  
The original holder of the memory writes and rewrites the memory in 
light of this collaborative attention to the detail until, with a collective 
sigh, or with tears, the assembled memory-workers say—yes, that is it 
exactly—we know this moment from inside itself. That is, the memory 
begins to register and resonate affectively in the bodies of the listeners. 
The memory-story is, in this moment, both intensely real and de-
individualised. (Davies & Gannon, 2013, p. 360) 
I like how they do not shy away from relying in a bodily sense of what feels 
right and correct as “this is my story” “this is hers/his/theirs story”. I think that 
their identity gets (also) affirmed in the process. Paradoxically, by becoming 
undone in the group, in the space, in the collective feelings, there can be a 
different – but affirmative – sense of selfhood. It is not about negating 
subjectivity but about seeing it thoroughly relational in a way that I am not that 
worried anymore about ‘myself’ as individual because I connect with a broader 
and movable sense of myself.  I find myself – as becoming – in losing myself 
– as fixed identity.  
Affect: a collective sense of intimacy 
To continue developing this notion of subjective experience as a becoming that 
brings surprise and novelty; a subjective experience that does not depend on 
the notion of a bounded subjectivity, the concept of affect is useful. Massumi 
(1995) speaks about intensity or affect. Affect as intensity is different from 
emotion. Emotion would be a qualified intensity, one that has been owned56. 
Affect is a bodily event that starts before one is conscious of it. “Will and 
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of O and evolved O; where O or the infinite is that can be felt but not known and moves 
everything else, and an evolved O is where 0 has evolved to be apprenhandable by K or 




consciousness are subtractive. They are limitative, derived functions which 
reduce a complexity too rich to be functionally expressed” (Massumi, 1995, p. 
90). In that sense, affect goes beyond a singular consciousness and will; there 
is a certain autonomy of it. “Affect is autonomous to the degree to which it 
escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for 
interaction, it is.” (Massumi, 1995, p. 96) 
The concept of affect can be related to the conceptualisation of thoughts in 
Bion’s theory (Bion, 1962a, 1970). The author, coming from psychoanalysis 
and concerned with psychotherapy and the capacity to work-through feelings; 
proposes that thoughts are impersonal and ask to be thought – to be 
elaborated – by subjectivities. With Bion, I think of thoughts as not belonging 
to a person and with power to impact.  
It is not often enough recognized that a patient in whom resistance is 
active can be reacting against what he feels to be a thought in search 
of a thinker. It is supposedly his own thought (classical resistance 
theory), but it does not have to be so. (Bion, 1970, p. 117) 
This finds a strong resonance with the concept of affect (Williams, 2010) as an 
impersonal force to affect and be affected that is continuously shaping self-
states and subjectivities in its movement. 
In this way, affects are best understood as transitive states through 
which bodies pass, they meander through and between bodies, resting 
like ‘foreign objects’, or excessive impersonal forces, awaiting 
transformation into the thought-imbued emotions of subjective 
experience. (Williams, 2010, p. 251) 
This can almost have been taken out of one of Bion’s texts. Thought/affect – 
as I have decided to call it to connect both conceptualisations – is an 
impersonal force that seeks a subjectivity to be elaborated. Bion (1962a, 
1962b) articulates that beta elements are raw sensations bodily felt that need 
to be transformed in alpha elements that are the basis for thinking. This is done 
through the alpha function where the beta elements – raw sensations, 
unconnected images, etc. – are contained and processed to transform them in 
alpha elements that can be thought and so developing our apparatus for 




‘transmitting’ images and intensities that are taken up by subjects that can 
process them by a folding movement through which they also continuously 
form their subjectivities. (Williams, 2010) 
For instance, I am in therapy with a client and I sense some vague uneasiness 
that I attend to without rushing to grasp what it means. Through this, I let the 
sensation evolve to be defined as a feeling of unrealness and I get the sense 
that there is something going on in the relationship that we are avoiding. I think 
about this process in this way: there was something happening beyond myself 
– “a thought in search of a thinker” (Bion, 1970, p. 117) – and I was able to pay 
attention to it to let it be processed and formed ‘in me’, producing myself and 
the situation in this movement. In that way, there is a subjective experience, 
but it is an experience – as affect/thought – that is emerging through a wider 
arrangement of different forces and produces me as a subjectivity. However, 
paradoxically, I do feel it as my experience.  
The concept of affect can feel connecting to me. There is a freshness and an 
aliveness in not being bounded but part of a becoming assemblage. From a 
first-person point of view (that I do not possess, that is necessarily temporal 
and that is always becoming otherwise), it feels enlivening to make contact 
with something that goes beyond the boundaries (more or less stratified) of my 
subjectivity. This that goes beyond the boundaries of myself is what it is 
outside (Deleuze, 2006), where outside is not part of the usual distinction 
inside/outside where each term is defined in a dialectical relation to the other. 
Instead, outside is what produces an inside in the folding movement.  It feels 
vitalising to intra-act with the outside that has the power to recreate my very 
subjectivity anew. The fact that affect is impersonal, wider and out of our 
control, grants the possibility of becoming differently. 
Things bring novelty and liveness when they are in constant processes of 
becoming otherwise. But if something, let’s say a subjectivity, closes off within 




& Guattari, 1983), then, what is needed is to open it up to connections. The 
possibility to deterritorialise as to allow a line of flight and become otherwise.  
I see the staying stratified for too long as being fixed as a bounded human not 
connecting outside (Deleuze, 2006) oneself and becoming differently through 
that. Feeling bounded as a centred subjectivity with its old tunes. The repetitive 
feelings and thoughts that sometimes make me feel tired of myself. I relate it 
to the sensation of being trapped inside myself, inside my head. In contrast, 
connecting to something wider and losing myself I can become otherwise: 
becoming music, becoming dance, becoming laughter, becoming cry, 
becoming love.  
I remember being in a concert a few years ago, it was a big one, I 
cannot recall who was playing. I was there. I was in the concert. I was standing 
there wanting to be permeated by music, wanting to stop feeling myself, to 
stop being aware of me. Tired of me. Wanting to be part of the music. The 
music was vibrating inside my chest, in my heart. Was it the rhythm of the 
music or my heartbeats? 
Before that, as a child, I went to a concert with my mum, and I realised 
that music has this power of actually getting into my body. I felt the loud music 
in my heart. The beat of the music vibrating in my heartbeat. I was holding 
hands with my mom. I told her: ‘mom, I can feel the beat in my heart’. Affect 
(Massumi, 1995) is that which is personally felt but I do not master because it 
goes beyond myself; it is collective/connective.  
I am aware that I have portrait affect in a very positive manner, as something 
that can bring novelty, connection and transformation. However, importatly, as 
Murray (2017, 2019) makes clear, affect not only has positive productions, 
affect can impulse us to act in compulsive, repetitive and life-draining activities. 
The affect that courses through us, making us prone to act with certain 
intensity and in certain ways – constantly producing us in that movement – can 
also get us stuck to habits and beliefs systems that we would rather avoid as 




way (Murray, 2017). In that way, I think that poststructuralism with its critical 
distance from experience as produced by wider cultural discourses can help 
us to engage more critically with the experience that is breathing through us 
and taking us to different places that might not be enabling. 
A different conceptualisation of subjective experience  
While writing this thesis – finishing this thesis – a crisis erupted in my country, 
Chile. Multitudes of people went onto the streets with their saucepans making 
a noise that gets into your bones to claim for their rights, for the profound 
inequalities and for a series of governments that have treated Chile as a 
multinational enterprise. I plugged into (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1983) this movement. This affect took on me. I felt elation, rage, 
boldness, circulating through my body in a way that felt way beyond myself. It 
connected with my own memories of abuse of power on behalf of my father. 
The images populated my head. I broke into anger towards my father. I feel 
myself differently. I stand on my two feet. I cannot eat well and I have 
nightmares seeing all the abuse of power in my country. We are awakening 
and we are braver. I am becoming otherwise. My country is becoming 
otherwise.  
This experience made me feel like finding myself in losing myself, it made me 
feel in contact with something very wild ‘in’ myself that was also collective and 
connective. I felt this, as existential phenomenology grants, outside a thematic 
and explicit awareness; I found myself feeling like this. This process of finding 
myself as already bodily involved is akin to the notion of pre-reflective 
experience. With the existential phenomenological notion of pre-reflective 
experience, we find ourselves in the world in a bodily manner, without needing 
a thematic awareness or a cognitive and reflective grasp. Similarly, experience 
as affect is felt and lived. As Massumi (1995) insists with his notion of affect, 
verbal consciousness is always subtractive of a much more intricate bodily 
experience. However, I think that the pre-reflective experience could be better 




beyond the boundaries of bounded subjectivities. Pre-reflective experience as 
affect does not belong to a subjectivity but can be taken up by one subjectivity 
– that is also paradoxically shaped in this very action. In this manner, pre-
reflective experience is not – only – something to be grasped, but has the 
power to create the very ‘observer’ that wants to ‘express’ it. In that way, 
experience as affect takes a much more active role, it is not there waiting to 
be articulated but has a strength on its own; it also takes a much more 
collective tone, it is not my experience but an experience that goes through 
me, shaping me in that movement.  
The way in which experience as affect is taken up by a subject is not the 
masterful creation of that subject – this is apparent if we remember that affect 
in its foldings creates and re-creates subjectivities. The way in which 
experience as affect is taken up is given by material-discursive practices 
(Barad, 2007) and by relational configurations – this at one time decentres and 
shapes the subject.  
With this panorama of a subject in constant process of emergence and 
reshaping, when we make sense or reflect about our experience – as affect – 
we are also producing ourselves. This production is not from a masterful 
subjectivity but as part of a greater intra-action or assemblage. The process of 
making sense of our experience cannot be just rational; we need to follow 
blindly our bodily sensations as how Merleau-Ponty (2012) and Gendlin (1981, 
1997a) advise, and to articulate from there. If, on the contrary, we do it 
rationally; looking for what we already expect to find – not allowing ourselves 
to be taken – then there is more a reproduction of the same than an openness 
to be nurtured and transformed by what goes beyond the more or less stratified 
boundaries of my subjectivity. As Massumi (1995) says, if language as linearity 
is put to make sense of affect it dampens it – we feel less alive – and no further 
growth or transformation can be produced there.  
Importantly, with poststructuralism, to follow our experience from our bodily 




wondering about the cultural discourses that make it intelligible becomes 
crucial if we want to be able to question and challenge the cultural orders that 
keep things in place reproducing injustice and stagnation.  
In this conceptualisation of experience, the worry is not as in phenomenology 
about the possibility of capturing ‘pure’ experience. Instead, the worry is how 
we are going to relate to experience as affect in a way that allow us to continue 
moving and transforming – because we are following affect: something that 
goes beyond ourselves and has the power of creating and re-creating 
ourselves anew. This notion of affect has an affinity with how Heidegger 
stresses the importance to follow life or to be close to it (Zahavi, 2003). 
Experience as affect is about the dynamisms and creativity of life in constant 
process of production and we can plug into it and be moved by it. We can also 
insist in staying in our own private ground: keeping ourselves safe from 
surprises. Nonetheless, without our ground being opened to the outside 
(Deleuze, 2006) it gets drier and more static; lacking the continuous rhythm of 
the beating life. However, this also requires the critical engagement that 
poststructuralism is so good at because we need to judge where affect is 
taking us; affect is not intrinsically enabling, it can also lead us to, say, 
reproduce conditions of exploitation when, for example, I just go along 
shopping at Primark. 
This notion of experience gives quite a different perspective from the 
existential phenomenological image of a subject trying to express their 
experience as transparently as possible and from the poststructural image of 
a subject with a critical distance of their experience because they know that 
their experience is not individual but socially produced. I feel the first manner 
tight and controlled and the second distant and suspicious. The third 
posthumanist image of a subject moved by and shaped by an impersonal 
affect feels dynamic and vertiginous; it is in this one where experience starts 
to have a movement on its own, the head of the subject-King is cut, experience 




subject over experience or the other way around. Experience moves the 
subject and the subject moves the experience. Experience is not of a subject, 
the hierarchy of the subject-King needs to surrender to the collectivity. The 
reconceptualisation of subjective experience that I propose takes this 
posthumanist version of experience but with two different turns. First, I 
emphasise that this decentring can also enable a production of identity and 
intimacy. I find myself in losing myself; I am ‘more’ myself letting go of myself. 
And second, I argue that the other two images (from existential 
phenomenology and from poststructuralism) are still active and productive; 
what is more, these other two ways of relating to (and so producing) 
experience are needed. I also need to articulate what I am feeling as coming 
from my experience, and I need to do it as existential phenomenology advises, 
close to the felt experience and attempting not to interpose many 
preconceptions. Following Gendlin (1968, 1981, 1997a), it is this way of 
relating to experience what makes experience be worked-through, be 
processed. I also need to critically examine my experience as culturally 
enabled so that I can push beyond the routes that hegemonic material-
discursive practices affectively draw me on.  
Conclusion 
To a certain extent the theories that I have used have been created on the 
ruins of the previous ones. Posthumanism over poststructuralism over 
phenomenology. I believe that the central place that phenomenology gave to 
experience was contested by poststructuralism that was suspicious of 
experience and I think that posthumanism was able to take experience again 
but decentring it from a bounded subjectivity. Coherently with my methodology 
this does not mean a linear development that discards the previous 
developments as useless. If we would believe this we would think about the 
concepts as reflections of the world and we would be ‘back’ to ‘before’ 




ways of relating – as apparatuses – that produce the delimitations that make 
particular worlds.  
Nonetheless, the fact that I use posthumanism to think about my methodology 
speaks about where my academic ground is. What allows me to use theories 
that I also criticise without being just incoherent is that I am not ‘following’ them, 
I am using them, I am playing with them. I think of the concepts as apparatuses 
that through intra-acting (with) ‘me’ – at this moment – produce the following: 
With the apparatus of existential phenomenology, the agential cut (Barad, 
2007) creates a reflective subjectivity, a pre-reflective experience and objects 
in the world. Through the apparatus of existential phenomenology, I can use 
my experience as a ground that I try to follow and express as closely as I can 
to the felt bodily experience, bracketing my assumptions as much as possible. 
This can be almost vital when I need to express how I am feeling. It does not 
help me to question the cultural underpinnings that make this experience 
possible and forecloses other possibilities. It does not help me to decentre 
subjectivity, as the notion of affect does, through thinking that experience does 
not belong to neither my reflective nor my pre-reflective consciousness, 
because it just passes through me; in contrast, with existential phenomenology 
I can reflectively find myself in my pre-reflective experiences. With 
phenomenology, I try to bracket my assumptions because I am an established 
subjectivity with assumptions that need bracketing. With affect the worry about 
the need of bracketing does not appear, the assumptions are not ‘mine’. With 
affect I am forced to let go of me; with phenomenology, I need to keep myself 
under scrutiny.  
With the apparatus of poststructuralism, the agential cut creates an experience 
that is not particular of a subject, instead experience is enabled culturally. 
Poststructuralism produces a subject that is spoken through. A subject that is 
invited to push the limits of intelligibility and become otherwise. 
Poststructuralism helps me to question my experience, not to take it as 




discourses. It allows me to contest the discourses that also enable my very 
existence – as I can currently imagine it. With this movement, the possibility of 
becoming otherwise is opened with the ontological risk that this places. 
With the apparatus of posthumanism, the agential cut produces an impersonal 
affect which creates subjectivities trough folding itself. This subjectivity is 
decentred in its very intimacy. I can be aware of what affect as power to act is 
passing through me; how in particular situations I can feel more enlivened, 
angered, depleted, and so on, and think about this feeling not as personal but 
as collective and impersonal; an affect that goes beyond me and that shapes 
my possibilities to act in that moment. Affect helps me to feel paradoxically 
undone and connected. 
These three different conceptualisations and productions do not need to stay 
in their own terrains clearly bounded from each other. Subjective experience 
gets deconstructred by poststructuralism and made inviable by posthumanism 
because there is no bounded subjectivity. I brought back the concept of 
subjective experience in a renewed way in a way that used the three traditions 
and also my psychoanalytic background. I thought that there is still space for 
speaking about a subjective experience even with the decentring of 
posthumanism because I think of the subject as becoming and not as 
bounded. We find ourselves in losing ourselves and there is still a sense of the 
intimacy of subjective experience even when it is, paradoxically, conceived as 
collective. This brought forth my conceptualisation of subjective experience 
that retains the sense of identity that existential phenomenology is so good at 
providing by following the stream of lived experience, understanding that this 
experience does not belong to me but it is collective as the posthumanist 
notion of affect grants; which makes it possible that I feel in contact with both 
something wider and with myself when letting go to my experience as affect. 
Nonetheless, experience as affect can take me to reproduce social dynamics 
that I would rather avoid and to collude in reproducing dominant discourses 




Because of this, I argue for the need of the critical awareness that 














Conclusions sound a bit daunting. I imagine that I am replying to the question: 
So, what have you done with your research?  And I, sitting at my University 
allocated desk, with bits of food around, the warmth of the heating just besides 
me, with the cold, wet and dark day awaiting through the window, with my 
supervisors, Jonathan and Liz, always somehow present in my writing and my 
thinking, with my colleagues typing, browsing, sometimes laughing and 
sharing thoughts and food and coffee, with the material-discursive practices of 
this University, with the written feedback from my supervisors, with my 
vulnerability, my strength, my decisiveness, my sharpness, my disorientation, 
my wanting, my need, my little miseries, with the people that I love, that I 
struggle to love, that I cannot but love, with the social movements that engage 
me, with the examiners that will read this, with my body, with my way of moving 
and with all of the uncountable things that are intra-acting (with) me now, I 
articulate an answer.   
It does not come right away, I feel anxious. What am I doing in articulating an 
answer? Am I pinning down things? Am I reducing them? Am I fixing them? 
Do I make myself for ‘you’, the one that asks me what have I done? I worry 
about that, but I feel that I need to give an answer to move something, to 
ground something else, to use my thesis, to use my thesis in the Winnicottian 
sense (Winnicott, 1971). Maybe until now it has been my transitional object, 
me and not-me at the same time, making me able to play and to imagine, to 
keep thinking. Now, it is different, I edit it, I finish it, I conclude it. My thesis, my 
production goes beyond myself. Because I pronounce its conclusions and 
submit it to let it be an entity in itself that will intra-act with others, it gains its 
proper existence beyond myself and then I can use it.  
So, making sense of ourselves: how to think differently about it through 
reconceptualising reflexivity and experience. This was my project. 
Conceptualising for becoming differently. This was my methodology, because 
in conceptualising and reconceptualising the concepts open up different ways 




Reflexivity and experience reconceptualised  
I have worked on reconceptualising reflexivity. Reflexivity is too often 
understood as an individual, conscious and intentional capacity to think about 
ourselves, our involvements, our assumptions, etc. In contrast to this 
understanding, firstly, I used the poststructural perspective that places 
reflexivity as given through cultural discourses that shape the way in which we 
are aware of ourselves to propose, inspired by Bourdieu, that we can 
reflexively question our assumptions when dwelling in different fields or 
positionings. Thus, I proposed that reflexivity is ignited when we yield to 
foreignness and not as a masterful, individual and intentional activity of 
questioning ourselves. Secondly, I reconceptualised reflexivity as affective 
ways of relating that produce. That is, reflexivity and subjectivity are not 
separated but the subject is produced in a reflexive activity – that does not 
perform from a mastery position but as part of a greater intra-action. Using 
Barad (2007), I proposed that different theories about reflexivity (reflexivities) 
work as apparatuses that make the agential cuts that delineate the boundaries 
of what would be considered a subjectivity, an object, an emotion, culture, and 
a whole world. I offered the threefold questioning device as a meta-reflexive 
tool of asking about how we are relating and what is that producing. Thirdly, 
drawing on the reconceptualisation that I put forward in the previous chapter, 
I proposed to let reflexivity intra-act with diffraction in a way that their 
distinctions become more blurred. Furthermore, I emphasised that we never 
find purely reflexivity (as wanting to grasp ourselves) or purely diffraction; like 
in a diffraction pattern there is light in the darkness and the other way around. 
We shift from using reflexivity (which is never pure reflexivity) to use diffraction 
(which is never purely diffraction) in a moment that cannot be rigidly specified.  
I put forward that clear-cut definitions can produce ways of relating in 
academia where there are followers and indoctrination rather than space to 
think differently. Fourthly, and finally, using my meta-reflexivity, I elaborated 
how even when we want to enact diffracting and decentring practices we, 




Deleuze and Guattari, I develop how slippage is not avoidable, and thus I 
propose to use both concepts and set of practices – reflexivity and diffraction 
– to think about each other.  
The conceptualisation of reflexivity that I produced is a diffracted reflexivity that 
is coherent with a subject that is continuously materially-discursively produced. 
A reflexivity that does not come from an individual masterful subject but from 
a subject that yields to foreignness and to become otherwise in a way that 
cannot control nor anticipate. A reflexivity that is multiple and that produces its 
own contexts including the reflexive subject. My reconceptualisation produces 
the invitation to a meta-reflexivity – to explicitly think about how we are, 
unavoidably, relating to ourselves – that responds to the imperative need to 
see what our ways of relating to ourselves, to others, to texts, and to the world 
in general are producing. A reflexivity that assumes that we are not the master, 
that we do not know or control how we are relating and so we need to 
continuously think about how we are relating and what is that producing. This 
meta-reflexivity is performed understanding, crucially, that the question about 
how we are relating is another way of relating and not in any way a neutral 
operation. It is my proposition that the usefulness of this particular way of 
relating to ourselves that meta-reflexively asks about how we are relating to 
ourselves/others/texts/(…)is to draw attention to how we are part of a wider 
production and bring ourselves to a commitment to how we, our relationships, 
our research, our communities, the environment, the world, are becoming and 
what that is enabling and what is not. That is why I think that it is an imperative 
need to use my meta-reflexivity in this way. Ethically, I think we need to stop 
asking who we are, who the others are, and to start asking what our ways of 
relating are producing and to wonder how we can relate differently to produce 
differently. A vital example of that is how my research puts forward a particular 
way of relating to the concepts and the theories where they are weighted in 
what possibilities they open and how they produce the world – not in their truth-




that is more open to diversity and less keen to policing practices of who is 
following the ‘right’ theories and who is not.  
The proposal on reflexivity as yielding to foreignness is a contribution to the 
field of qualitative inquiry, especially to the authors that give relevance to the 
possibility of questioning our assumptions (Bondi, 2009; Davies et al., 2004; 
Denzin, 1997; Denzin & Lincoln, 2017; Etherington, 2017; Finlay, 2002, 2003, 
2008, 2017; Gemignani, 2017; Pillow, 2003, 2015; G. Rose, 1997; Shaw, 
2016; Wilkinson, 1988). The remaining three chapters that delve into reflexivity 
and diffraction are a contribution to the field of qualitative methodology with 
their drawing on diffraction – and the rejection of reflexivity (Bozalek & 
Zembylas, 2017; Campbell, 2004; Davies, 2014; Davies & Gannon, 2013; 
Gale, 2018; Gale & Wyatt, 2017; Hein, 2016; Jackson, 2017; Jackson & 
Mazzei, 2012b, 2017; Mazzei, 2014; Murris & Bozalek, 2019; Wyatt, 2019). My 
work particularly contributes the possibility to think about reflexivity with 
diffraction and to have a critical perspective on diffraction. All of these chapters 
make a contribution to the conceptualisation of subjectivity through 
poststructural and posthumanist lenses, making also use of psychoanalytic 
theory. Butler (1997b, 2005) and Kristeva (1991) have made advancements in 
this intersection, although mostly through the using Lacanian theory and 
poststructuralism. Finally, each chapter on reflexivity is a contribution to 
psychotherapy because their insights can be explored in the 
psychotherapeutic field – as I briefly do in many places and I will do in the next 
section. Particularly, my reconceptualisation of reflexivity as affective ways of 
relating that produce, and its invitation to a meta-reflexivity, is a contribution to 
psychotherapy because it invites an awareness about how our ways of relating 
are producing the client, ourselves as psychotherapists, what we consider a 
problem, an interpretation, an emotion, and so on. I consider that this is a work 
that started in this thesis but that needs a piece of work on its own to be 




And experience, what did I do with experience? I explored the 
conceptualisations of experience through existential phenomenology, 
poststructuralism and posthumanism to see what they produce, how they 
shape my subjectivity, affects, identity, and so on. What questions they open 
and in general how they produce experience. Finally, I articulated a 
conceptualisation of experience using the three traditions: I think about 
experience in an impersonal manner, as affect that can be taken up by a 
subjectivity producing this very subjectivity in that movement. However, even 
if experience is impersonal, I can still speak about ‘subjective experience’ 
because the subject is not conceptualised as bounded but as becoming: I ‘find’ 
myself, losing myself. Experience as affect is not passive but has a strength 
on its own which goes beyond the control of the subjectivity that is 
experiencing it. The way of taking up this experience is, as existential 
phenomenology grants, blindly through the opacity of the bodily sensations so 
that we follow its stream of life. Nonetheless, affect does not necessarily take 
us to enabling places and we need the critical questioning of experience that 
poststructuralism is so good at to interrogate the productions of experience.  
This is a contribution to the work on experience and subjectivity, especially in 
relation to authors that are using posthumanism for this purpose (Blackman et 
al., 2008; Gale, 2016; Manning, 2009, 2014; Manning & Massumi, 2014; 
Williams, 2010). My particular contribution to these discussions is the 
emphasis in how we can still speak of subjective experience amidst the 
problematisation that posthumanism places on the notion of subjectivity as 
bounded. The reconceptualisation of experience also speaks to 
psychotherapy, providing a new way of understanding a vital concept as 
subjective experience. How this would affect psychotherapeutic theory and 
practice is something that needs further elaboration in future projects.  
Where does this take us/me?  
Making sense of ourselves goes in tandem with producing ourselves. When 




produce ourselves and the world. We do not do this from a masterful position, 
we are always becoming with a greater assemblage. Drawing on Barad (2007), 
when we make sense of ourselves we make an agential cut that produces the 
boundaries of our very subjectivity. ‘We’ – as bounded subjectivities – did not 
make the agential cut, the agential cut is the one that produces these 
differentiations in the first place.  
Furthermore, precisely because we are not the masters in this game, I insist 
on being reflexive about how we also reproduce what we criticise; how we find 
ourselves where we did not expect. I put forward that this acknowledgment 
helps to produce ways of making sense (personal narratives, theories) that 
continue to be open to re-configurations. We are not the masters of this game 
and this has its perks because it makes us able to use (Winnicott, 1971) the 
authors because we see them outside our omnipotence. In this way, we can 
find nutrition in the texts because they offer something that is not already ours. 
I strongly argue that in holding a relational, immanent and performative 
ontoepistemology, the concepts and the theories, are nor needed to be 
regarded as better or worst reflections of the world but as emerging from 
particular material-discursive configurations and producing other material-
discursive configurations or worlds. In that sense, I regard the theories and the 
concepts in relation to the world that they produce, to the possibilities that they 
enable and to the contexts that call for them. I believe that this perspective can 
help to embrace the diversity of theories and possibilities and to further 
articulate rather than categorically reject conceptualisations as not good 
enough.  
What I put forward has important implications for psychotherapy, for research 
and for our lives in general. In the context of psychotherapy, if I take seriously 
that in making sense of ourselves, we produce ourselves, I need to think about 
what my client says – how they are reflexive about themselves – not as 
representing their affective life as if it was a thing in itself already there; instead, 




themselves that is producing their affective life. This is not to say that their 
affective life – their experience – is passive material that is shaped by 
language. Indeed, their bodily experience has a strength on its own that intra-
acts (with) their narratives. Hence, I am proposing not to give the full 
responsibility to our verbal ways of making sense; it is not as constructivists 
would say just about how we interpret the situations, ourselves or others; we 
are far more decentred and connected than that. The making sense is not our 
sovereign creation; instead, our experience – as an impersonal thought (Bion, 
1970)/affect (Williams, 2010) that goes through us – as well as the 
intersubjective dynamics that are active and the material-discursive practices 
that we are part of, have all their strength in relation to how we make sense, 
to how we relate to ourselves. We find ourselves feeling and making sense 
and relating to ourselves in particular ways; we do not decide this, it happens. 
This is not to say that it ‘happens to us’ as if we were the victims or just the 
passive recipients of external forces; ‘we’ are part of it, part of the intra-action, 
part of the world’s becoming. We are far more decentred and connected than 
what we might assume sometimes because this identity, this ‘we’, this ‘I’, is 
constantly being produced in a greater assemblage. In that sense, it is 
important to use this meta-reflexivity that I am proposing to see how the client 
and how we are relating to our own selves and to the other and the space, and 
so on, and what is that producing.  
For example, when my client makes sense of herself as a spoiled little girl for 
asking the presence of her loved ones, I think about how this is not capturing 
how things ‘are’, but it is producing the way in which things ‘are’. Using the 
threefold questioning device that I developed in chapter four: Reflexivities as 
affective ways of relating that produce (that is, using my meta-reflexivity) I think 
that she is relating to herself by judging herself harshly as she could 
transparently see how she essentially is – spoiled, too demanding – and 
needing affectively to reject and control her ‘neediness’ (as if it was an 
essential feature of her). Maybe this way of relating is producing her difficulty 




distance with herself, and so on. Not to mention how her way of being reflexive 
about herself is entangled with me and with all of what is present in the room 
– the spatiality of the chairs, the cultural backgrounds, the material-discursive 
practices of the institutions we are part of, the affective tonalities of our bodies, 
and so on. She is not making sense on her own, as if she could stand 
separately from everything else that is shaping her at the moment. Hence, I 
am, as her psychotherapist, part of what is becoming in that scene and my 
way of intervening is from the inside; If I make an interpretation it is not its 
representational value alone what is impactful but how this interpretation 
generates different productions. The way in which this interpretation will impact 
has to do with all of what is intra-acting at the moment that I can momentarily 
define as, say, the affective tension of our bodies, how my voice sounds, the 
light that enters in the room and the authority invested in the figure of the 
psychotherapist. My presence/thinking/acting/feeling there with the client 
arranges things differently and I need to be attentive to what it is being 
produced and how enabling is that and for what purposes.  
Hence, how the client makes sense is produced by wider affective-relational-
discursive-material practices, and the making sense also produces – through 
making an agential cut that defines boundaries – the subjectivity that utters the 
narrative that makes sense of the situation and all the world around. As a 
psychotherapist, I am in the entanglement and producing in ways that I cannot 
completely control. What I can do is to be curious (to be meta-reflexive) about 
how I find myself and the client and to be attentive and critical of the 
productions of the psychotherapeutic intra-action.  
Psychotherapy moves away from representing and categorising. I do not need 
to ‘find’ a theory or evidence about how humans function as if it was a 
foundational truth. Knowledge is produced and productive and it becomes 
more relevant to think about what it does, what it enables. This perspective 
can help to open to other practices of making sense and making knowledge 




knowledge and a practice it has to do with my consideration that its productions 
in that particular context are rather detrimental and not with a rejection of the 
theory or practice altogether. The ethical dimension is inevitably part of 
knowing: ethic-onto-epistemology, what our knowledge is producing.   
Reflexivity is integrated as an ability that what we would expect a 
psychotherapist to develop. Psychotherapists in training are encouraged to be 
reflexive about themselves, to be able to use themselves in psychotherapy. 
For example, in one of the first assignments of one of the courses on 
Counsellor education here at the University of Edinburgh, students are asked 
to make a reflective biographical account about the development of their 
motivation to become a helper. What does this question produce? Marking 
these assignments, I would say that most of them make narratives of different 
reasons that have led them to choose to study for becoming a helper. They 
are reflexive about themselves in a transparent, and essentialist manner. Just 
in a couple of occasions I have read students that say: “I do not know”, and 
move the reflection in more explorative and questioning manners. I wonder if 
this question helps to produce a more structured identity narrative that reads 
like “because of x, y and z experiences, I have developed my drive to become 
a helper”. I wonder whether another question like: how are you relating to the 
fact that you are studying counselling? Or, how do you relate to the idea of 
becoming a helper? Might enable more exploration and questioning. 
Moreover, if we add to that an indication to include not only the relationships 
with other people but also how wider cultural and material contexts and 
practices are part of their development as a counsellor, that would probably 
collaborate to generate a more critical and politically involved perspective and 
practice in the students.  
The students in the counsellor education at the University practice their 
therapeutic listening in listening triads with other students. In this exercise, they 
are also asked to reflexively think about their experience in the different roles 




to bring their attention to how they are relating to themselves and to each other: 
that is, in my conceptualisation, to use meta-reflexivity. For instance, they can 
be quite nervous about getting it right or performing well. Instead of giving them 
any kind of answer, I invite them to think about what ways of relating to 
themselves and to the talker there are present and how enabling they are, 
what they are producing. For instance, how does the talker feel if I am relating 
to them as needing to grasp what they are feeling so that I can feel reassured? 
Students can quite quickly get that it is important to enable a way of relating to 
the talker and to themselves that allows space for difficult feelings, and 
acceptance of what is emerging, whatever that is. It is still a challenge for me 
to think about how to broaden and transform this understanding to include the 
material-discursive practices as part of what is happening in the room.  
In the research context, if I think about an interview with a participant, I need 
to think about how my questions and ways of responding to their narratives 
and presence, together with all the material-discursive practices that are 
present at the moment are shaping and producing their very narratives, that in 
turn, produce them as a particular kind of subjectivity. I need to wonder what 
their narrative, and my narrative of them, my research, are doing.  
In writing theory, I need to think about what my writing produces, what it 
enables, what it forecloses: what my writing is doing. I do not feel myself as a 
masterful creator; I write in the middle of things, many things write through me, 
the assemblage that I also am writes the texts, writes me, and writes the world. 
Crucially, I think that this decentring is also fundamentally connecting; I find 
myself in losing myself. Furthermore, when I read I do not read as pinning 
down what a text is, but try to use (Winnicott, 1971) it because it goes beyond 
what I can control; it can surprise me. I read diffractively, seeing where the text 
can take me, what worlds it makes appear and how it can change me. An 
adventure rather than a distanced analysis. 
In the personal context, when I give any account of my state, I do not think 




what is intra-acting (with) me at the moment. Importantly, whenever I make 
sense of myself the pressing question appears, what is this producing? For 
instance, if I say: “I have had a very difficult day because these dates affect 
me”, there are cultural discourses on how people should feel, rainy weather, 
affective encounters, a felt lack of vitality and uncountable other things that are 
producing this statement and my subjectivity at this moment. This way of 
making sense of myself “I have had a very difficult day because these dates 
affect me” produces me as an affected subject experiencing a temporal 
difficulty. I think this narrative helps me to frame my feelings but what does it 
not allow me to do?  
In giving relevance to how when we make sense we are not reflecting an 
already existing and bounded affective state, I am not saying that the practices 
of making sense have not value in relation to articulate something of what is 
actually happening. Gendlin (1964, 1968, 1973, 1981, 2003, 2004) makes this 
clear, it is not that the symbolisation that we use to make sense of our 
experience reflects it – as if it was a unit already there – instead, how we 
articulate our experience does something to our experience; the narrative 
makes an impact on something there (experience) even if this experience is 
not shaped or formed. What the posthumanist idea of affect adds to this is that 
the experience is active and not only goes beyond the subjectivity that is living 
it but also produces it. Similarly, I do not argue that I can just have any narrative 
because they are not true or false but performative. Instead, I put forward that 
the different narratives do/produce different things in intra-action with bodily 
feelings. Which narrative we make matters. The crucial insight of Gendlin is 
that when the narrative is articulated ‘following’ from the felt sense, then our 
experience gets worked through and there is a felt change that makes our 
experiencing open and in process, rather than frozen and repeating old 
patterns.  
My emphasis on the questions how are we relating and what does this 




Nonetheless, as I have insisted, the articulation of an answer to this question 
is another way of relating that produces; it is not representing as if capturing 
what is already there. I could articulate infinite answers to this question and all 
of them would have different productions. These questions how am I relating 
and what does this produce? has a reflective and representational flavour even 
in putting forward something performative. I want to assert the productions, to 
say what are the productions; the paradox is there and I cannot resolve it. What 
I emphasise is that these meta-reflexive questions are advantageous because 
they are a way of relating that produces us as part of the world’s becoming; it 
opens the ethical questioning that asks about what we are producing and 
whether that is enabling and for what. Nonetheless, yet again, this questioning 
about how enabling the productions are has a representational flavour even 
when I assert that I cannot answer this questioning in any neutral and objective 
way. There is not an objective ethical compass in which to rely. Every theory 
has an implicit ethic; for some it might be control and prediction to ‘improve’ 
life conditions, justice and equality, dominance and expansion, etc. Evidently 
this thesis is ethically embracing processes of becoming, tolerance towards all 
kinds of foreignness, sustaining tensions rather than polarising, and 
questioning social productions of categorisation, exclusion and in general 
dynamics of domination. Nonetheless, even if I am committed to this ethic, I 
affirm the value of questioning our implicit and explicit ethical commitments to 
be able to keep thinking, and, paradoxically, to keep thinking seems to be my 
ethical compass at the moment.  
I know that I cannot represent my experience as if it was something in itself 
that I can capture and yet I find myself trying to do it. I make sense, I need to 
make sense as if I was capturing what is happening. I look for reflexivity as 
grasping myself, I cannot avoid practices of centring and identity even in 
putting forward that every boundary is continuously produced. I propose to 
embrace this need of mine/of us to generate symbolisations and theories that 
remain open to re-articulations. With relational psychoanalysis (Bromberg, 




the ideals of the different theories – in the case of posthumanism, a subjectivity 
that wants to know who she ‘is’– to be able to keep thinking.  
I am finishing this thesis, after three years and a few months of being immersed 
in it, my first three years and a few months living abroad, speaking and writing 
in my second language, finishing this project and opening up for other projects. 
In finishing this thesis, I feel less of an urgency to make sense of myself as to 
be sure of ‘who I am’, to know what is going to happen next and to be seen for 
‘who I am’. This project does have produced me differently; I do not know 
exactly how, but it feels different.  
My childhood wonderment: Karen, Karen, Karen, who is Karen, anyway? In 
repeating my name its meaning faded, became strange. I do not know who 
Karen ‘is’ and that is fine. I am becoming with; I find me, again and again, 
where I do not expect to. I find myself in losing myself. Without striving for it, I 
learnt to make sense of myself in a looser way, tolerating uncertainty and 
unformed states and that produced myself differently. As well as tolerating the 
pressing need that emerges at times of knowing who I am, who are the others 
and what is happening.  
There are different practices of making sense of oneself: one can be more 
reflexive in a search for reasons and certainties, one can make sense of 
oneself as becoming and not bounded, one can make sense of oneself as 
discursively produced, one can make sense of oneself as driven by biological 
instincts, by relationships, by desire, by ideals, and so on. There are infinite 
ways of making sense of ourselves and so of producing ourselves differently. 
We find ourselves enacting them; we do not masterfully decide how we make 
sense of ourselves and so how we become. Nonetheless, ethically, I 
emphasise the importance of thinking about how we are relating, how we are 
making sense of ourselves, others and the world and the productions that this 
relating has. I propose that a tolerance and an acknowledgment of the different 
ways in which we make sense and so produce ourselves, even when we 




stagnant in a certainty that congeals us even when – maybe more when – 
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